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1Chapter One
Assimilation in Question
Introduction
Studies of the Chinese and their relations with the indigenous majority in 
Indonesia have, for decades, been dominated by the discourse of assimilation. 
In the 1970s, the Indonesian term for ‘assimilation’, asimilasi, gave away to the 
term pembauran,1 but the discourse remained unchanged. Pressure on Chinese 
to assimilate has continued to shape public debate and media coverage (Tan, 
1995:13-26). Why has the assimilation trend been so persistent in Indonesia, 
while it has never been a prominent issue in the rest of Southeast Asia?
Unlike in Thailand and the Philippines, where most Chinese have merged 
with the indigenous population, the Chinese who have lived in Indonesia for 
many generations have remained a distinct ethnic group (Skinner, 1957; 1960; 
Weightman, 1960; Ang See, 1995). The persistence of a separate Chinese 
community is perceived as an expression of their unwillingness to merge into the 
Indonesian society. This perception is arguable as it ignores the fact that there 
are quite a number of Chinese who have integrated themselves into the local 
communities. They are not able to speak Chinese languages, they are ignorant 
of Chinese traditions and have adopted the local culture. They are moving away 
from traditional Chinese religion and converting to Christianity and Islam, and 
inter-ethnic marriage is not uncommon. The very low numbers of registered 
Chinese in the National Census of 2000 implies that many ethnic Chinese-
1 The root of this word is baur, meaning to mix. In the context of assimilation in Indonesia, it means ‘to as-
similate’. The term is embedded in a discourse about Chinese.
2Indonesians chose not to identify themselves as Chinese.2 In the light of these 
indications, it appears that reasons other than the Chinese unwillingness to merge 
are also responsible for their continued separateness, such as the government’s 
discriminatory treatment against the Chinese and the reluctance of the indigenous 
majority to fully accept the Chinese as their fellow citizens.
Many Indonesians and Chinese who advocate assimilation consider dis-
crimination against the Chinese and anti-Chinese violence to be the result of 
the failure of the Chinese to assimilate into the host society. In their opinion, the 
Chinese would not become targets of discrimination and violence if they assimilated 
into the indigenous society to a degree that they were not distinguishable from 
the indigenous people. In other words, solving the ‘Chinese problem’ requires the 
disappearance of Chinese as a distinct ethnic group.3 
In this study, I question three major assumptions that have framed the 
discourse on assimilation, that the Chinese are a homogeneous community, 
that assimilation is the ultimate solution to the ‘Chinese problem’, and that the 
Chinese must eventually, or will,  assimilate into the indigenous society.
The present study of the Chinese in Yogyakarta is an attempt to understand 
how different sections of the Chinese community vary in their accommodation 
of the pressure for total assimilation, the pressure to narrow the economic gap 
between them and the rest of the population, negative stereotypes of the Chinese 
or racial prejudices, anti-Chinese violence, and state discrimination. It aims at 
showing the differential experiences, reactions and strategies of different sections 
of Chinese in Yogyakarta.
This study proceeds on three fundamental assumptions. First, the Chinese 
in Indonesia are far from a homogeneous group, therefore, we cannot speak of 
the Chinese. Second, given the range of diversity amongst the Chinese, it is not 
realistic to assume that all Chinese face the same problems or would be likely 
to adopt similar strategies. Third, there is differentiation in accommodation 
amongst Chinese communities. 
2 See BPS, 2001; for discussions on the low figure of the Chinese population, see Suryadinata, 2003; Mackie, 
2005.
3 There is, of course, remarkable similarity to the 19th century discussion regarding the European Jews. See 
Chirot, 1997.
3Before continuing, I would like to discuss what is meant by ‘the Chinese 
problem’: who is involved and in what ways? This issue is viewed from the 
perspective of the government and indigenous Indonesians, as well as the 
perspective of the Chinese.
‘The Chinese Problem’
“For though only two million strong the Chinese in this country are posing a real national 
problem, serious enough to be regarded as a direct threat to the economic and political 
survival of the eighty million autochthonous Indonesians” (Muaja, 1958:5).4
It is often said that the Chinese constitute 3 per cent of population, but control 
70 per cent of Indonesia’s economy. Journalists and academics have repeatedly 
referred to this generalisation without bothering to verify it. Wibisono, Director 
of the Indonesian Business Data Centre, argues that the figure does not accurately 
reflect the economic position of the Chinese in Indonesia. The private Chinese 
sector is smaller than both the state-owned sector and that of the multinational 
corporations (MNCs) (1995:87). According to Aditjondro (1998), the distinction 
between Chinese and non-Chinese has been blurred in a web of interlocking 
networks of shareholders and directorates that include the relatives of Suharto 
and the army, the country’s former rulers. Besides, it is not the Chinese who 
dominate the private sector conglomerates, but a handful of Chinese business 
families. However, few people seem able or willing to make this distinction. The 
perception of Chinese economic domination remains an undebatable fact and 
represents the seed of the ‘Chinese problem’.
Tan (1991:114; 1995:16) attempts to define the ‘Chinese Problem’ as the 
presence of a group of people of foreign descent who are still perceived as alien and 
who play a dominant role in the economy, which is disproportionately favourable 
to them. At the same time, the indigenous majority perceives that the Chinese 
Indonesian have a superiority complex, which is expressed in their tendency to 
be exclusive, that is, to segregate themselves socially and residentially. It is this 
perception that creates problems for the Chinese community.
4 Muaja was a correspondent of Antara News Agency and a member of the propaganda department of the 
All-Indonesian National Economic Conference (KENSI). For an account on KENSI, see Go, 1984:147.
4The perceived negative characteristics of the Chinese in general and Chinese 
economic domination have contributed to anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia 
(Muaja, 1958:29-33; Wertheim, 1959:79; The, 1966:1-32). The negative image 
of the Chinese has been aggravated by accusations that the success of Chinese 
businesses has been achieved through unfair competition, collusion with power 
holders and dubious methods, and that their success was at the expense of the 
welfare of indigenous peoples. These prejudices have generated envy, resentment, 
hostility, and hatred towards Chinese businesses, which at times has exploded into 
outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence.5 However, hostility towards the Chinese has 
not been confined to identifying them as economic competitors. Collective acts 
of violence against the Chinese may have no apparent connection with economic 
competition. In each case, the Chinese have on occasion been a convenient target 
against whom aggression for whatever reason could be vented. Acts of violence 
against the Chinese are often interpreted as an expression of the resentment of 
the poor against the rich, or resentment at their exclusivity. However, this anti-
Chinese feeling affects all Chinese – the rich as well as the poor.
Although Chinese in Indonesia are considered economically strong, they 
are politically vulnerable. They are easily turned into scapegoats in various socio-
political scenarios that involve social frustration or economic discontent, and 
in attempts by politicians to manipulate anti-Chinese sentiments for their own 
purposes.
The perception of the Chinese as a ‘problem’ by the government and the 
indigenous population has, in turn, generated problems for the Chinese. In order 
to solve the ‘Chinese problem’, laws and decrees were issued to regulate the lives 
of the Chinese, which in turn created difficulties for them, particularly during the 
New Order (1966-1998). As a consequence of this anti-Sinicism policy, ethnic 
Chinese citizens have been subject to legislative and administrative discrimination.6 
For example, it was prohibited to celebrate festivals related to Chinese religion 
and tradition in public spheres. Chinese Indonesians faced bureaucratic obstacles 
when they applied for a passport, a business license, or permit for social and 
5 For a comprehensive analysis on anti-Chinese outbreaks in Indonesia between 1959 and 1968, see Mackie, 
1976: chapter 3. Since colonial times, the Chinese dominance in trade has been challenged by indigenous 
rivals, often leading to physical violence. See Castles, 1967; Kartodirdjo, 1973:142-185.
6 Discriminative legislation had been in effect prior to the New Order.
5cultural activities (Tan, 1991:116; Suryadinata, 1993:88-91). They are often 
obliged to fulfil more requirements than are otherwise necessary or to pay more 
than the official price. In the field of education, a quota system is enforced to 
restrict the numbers of Chinese admitted to state schools and universities.
Although anti-Chinese feelings and legislation affect all Chinese in Indonesia 
including the economically weak, the Chinese vary in addressing these issues. 
The following debate between those promoting assimilation and those defending 
integration illustrates their respective perspectives.
‘Assimilation’ versus ‘Integration’
Once Indonesia achieved independence in 1945, the Chinese in Indonesia entered 
a new socio-political environment to which they had to adjust. The new situation 
demanded that they demonstrate their loyalty to, and identify themselves with, 
the new state. Within the Chinese community, different views emerged on how 
to adapt to the new circumstances and on what the independent Indonesian 
state required of them. A debate arose between those who favoured ‘assimilation’ 
and those argued for ‘integration’ (Somers, 1965; Coppel, 1976; Suryadinata, 
1979).
The concept of assimilation first became the centre of controversy amongst 
the Chinese in Indonesia in the early 1960s, when pro-assimilation Chinese 
launched a statement in the magazine Star Weekly (26 March 1960) favouring 
assimilation as the only solution to the Chinese minority dilemma. In launched 
a polemic in that journal during the succeeding months.7 The assimilation 
movement established a firm base when a number of assimilationists (Lauw Chuan 
To, Ong Hok Ham, Kwik Hway Gwan) organised a conference at Bandungan, 
Central Java, in January 1961, which issued the Piagam Asimilasi, Charter of 
7 For a discussion on the origins of assimilation ideas, see Somers, 1965:257-9; Coppel, 1976:51-55; Surya-
dinata, 1979:98-111. Coppel also links the birth of the assimilation concept to the aftermath of the imple-
mentation of PP.10 of 1959 (government regulation which banned Chinese traders from rural area), which 
indicated to many Chinese Indonesians the need to protect themselves and distance themselves from alien 
Chinese. 
6Assimilation.8 The Charter asserted that the Chinese must cease to be a socially 
and culturally discrete group; they should be absorbed into the the indigenous 
society. This could be achieved by dissociating themselves from Chinese tradition, 
abandoning their cultural traits, changing their Chinese names to Indonesian 
ones, and marrying indigenous Indonesians. The assimilationists argued that this 
was the best way for the Chinese to be fully accepted by Indonesians.
By launching their campaign, these assimilationists were chal lenging 
the views of the Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarnegaraan Indonesia (Baperki), 
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship,9 which was at that time, the 
dominant mass organisation in the Chinese community.10 Baperki’s leaders 
defined their position as integrasi, ‘integration’.11 It favoured cultural pluralism, 
retaining their own culture within the framework of Indonesian citizenship. 
It meant that Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent should be accepted as a 
group with their own social and cultural institutions within the multicultural 
Indonesian society. The integrationists argued that the Chinese were equal to any 
other Indonesian suku or ethnic group, e.g., the Javanese, Sundanese, Balinese, 
and Batak, and any demand that they abandon their cultural distinctiveness was 
regarded as discriminatory (Siauw, 1982).
The polemic between the assimilationists and the integrationists overlapped 
and to some extent masked an important difference between them. The 
assimilationists were identified with the anti-communists, while the Baperki 
leadership was associated with the progressive left in the increasingly polarised 
8 According to this charter, assimilation means the disappearance of the Chinese as a distinct ethnic group. 
Therefore, the Chinese had to abandon their ethnic identity and merge into Indonesian society. See Jahja, 
1983:13.
9 Baperki was established in March 1954 by a number of prominent Chinese (Siauw Giok Tjhan, Oei Tjoe 
Tat, Khoe Woen Sioe, and Yap Thiam Hien). Its aims were the promotion of a proper citizenship for, and 
the elimination of discrimination against, the Chinese in Indonesia. Its membership was open to any Indo-
nesian citizen. In reality, however, its leaders and members were overwhelmingly Chinese. Although Baperki 
contested the national election of 1955, and had members in the parliament, its leaders argued that it was 
not intended to be a minority political party (Coppel 1983:43).
10 According to Siauw Tiong Djin (1999:306), the background of the movement was more complicated than 
a mere response to Baperki’s proposed solution to the Chinese problem.
11 Williams (1966:114) who considers assimilation to be the process by which overseas Chinese become ori-
ented toward their Southeast Asian homelands, concludes that Baperki was fundamentally assimilationist. It 
is worth noting however, that asimilasi and integrasi were terms that the Chinese leaders themselves used to 
label their political views in the 1960s, and were not necessarily in line with academic definitions.   
7politics of Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.12 After the military take-over by Suharto, 
during anti-communist purges in 1965-66, many Chinese became targets of 
mass-violence. Although both groups expressed their concerns, they interpreted 
the clash from different angles. Baperki made a strong protest to the authorities, 
accusing them of being unable to protect the Chinese. The assimilationists 
perceived the violence as the consequence of the Baperki’s affiliation with the 
communist party, and the failure of its multicultural policy. The battle of the 
arguments between the assimilationists and the integrationists ended with the 
banning of Baperki by the new military regime, which favoured the view of assi-
milationists.
The New Order Policy of Assimilation
After 1965, with the emergence of the New Order, which was domina ted by the 
Indonesian army, the government, to a large extent, adopted the views of the 
assimilationists, while the views of Baperki were discredited because of their as-
sociation with Sukarno’s Old Order13 and because it was supposedly a tool of the 
PKI.14  Official policy was directed towards encouraging the Chinese to assimilate 
and restrictions were placed on any public manifestation of Chinese culture.
The New Order government promulgated the Basic Policy for the Solution 
of the Chinese Problem in June 1967, which implemented a series of regulations 
aimed at accelerating the process of assimilation. These measures reflected 
the government’s interpretation of the term ‘assimilation’, that is the eventual 
disappearance of Chinese as a socio-cultural entity. This meant that the Chinese 
were to cease existence as a group that was culturally distinct from the Indonesian 
majority and were to dissociate themselves from Chinese traditions. In August 
1967, the Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina (SCUT), the Special Staff for Chinese Affairs, 
was established with the task of coordinating and monitoring the implementation 
of the regulations (Coppel, 1983:131).
12 Although Baperki was not technically affiliated with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesian 
Communist Party, its political stance was identified in the public mind with the forces of the left.
13 Suharto used this term to contrast his administration (New Order) with that of his predecessor, Sukarno.
14 In fact, the notion of assimilation was not entirely new in government circles. It has been advocated even 
during the struggle of independence. See Tabrani, 1950. The assimilationist movement of the 1960s had 
been given a government-sponsored home in the Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB), the Institute 
for the Promotion of National Unity. See Coppel, 1983:55.
8The New Order policy of assimilation was ambivalent, and contradictory. 
This was evident in the Presidential Decision No. 240, issued on 6 December 
1967, concerning the Basic Policy on Indonesian Citizens of Foreign Descent.15 
The decision states repeatedly that Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Asing 
(WNI Keturunan), Indonesian citizens of foreign descent, have the same legal 
position as other Indonesians (bangsa Indonesia lainnya), that discrimination 
between WNI Keturunan (i.e. Indonesian nationals of foreign descent, including 
Chinese, Eurasians, Indians or Arabs) and indigenous (asli) Indonesians is 
prohibited and impermissible. However, there are some clauses, which conflict 
with the proclaimed principles of non-discrimination. For example, in clause 5, 
only the Indonesian nationals of foreign descent who used Chinese names were 
singled out and required to change their names to Indonesian ones, while those 
who used European, Indian or Arab names were allowed to retain their names 
(Coppel, 2002:22).
Similar contradictions can be seen in the Presidential Instruction No.14 
of 1967, a policy document on Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs. The first 
clause of this decree opens with a reference to the constitutional guarantee of the 
freedom of Indonesian citizens to embrace a religion and to worship in accordance 
with that religion and its beliefs. However, observance of Chinese religion could 
only be conducted privately within the family or individually. Public observance 
of Chinese religion festivities of any kind was not permitted.16
In general, the New Order was very authoritarian. As a result, the desirability 
of assimilation as a policy goal went largely unchallenged during the three decades 
of the New Order. However, after the end of Suharto’s New Order in 1998, the 
old debates over whether Chinese should assimilate or integrate themselves into 
the Indonesian nation have re-emerged. The new freedom of the press allowed 
the media to provide an arena for the debates that had been silenced during the 
New Order.
15 There is a substantial collection of the New Order policies, statements, and laws (many of them are taken 
from Bakin 1979-80), which are attached as appendices to Coppel’s paper (2002).
16 For the discussion on this ambivalent policy, see Tan, 1991:116-118; Coppel, 2002:21-25. 
9Terms and Concepts
Integration, Assimilation and Accommodation
To be integrated into a society means to be part of a society without losing 
one’s identity and the characteristics or of his/her birth language and culture. 
Implicit in the concept of integration is the allowance for the minorities to retain 
whatever religious and cultural characteristics they choose – provided these 
characteristics are not incompatible with the basic values of the society-at-large. 
Therefore, integration is not a leveling process, as assimilation is, but rather 
a process in which people have equal opportunities in a society with cultural 
diversity and in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. It signals approval of a system 
in which there is participation on the basis of equality, within the framework of 
common legal and political institutions, but with recognition for diversity and 
specificity (Bullivant, 1983:243).
Accommodation is a term sociologists use to denote “the process by which 
competing and conflicting individuals and groups adjust their relationships 
to each other in order to overcome the difficulties which arise in competition, 
contravention or conflict” (Fong, 1959: 7). Accommodation has been described 
as a process of adjustment, that is, an organisation of social relations and attitudes 
to prevent or to reduce conflict, to control competition, and to maintain a basis 
of security in the social order for persons and groups of divergent interests and 
types to allow them to conduct their daily activities.
Contrary to integration and accommodation, assimilation is not based on 
recognition of the right to be different. Assimilation requires that a minority 
group, or immigrants and their descendants, should be absorbed into the 
majority, becoming an integral part of the host society. To be assimilated into a 
population means to become indistinguishable, for all practical purposes, from its 
other members. Thus, it demands that the minority to abandon their distinctive 
traits. Assimilation can be seen as a social process characterised by minimalising 
differences, as well as by reinforcing unity in action, attitude, and mental processes 
with respect to common interests and goals. As individuals become assimilated, 
they lose their distinctiveness and become one uniform group; they identify 
themselves with one another as having similar goals, interests, attitudes, and 
sentiments. Foreigners are assimilated when they think and act more and more 
10
like a member of the host group (Weigthman, 1960:2-4). When they fulfil the 
same role as the majority population, share the same cultural values, internalise 
the same expectation patterns, think of themselves as members of the host society, 
and are regarded as such by others, then they have become full members of the 
host society.
Assimilation, as distinguished from accommodation, implies a more 
thorough transformation of group and personal identities, which takes place 
gradually under the influence of social contacts of the most concrete and intimate 
sort. Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion, in which persons 
and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or 
groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them 
in a common cultural life (Park & Burgess, 1921).
The Chinese and Pribumi
There are several terms used in academic works to refer to the Chinese 
in Indonesia: Indonesian Chinese, Chinese Indonesian, Sino-Indonesian, and 
ethnic Chinese. The Indonesian government and its population usually refer 
to Chinese Indonesian as either WNI Keturunan, Indonesian citizens of foreign 
descent; non-pribumi, non-indigenous; or simply Cina, Chinese. After the fall 
of Suharto, the term Tionghoa, which many Chinese prefer, was promoted to 
replace Cina, which is considered derogatory.17 
Although ‘ethnic Chinese’ is an appropriate term, it is awkward for repeated 
use, so for convenience sake, the term ‘Chinese’ will be used in the remainder of 
this study. The term ‘indigenous’ will be used to refer to Indonesians of indigenous 
descent, not in reference to aboriginal inhabitants of a territory, but for practicality 
in differentiating between the Chinese and other Indonesian ethnic groups as 
subjects of discussion.18 The term ‘community’ used in this study is arbitrary. 
Ethnic Minority and the Nation-State
In societies where nationalism is presented as an impartial ideology, ethnicity 
can be seen as a threat of national cohesion. The conflict between ethnicity 
17 Debates on which term is more proper - Cina or Tionghoa  - flourished among the Chinese at the beginning 
of Reformasi era (Dahana, 1998). See also Coppel & Suryadinata, 1970.
18 “Just as ‘being Indonesian’ was (and is) not something ‘natural’ or biological, but was (and is) something 
created by modern history” (Anderson, 2002:19). See also Renan, 1996.
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and nationalism can also be described as a conflict between a dominating and 
a dominated ethnic group within the framework of a nation-state (Eriksen, 
2002:119-120). The state tends to be dominated politically by the elite of the 
ethnic majority, though not per se. In this context, mechanisms of exclusion 
and ethnic discrimination are more likely to emerge rather than mechanisms 
of inclusion and equality. Ethnic variation is often defined by the dominant 
ethnic groups as something that is inappropriate within the nation-state, or a 
‘problem’.
In Indonesia, according to Brown (1994), ethnicity has been used as a 
means of mobilising the indigenous majority. Its fusion with the cleavages of 
class, culture, and religion reinforces the differences between the minority and 
the majority. The quest for national unity finds its inspiration in the idea of a 
united indigenous identity and predominance. Whenever politically necessary, 
the central identity encouraged is that of the majority. As institutional boundaries 
of ethnicity cannot be crossed, the Chinese are not accepted as indigenous, not 
even when they convert to the religion of the majority or adopt the indigenous 
way of life. The various discriminatory policies towards the Chinese, which seek 
to subjugate non-indigenous cultural identities, have often been presented as 
being necessary for national unity (Lombard, 1997:115-31).
Since the birth of the Indonesian nation-state, the rights of the Chinese to 
participate in what Anderson (1991) terms the ‘common project of Indonesian 
nationalism’ have been neglected. At the time of independence, the Chinese 
were hardly mentioned in speeches and manifestos relating to the difficulties of 
ethnic and regional diversity for national unity.19 The Chinese have occupied 
a problematic position in the discourses of Indonesian national identity, since 
it is perceived that they have no historical roots in Indonesian plurality. This 
is evident in the exclusion of the Chinese in the icon of Indonesian identity 
that boasts of the country’s cultural identity, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah, the 
Beautiful Indonesia Miniature Park. While the park presents emblems of ethnic 
and cultural diversity from all parts of the archipelago, a Chinese presence is 
nowhere to be found in the park.
19 See Feith and Castle, 1970. Few political parties in the pre-war period accepted Chinese as their members 
(Coppel, 1983).
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The following discussion is a brief overview of several studies on Chinese in 
Indonesia over the past fifty years. For the purpose of this study, only studies that 
related to assimilation and the Yogyakarta Chinese community will be highlighted. 
These studies were selected to identify the major issues they addressed and which 
issues remain unaddressed.
Studies on Assimilation in Indonesia
There are few studies on assimilation before the New Order.20 Tan’s study on the 
Chinese in Sukabumi (1963) and Go’s study on the Chinese in Tangerang (1966), 
both in West Java, are among the few. Tan (1963:227) came to the conclusion 
that although there was a high degree of acculturation, the peranakan21 Chinese 
in Sukabumi were still far from assimilated into the larger society. According 
to Tan, it was because the indigenous cultural elements that they adopted were 
incorporated and merged within a fundamentally Chinese framework, thereby 
creating a new syncretism. She interpreted this phenomenon as accommodation, 
which she defined as a working relationship between groups that insist on 
preserving their own identities and interests.
Based on a thorough investigation, Go concluded that integration of the 
Chinese in Tangerang had not reached the extent of assimilation in the sense that 
the Chinese lived in the same way as the majority of the Indonesian population, 
sharing the same cultural values. They still practiced traditional Chinese religion 
and there was only one Chinese in the whole village who had converted to 
Islam. Nevertheless, Go concluded in the late 1960s that the Tangerang Chinese 
culture reflected a greater degree of assimilation. Although the doorposts of 
their dwellings had Chinese inscriptions, none of the residents was able to speak 
Chinese. Even so, stereotyped racial prejudices penetrated into this area, as anti-
Chinese outbreaks occurred in 1924, and again in 1941 and 1946.
20 Go Gien Tjwan (1968:44) wrote that “very little attention has been directed towards the issue of assimilation 
in Indonesia, but it is this particular question which has become of primary importance in the post-Sukarno 
period.”
21 Peranakan are considered to be more acculturated and Chinese Indonesian and less affiliated with traditional 
Chinese culture.
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Indonesian academic studies of the Chinese, particularly those conducted 
during the New Order period, were almost entirely dominated by the assimilation 
framework. Based on her review of the literature, Thung Ju-Lan (1999:3-23) 
concluded that over the last fifty years there has been a uniform approach in 
viewing the position of the Chinese in Indonesia, in line with the government 
policy on assimilation. Books on the Chinese written by Indonesian scholars 
contain an assimilation bias. The authors wrote the books with the intention of 
promoting assimilation as the only solution to the so-called Chinese problem. As 
Oetomo (1989:44) wrote earlier, “One is struck by how often the word ‘problem’ 
is used by indigenous Indonesians in titles of their books.”
During the period after the Old Order, Poerwanto conducted studies on 
the Chinese minority in Blora, Central Java (1973) and in Singkawang, West 
Kalimantan (1990). He followed the concept of assimilation, which requires the 
migrants to abandon the culture of their origins and to adopt the culture of 
the host society. From his study, he found that the obstacles to the process of 
assimilation were a lack of sense of belonging, loyalty, and solidarity among the 
Chinese towards the Indonesian nation. Therefore, he suggested that there should 
be a more serious effort from the government to cultivate national consciousness 
among the Chinese (Poerwanto 1976).
The fact that two former ministers from Suharto’s cabinet wrote books on 
the assimilation issue indicates the concern among the Indonesian political elite. 
In his book, Warga Baru: Kasus Cina di Indonesia (New Citizens: Chinese Case in 
Indonesia, 1985), Siswono emphasised that the success of assimilation depended 
on the willingness of the Chinese to assimilate into the indigenous Indonesian 
society. He also suggested the need of a policy to promote the development of 
indigenous entrepreneurs. A similar opinion can be found in the Taher’s book, 
Masyarakat Cina: Ketahanan Nasional dan Integrasi Bangsa di Indonesia, (Chinese 
Society: National Defence and National Integration in Indonesia, 1997). 
According to Taher, the obstacles to the assimilation process lay in economic life. 
He argued that the Chinese would never be fully assimilated into the indigenous 
society as long as there was an economic gap between the Chinese and the 
indigenous population.
In another study on the Chinese in Jakarta, Thung Ju-Lan (1998) re-
examined the assimilation policy in Indonesia. She argued that the assimilation 
framework enforced by the New Order government was neither realistic nor 
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applicable. Given evidence of forced or artificial assimilation, she concluded 
that the New Order programmes of assimilation failed to address the ‘Chinese 
problem’.
Studies on assimilation, following Oetomo’s analysis (1989:44), belong to 
the approach that emphasised pembauran, or assimilation, as the solution to the 
‘Chinese problem’. These ‘problem-oriented’ studies were undertaken to evaluate 
the success or failure of assimilation. Interestingly, as one might expect, the majority 
of those who wrote these ‘problem-oriented’ papers were indigenous observers or 
Chinese who were close to the government or advocated the assimilation policy 
(Lie, 1971; Jahja, 1985; Tan, 1997).22 
Although this study is about assimilation and deals with the ‘Chinese 
problem’, it adopts a different approach. Given the context of the New Order 
regime’s forced assimilation policy, this study focuses on how the pressure to 
assimilate affected members of the Chinese communities in Yogyakarta, and on 
the diversity of strategies that developed in response to the pressures (both from 
the government and the indigenous society).
Studies on the Yogyakarta Chinese
There are four studies on the Yogyakarta Chinese that serve as references for this 
study. The earliest one is Liem’s study (1960) on the position of the peranakan 
Chinese as a minority group. He argued that the existence of a separate Chinese 
minority group was not formed on the basis of race and religion, but as a result 
of the development of interrelated political, economic, historical, educational, 
and psy chological factors. Basically, the way of life of the peranakan Chinese and 
the majority of indigenous Indonesians was not different. The differences they 
did have fell within the range of normal variation. However, there was a desire 
in the Chinese community to accommodate the differences either by natural 
assimilation or integration. Natural assimilation was promoted by the younger 
generation, while integration was supported by the old generation.
22 Suryadinata’s survey (1978a) mentioned a few exceptions, the most notable of which was the writing of 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1960), which was banned during the Old and New Orders. There were also other 
analytical studies by indigenous academics, such as Siahaan (1974) and Rakindo (1975) that did not per-
ceive the presence of the Chinese in Indonesia as a problem.
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Hardjono (1970) conducted a historical-sociological study of the peranakan 
Chinese. His work was an attempt to compose an intelligible picture of the 
human aspects of Yogyakarta. Although this study did not give much detail 
about the contemporary Chinese community, it did provide an important base 
for understanding the history of the Chinese in Yogyakarta. 
In the 1980s, Hariyono carried out a sociological study on cultural 
assimilation between the peranakan Chinese and the Javanese in urban kampungs23 
of Yogyakarta. He focused his research on how the Chinese had changed to the 
point that they were ‘no longer Chinese’. He measured ‘Chinese-ness’ by a number 
of variables, including  use of the Chinese language, appreciation of Chinese songs 
and films, frequency of family visiting and gathering, and practice of Chinese 
traditions. He found that there was increasing self-determination in marriage and 
occupation, equal appreciation of sons and daughters, less traditional concern with 
the extended family, and declining practice or observance of Chinese manners 
and rituals (e.g. greeting other members of the family, rituals of worship). In his 
opinion, these changes have resulted in a decreased exclusivity in the Chinese 
community, and have influenced their acceptance for mixed ethnic marriages. 
However, it is interesting that while the Chinese have become ‘less Chinese’, and 
the occurence of mixed marriage was high, the level of social interaction between 
the Chinese and their neighbours remained relatively low.
The extraordinarily extensive historical research conducted by Didi 
Kwartanada (1997) was extremely helpful, particularly concerning the period 
he studied, i.e., the Japanese occupation. He concluded that it seemed that the 
Chinese minority never had any choice other than to adapt and collaborate with 
the power holders at that time (1997:545).
The studies described above present a comprehensive picture of a section 
within the Chinese community by providing detailed descriptions of their 
economic activities, family lives and kinship relations, education, and religion. 
Some studies provide knowledge only about aspects of life in the Chinese 
community itself and have little to do with their relationship with the larger 
society. In other words, there has been a strong tendency to look at the Chinese 
23 The Kampung, urban neighbourhood, is not necessarily identical with the administrative residential units or 
wards.
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in isolation. The socio-political context of the Chinese communities is regarded 
to be of minor importance.
This study does not focus on the nitty-gritty of Chinese everyday life, but 
aspires to capture the diversity amongst Chinese communities. I discuss specific 
issues or particular problems in view of their accommodation to the pressures 
for assimilation. I place them in the wider social context and examine varying 
responses to the problems that emerged from their relations with the government 
and the indigenous society. In short, this study emphasises the heterogeneity 
of the communities and is fundamentally outward looking. This will, I hope, 
contribute to a more accurate understanding of the Chinese in Indonesia, which 
has often been distorted by stereotyping.
Prior to discussing the research questions and methodology, an explanation 
of the arguments made in this study will be presented.
Arguments
The assimilation model obscures the complexity of the human ex perience. Its 
rationality appears to be parallel with ideas of moder nisation, which are based on 
the idea of the nation-state as a culturally homogenous entity, equally accessible to 
everyone and exhaustively determinant of its bearers’ view and behavior. Although 
deviance is acknowledged, the assumption is that Indonesia will succeed in nation 
building only if all of its citizens share the same model culture that is internalised 
in virtually finalised form. This is, however, only one part of the story.
Assimilation, as the conventional description of the management of the 
Chinese in Indonesia, does not capture the dynamics of the accommodation 
processes and the cultural reformation occurring within the various sectors of 
Chinese community. The dominance of assimilation discourse limited the 
discussion to a single narrow perspective. This kind of focused discourse obscures 
the various ways people deal with their social environment. Therefore, rather 
than speaking in a uniform manner about all Chinese and assuming that all 
Chinese respond to their socio-political situation in an identical manner, we must 
develop a more culturally and sociologically realistic understanding of Chinese 
life in Indonesian society that proceeds on the assumption that culture is not “the 
undivided property of the whole society” (Bourdieu, 1977:73), but is instead 
subject to contestation and divergent interpretations.
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Recent psycho-cultural anthropology has shown how human subjectivity is 
constituted by a number of dialectical influences, such as the interaction of cultural 
symbolism, individual biography, biological disposition, embodied social habits, 
and deliberative thought. In this perspective, culture is not a finished social fact, 
materialised by passive cultural subjects. Cultural knowledge is accommodated 
into an already complex world of emotion, cognition, and previously assimilated 
social knowledge. Public culture, therefore, is not the same thing as individual 
subjectivity, and not the only thing that influences an individual’s interest, 
judgment, or disposition (Hefner, 1998:4). Even when they come from a similar 
social background, members of the same society can engage and practice their 
traditions in varied and, sometimes, even opposing ways.
In the process of nation-building, ethnic identities are selectively moulded 
in the construction and enforcement of institutional boundaries of ethnicity 
in Indonesia. To varying degree, ethnic cleavages are enforced as a means of 
mobilising and securing the allegiance and unity of the indigenous majority. 
Arising from the complex interplay of processes in the historical, socio-economic, 
and political milieu, ethnic accommodation is achieved through informal and 
personal political influences, economic activity, and cultural reproduction. For 
centuries, the Chinese in Yogyakarta have demonstrated that being different 
does not preclude being good citizens. They just express citizenship differently. 
With Indonesia in the process of becoming a multicultural state, there is a need 
to consider new idioms in the construction of Indonesian nationalism and 
belonging, and to develop a novel mode of expression for differences, within 
which being Chinese is included. 
Research Questions
Contrary to studies speaking about the Chinese, this study aims to understand 
how Chinese in Yogyakarta vary in their responses to the pressure to assimilate, 
their perceptions and coping strategies. The central questions addressed are: How 
do various categories of Chinese face different kinds and degrees of pressures 
to assimilate with the majority society? How do they cope with them and what 
problems do they face in coping with those pressures? More specific questions 
to be asked are: What strategies do they employ to maintain their economic 
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interests? How have they responded to the pressure to abandon their cultural 
identity? What obstacles or restrictions did they encounter and how did they deal 
with them? What kinds of social organisations did they build after the Chinese-
based organisations were banned? While their political activities were restricted, 
how did they channel their political aspirations and participation?
Although the community is under strong pressure to follow a specific course, 
groups and individuals always have a choice. The options are not simply black or 
white, or to follow or to reject. Individuals may prefer to remain in the middle or 
in the grey area, or it may be a  matter of when they think they need to cooperate 
and when cooperation is not necessary, in what kind of circumstances, and how 
long will they wait to cooperate  with given measures. This study attempts to 
examine how Chinese Indonesian citizens in Yogyakarta determine where the 
limits are, what they can do within those limits, as well as what they can do to 
extend the limits.24
Methods and Fieldwork
The choice to study the Chinese in Yogyakarta was initially quite personal. While 
others identify me as Chinese, I did not know much about my own ethinic 
community. Although I experienced the outbreak of anti-Chinese violence in 
Solo in 1980, and had often been told about discrimination against the Chinese, 
I did not know why the Chinese had become the targets of discrimination and 
violence. Therefore, when my supervisor suggested undertaking this study, I took 
it as an opportunity to gain a better understanding of Chinese Indonesians. Why 
study the Chinese in Yogyakarta, where numbers are relatively small in comparison 
with Chinese communities in big cities on Java? After preliminary study of the 
existing literature, I uncovered some interesting facts that indicated a unique 
situation in Yogyakarta: most Chinese associations in the region maintained good 
relations with the Sultan and the local Islamic organisations, they supported the 
Republic during the struggle for independence, intermarriages between Chinese, 
24 The limits are determined by structural and cultural constructions and are the result of the vulnerable posi-
tion of the Chinese as WNI Keturunan under pressure to assimilate into the indigenous society and under 
the exploitation by the authorities.
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particularly the Hokchia, and Javanese were the highest in Central Java;25 and 
the Yogyakarta Chinese had never experienced anti-Chinese violence. In addition 
to this, as Wang Gungwu (1976:204) wrote, “what the Chinese Indonesians are 
and what they do in response to their environment appears unique only because 
that environment is not found anywhere else”. These factors convinced me 
that a study of the Chinese in Yogyakarta, a city that has a special position in 
the Indonesian political and cultural landscape, would be valuable.This study 
began with intensive fieldwork beginning in late 1997 and continued through 
late 1999. Since then, I have been involved in activities organised by Chinese 
associations and have been able to continue to monitor the development of the 
Chinese community in Yogyakarta.
Yogyakarta was founded by Sultan Hamengku Buwono I in 1755, and 
retained relative autonomy under the Dutch colonial admi nistration. During 
the war against the Dutch reoccupation, the capital of the new Indonesian 
republic was moved temporarily to Yogyakarta from 1946 to 1950. In return for 
the unfailing support of the Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX in the struggle for 
independence, Yogyakarta was granted the status of special region, and the Sultan 
was appointed as the governor of the province for life. This status recognises the 
power of the Sultan over domestic affairs within his own region.
Yogyakarta is known as a centre of Javanese culture.  It is also a centre of 
Indonesian higher education and the city attracts students from all over the 
country to study there, making Yogyakarta a kind of mini-Indonesia. The city’s 
economic activities are influenced by its multiple roles as a cultural centre, an 
educational centre and tourist destination.
The population of Chinese in Yogyakarta is about 14,000. They come from 
various socio-economic backgrounds and they live mainly in the city proper. The 
majority of the Chinese community engages in small and medium businesses, 
both as employees and employers. However, many Yogyakarta Chinese have also 
become professionals, such as lecturers, doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, 
and beauti cians. Their sub-ethnic groups include Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, 
Hokchia, and Teochiu. Many Chinese are Christians, but there Buddhists and 
25 Hokchia is a sub-group of Chinese speech-groups, or sub-ethnic group. For further account of these inter-
marriages, see Twang Pek Yang, 1998:60.
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Muslims as well. Although the distinction has been blurred, the peranakan and 
totok categories still prevail.26
The Informants
I met with many Chinese in the community, including peranakan Chinese 
as well as totok Chinese, prominent and ordinary, rich and poor, business people, 
professionals, as well as with many indigenous Indonesians. I attempted to cover 
the variation in socio-economic status, cultural and political orientation, age, 
gender, religion, education, and occupation amongst the Yogakarta Chinese.
My informants and respondents were aged primarily between 30 to 60 
years old, the majority were males of second and third generation of Chinese 
migrants, middle and lower class, high school graduates, and mostly Christian. 
Many of my informants in the business community were former students of 
Chinese schools. Most of them lived in the heart of the city, particularly in the 
Kecamatan Gondomanan and Gedong Tengen.27 I interviewed approximately 30 
informants intensively and many others less intensively. They were community 
and business leaders, board members of Chinese associations, shopkeepers, 
employees, and young activists. There was often considerable diversity amongst 
the family members of my informants. The indigenous Indonesian I interviewed 
included members of parliaments, members of boards of Indonesian chambers of 
commerce, lecturers, students, and journalists.
Fieldwork Experiences
I met with and was introduced, and in many cases, reintroduced to both 
Chinese and Javanese residents in several wards, including Pajeksan, Jogonegaran, 
Beskalan, and Ketandan,28 where I started my fieldwork. I decided to begin in 
these areas because they were the old Chinese settlements. I was interested in 
Pajeksan and Beskalan in particular because the residents are of the lower-middle 
26 Totok are regarded as pure Chinese, because they are not the descendants of intermarriages between the Chi-
nese and indigenous Indonesians, as many peranakan Chinese are . Totok Chinese retain a strong affiliation 
with the Chinese culture. These disctinctions will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.
27 These are the two sub-discticts in the city that have the most Chinese residents. Chinese of various social 
backgrounds live in these two areas. See the demographic section in Chapter 3. Part of this area  was formerly 
the Pecinan,  the Chinese quarter, where the Chinese were confined by the colonial administration.
28 These wards are in the Gondomanan and Gedong Tengen districts.
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class. Amongst the peranakan Chinese elite these areas are known as the ‘Chinese 
slums’. Of particular interest in Pajeksan is the close relationship between Chinese 
and Javanese residents, and the high rate of intermarriage between them.
I usually introduced myself as a lecturer at Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University 
and explained that I wanted to study the daily life and history of the Chinese 
community in Yogyakarta. Many of them initially thought that I was studying 
the process of assimilation.
I did not tape the conversations, but occasionally took notes. The interviews 
were, for the most part, open and unstructured converstations, rather than 
structured interviews. Although I attemp- ted to follow a list of questions, 
the conversations broadened naturally. This sometimes created difficulties in 
subsequent summarising, especially if the conversation had been long and 
note-taking inconvenient. I relied on my memory and kept detailed field notes. 
I realised that I might have missed some pertinent points, therefore, I noted 
any unanswered questions and subsequent new ones to be asked at the next 
meeting. Sometimes a brief encounter in the streets provided me with important 
information or broadened my insights. I met most of my informants more than 
once, particularly those who showed a willingness to share informations and 
insights. Most of them were more open in telling their stories in the second and 
subsequent meetings.
During the initial nine months of my research, I visited my respondents 
almost everyday, particularly those who live in Pajeksan, Jogonegaran, Beskalan 
and other nearby wards, usually in the morning between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m., and 
in the evening. I attended meetings and arisan29 gatherings regularly, both in 
the kampung and within the families. Usually, I went with Marsel, 27 years old, 
a son of a Hokchia totok and a Javanese mother, who had grown up there and 
knew many members of the local community, both young and old people. I also 
met with friends and family members of my informants and, occasionally made 
acquaintances in shops or other public places. Although most of my informants 
were residents of Pajeksan and Beskalan, not all of them lived there.
29 Arisan is a collective financial arrangement or rotating credit association, whereby participants make regular 
payments that are redistributed to each participant in turn; the sequence is determined by lottery or mutual 
agreement. A meeting is organised regularly to hold the arisan, usually at the residence of the member who 
won the lottery at the previous meeting. These gatherings are also social affairs. See Lont’s work (2002).
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I made observations in homes, as well as in public places, including the 
marketplace, temples, churches, government offices, restaurants, places of 
entertainment, etc. In this way, I was able to observe interactions between many 
different people in a variety of situations.
I found funeral parlours to be very interesting and important, since I could 
meet and observe many Chinese in an exclusively ‘Chinese’ social and cultural 
situation. The sense of community was strong there, as it was in some social and 
sport events.
I became acquainted with the owner of a food stall in Beskalan, close to 
Pasar Patuk, a food market where many Chinese shop daily. Kho Wie, who is 
in his 40s, was very friendly and talkative. He had graduated from Atma Jaya 
Yogyakarta University, where I teach, and this serve as a convinient common 
ground for our initial conversation. His noodle shop, which I frequented at least 
once a week, was a good place for observing encounters,  meeting people and 
conversing, as his customers were mainly Chinese on their way to and from the 
market. Kho Wie always introduced his friends to me and suggested that I speak 
with some of his own customersand it was one of them that introduced me to a 
major local Chinese group. 
I also frequented Li Ing’s shop on Malioboro Street. This was an excellent 
place to get an idea of people’s motions and their activities in the downtown 
areas, specifically the Malioboro neighbourhood. While chatting with Li Ing and 
her husband, I could observe their activities, the relations with their employees 
and customers. I also met some of their friends in the shop, some of whom I 
visited later. Like the people I met in Kho Wie’s food stall and other places, they 
were generally welcoming and willing to talk, although some claimed that they 
had no significant information on the issues in which I was interested.30
During the riots in May 1998 in Jakarta and Solo, and later during outbreaks 
in Kebumen, the situation in Yogyakarta, especially among the Chinese, was also 
tense and uncertain. I did not go to visit my informants as often then, especially 
30 Interestingly, their reason for this response was because they claimed that they were just ordinary people 
and had no higher education. In their view, only those who were well-educated and held important role in 
the community could have something significant to say or provide information to researchers. It was not 
that they were not willing to help. I managed to convince some of them that my study was especially about 
ordinary people, so they would fit perfectly in it. 
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in the evening. However, to keep up with the situation developing there, I kept 
in close touch with my informants on the phone.
In the middle of 1998, after the fall of Suharto, I became involved in a 
group called Kelompok Solidaritas Minoritas, Minority Solidarity Group, initiated 
by Catholic peranakan Chinese and Indonesians. Unfortunately, this group 
was short-lived. In late 1998, I was asked to participate in the Bhakti Putera 
association of former students of Chinese schools. Since then I have maintained 
close contact with this group, which has provided me with connections with the 
larger business community in Yogyakarta.
A Chinese Conducting Research in the Chinese community
A researchers’ socio-cultural background inevitably influences the process of 
conducting, and especially, analysing research. Particularly when a researcher 
comes from the same ethnic group he studies, his perspective of the situation 
could be imbalanced. In light of this, I would like to explain my background, 
and it should be against this background that this study is read. Although I have 
also attempted to distance myself from my subject, I do not claim to be free from 
subjectivity.
I was born in Lampung, a province in the southern part of Sumatra. On my 
mother’s side, I am the second generation of Chinese immigrants. My maternal 
grandparents were born in China, and my grandmother spoke only the Hakka 
language. My mother was born in Jakarta. After she finished her studies, she went 
to Lampung to teach at a Chinese school. She married my father, who taught at a 
Baperki School there. He was born in Singkawang, West Kalimantan. His mother 
wore kebaya encim31 and was able to speak Indonesian, although she spoke to my 
father in the Hakka language. I assume his family was peranakan Chinese.
After the closure of the Chinese and Baperki schools in 1966, my parents 
opened a laundry business. We lived in a simple house that was owned by my 
mother’s close friend.32 My five brothers and I slept together upstairs in a big 
room next to the ironing chamber.
31 The kebaya encim is like the indigenous kebaya, but features different motifs or ornaments. It was usually 
worn by peranakan Chinese women.
32 He was from a well-to-do Hokkien family in Jakarta. He also went to Lampung as a teacher, but later opned 
his own business. My mother told me that she had to turn down his proposal because intermarriage between 
different sub-ethnic groups was not common at that time.
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In my family, the children spoke Indonesian to my parents and grandmother, 
while they spoke Indonesian mixed with a little Mandarin or Hakka. My mother 
and father spoke mainly in Mandarin, sometimes mixed with the Hakka and 
Indonesian languages. My parents sent me to learn Mandarin at an informal 
course run by a former Chinese schoolteacher, however, the lessons did not last 
long, because I could not bear the harshness of her teaching method.
During the fifteen years I live in Lampung, I spent the first seven years 
in a predominantly Chinese area. Following her divorce, my mother married 
a Javanese. For the next eight years, before I went to Solo to continue my 
studies, we lived in an urban kampung where the majority of the residents were 
indigenous Indonesians. Most of them were Sundanese and Javanese, but there 
were also Batak, Minang, and Palembang families. My friends at school were 
mainly Chinese from the Chinese quarter, but in the kampung all my friends 
were indigenous people.
It was common amongst the children to stereotype ethnic eating habits. 
For example, “Batak makan anjing”, Batak people eat dog; “Jawa makan kutu”, 
Javanese eat lice; and “Cina makan babi”, Chinese eat pork. No hatred, no hard 
feelings. We continued to play together.  It was at this time, when some friends 
in the kampung yelled “Cina Cina” at me, that I began to realise that I was, in 
fact, Chinese.33 I was not sure why, but I was offended.  I also did not know why 
I was sometimes targeted by street gangs.34 In retrospect, I feel that my Javanese 
stepfather had, to some extent, influenced, not only my way of life, but also my 
earlier perception on the Chinese.
I spent three years in high school in Solo. There, for the first time in my life 
as a Chinese, I was very frightened and threatened when anti-Chinese outbreaks 
occurred in November 1980.35 I moved to Yogyakarta to study International 
Relations at Gadjah Mada University, and wrote a BA thesis on Deng Xiao-
ping’s political struggle. There were only three Chinese, including me, in the 
department. People were always surprised when I told them I was studying in 
33 It was only much later that I learned that ‘Cina’ is considered to be derogatory.
34 My mother and Chinese friends told me that it was because I was Chinese that I was often waylaid and 
forced to hand over money to gang members.
35 For details on this incident, see Siegel, 1986, Chapter 9.
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Department of Political Science.36 I have never experienced any discriminatory 
treatment or racist offence during my studies there.37
Upon finishing my Master’s degree in Development Studies at Satya Wacana 
Christian University in Salatiga, I became lecturer at Atma Jaya Yogyakarta 
University. My thesis research concerned the cooperation between coffee peasants 
and exporters (Chinese and indigenous business people) in Lampung. A Chinese 
studying Development Studies, particularly with a rural orientation, and lecturing 
on social and political sciences was again perceived as unusual.
I have lived in Yogyakarta for more than twenty years. I live in a suburban 
kampung where I do not have any Chinese neighbours.38 Since I first began my 
studies in Yogyakarta in 1981, it seemed as if I had almost been cut off from the 
Chinese community, as I did not have any significant social contacts with them, 
and rarely contacted my extended family. I believe that this, to some extent, 
indicates the uneasiness and critical attitude towards the Chinese I formerly 
held.39 
I think that my background has, to some extent, helped me in the process 
of this research. My informants more readily accepted me when they learned that 
my parents were teachers at Chinese schools. Although I cannot speak more than 
a few words of Chinese, they were quite sufficient to facilitate our conversations. 
Also, my background has enabled me to grasp the issues and problems addressed 
by my informants. Having experienced a mixed-married family and long 
friendships with Javanese, I also had the advantage of intimacy with both Chinese 
36 Chinese were stereotyped to be apolitical and uninterested in politics. Iswayudia, a board member of a Chi-
nese association in Solo, once said to me that, “A Chinese who studies politics is a rare man; he is a necessary 
addition to the community”.
37 My friend once said that Chinese who participate in social and cultural activities usually do not have pro-
blems with their indigenous friends. Because they are perceived in a different light, the stereotypes that 
usually serve as social barriers dissapear.
38 It is about six kilometres from the Chinese neighbourhoods in the city centre. I did not socialise much, 
however I maintain good relationships with some of my non-Chinese neighbours. The closest one, Pak 
Parjo’s family, live next door. He works as concierge at the school next to my house. His wife works as a maid 
at my other neighbour’s house. Since I live by myself, not with my parents, they are almost like my second 
family.
39 Perhaps it was partly due to a number of unpleasant experiences dealing with Chinese individuals, and partly 
as result of the so-called process of co-optation, the hegemony of assimilation ideology has produced a false 
consciousness in respect to the Chinese. Nevertheless, I never favoured the idea of forced assimilation. 
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and indigenous Indonesians. Finally, it was due to my educational background 
that key figures in Chinese associations invited me to join their groups during 
the Reformasi period in 1998. They hoped for input from a Chinese academic 
who studied sociology and politics, and through this experience I had better 
opportunities to follow their activities and collect information.
Outline of Dissertation
The presentation of this study will be structured as follows: the first part, consisting 
of Chapter 1, 2 and 3, will provide the background of the study and present the 
information necessary to understand the context of the situation. The second 
part, consisting of Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7, discuss the findings that answer to the 
research questions – the variety of accommodations developed amongst different 
sectors of the Yogyakarta Chinese community to their situations. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in the last chapter.
In Chapter 2, I describe the history of the Yogyakarta Chinese and the ways 
in which they have responded to the unfolding situations around them. It begins 
with the origins of the Chinese in Yogyakarta and proceeds to focus on their lives 
from colonial times through early independence. I examine the 1950-1965 period 
when the Indonesian government made major efforts to curtail the dominant 
economic position of the Chinese and how they weathered the political crisis that 
battered the country at the end of 1965.
In Chapter 3, I introduce the Chinese in Yogyakarta, and the city as well as 
its people, then I describe the development of the Yogyakarta Chinese community. 
The features of the Chinese population will be explained later.
Chapter 4 starts with descriptions of the economic measures of the 1950s 
that were detrimental to the Chinese entrepreneurs, and then the changes of the 
New Order assimilation policy in tackling the economic gap between the Chinese 
and the indigenous population. The next section of this chapter examines the 
development of Yogyakarta Chinese businesses from the onset of the New Order. 
I will explain the Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs’ endeavours to progress 
within the boundaries of forced economic assimilation and the prevalent ethnic 
prejudices against their economic positions.
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In Chapter 5, I show the diverse responses of the Yogyakarta Chinese to 
the assimilation pressures in their social lives. It begins with a description of two 
types of pressures, and continues with an explanation on how they accommodate 
the pressure to erase their identity, and their different strategies in settlement and 
religion preferences. I proceed to show how the Yogyakarta Chinese have ma-
naged to transform their forbidden ethnic-based social organisations into more 
open ‘general’ ones.
 The many ways in which the Yogyakarta Chinese have channelled their 
aspirations and interests will be discussed in Chapter 6. It begins with the 
Chinese political trajectory from colonial times through the New Order period, 
and subsequently, examines their changing political behaviour in the New Order. 
Finally, the last section devotes attention to a special case in which the Yogyakarta 
Chinese are struggling to defend their civil rights.
Chapter 7 explores the implications of the 1998 political and economic crisis 
on the Yogyakarta Chinese community. I explain how the Yogyakarta Chinese 
deal with insecurity generated from the outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence that 
occurred elsewhere during the crisis. I examine the impact on the Yogyakarta 
Chinese’s economic life and analyse their reactions to the creation of space for 
expressing Chinese culture in the Reformasi era.
In the concluding chapter, I highlight the main features of accommodation 
the Yogyakarta Chinese adopted during the New Order. I then attempt to explain 
the inter-related factors that contribute to the relative peaceful co-existence 
between the Chinese and indigenous communities in Yogyakarta.
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Chapter Two
The Yogyakarta Chinese: From Immigrants 
to Second Class Citizens
In order to understand the way in which the Chinese have made accommodations to urban life in Yogyakarta, we must consider the socio-political context they 
have had to deal with over time, as well as the internal dynamics within the 
Chinese community. These contexts evolved from the early colonial period 
through the years in which Dutch power became more direct and more effective, 
through the first decades of independence, and finally the New Order era. I will 
begin with the origins of the Chinese in Yogyakarta,40 and then proceed to the 
crucial situations and experiences they experienced. In the last two sections, I will 
describe the 1965 political turbulence in the country, and the general situation 
during the New Order.
From the Colonial Period to Days of Early Independence
Approximately two hundreds and fifty years ago, the first Chinese arrived in 
Yogyakarta, which was the newly founded capital city of a new principality, 
the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.41 The city is situated in the heartland of south-
central Java. Most of the Chinese who moved to Yogyakarta were descendants 
of earlier migrants who had settled on the north coast of Central and East Java 
centuries earlier. As traders and merchants, they were searching for new business 
opportunities or seeking fortunes in the new political centre of Java. Most of 
40 Little is known about the Chinese in Yogyakarta before the 19th century; much is historical conjectures. See 
James Rush’s assessment on the lack of scholarly writings of the Chinese in Indonesia prior to the twentieth 
century (1991:13-24). Nevertheless, this subject has been discussed in a number of works (Hardjono, 1970; 
Carey, 1984; Sasongko, 1992; Boedi, 1994).
41 For a history of the founding of Yogyakarta, see Ricklefs, 1974.
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them settled closed to the court, kraton, of the Sultan who had allowed them to 
come to Yogyakarta.
A small Chinese community gradually settled in Ketandan, next to the city 
central market. Their livelihoods depended primarily on intermediate trading, a 
field in which most of them had previous experience. The Sultan and the Java-
nese nobility valued their roles as middlemen, not only in the retail trade, but 
also in general commerce where the Chinese operated as moneylenders, tax farm-
ers, large-scale rice traders, and business brokers. However, already an early stage, 
some Chinese were also active as gambling housekeepers, artisans (painters and 
carpenters), and as small-scale entrepreneurs in home industries.
At the core of this community were the markmeester, market tax admi-
nistrator, and the pachter, tax farmer, the wealthy Chinese merchants who 
served as tax collectors and tollgate keepers on behalf of the Sultan.42 Since the 
inception of the state, the Yogyakarta rulers relied on the Chinese for the tax-farm 
administration of the market and tollgate fees that constituted the largest part of 
the royal revenue (Carey, 1984:11).  It is no wonder that the Sultan treated these 
Chinese tax farmers as treasured members of his entourage. However, while the 
Chinese elite elsewhere in Java were the main beneficiaries of the most lucrative 
opium pacht, the Yogyakarta Chinese pachter seemed to have held relatively 
minor pachts, such as the markets, the sale of salt and the pawnshops.43
Although living under the protection of the court, the Chinese community 
existed also under the Dutch system of indirect rule called the Officer System. 
The Dutch appointed a Chinese Captain as the head of the community, who was 
granted the rights to manage the community affairs. The Captain served as an 
intermediary between the Dutch administration and the Chinese community, 
whose duties included explaining government regulations and collecting revenues 
from the community (Suryadinata, 1993:80-81; Lohanda, 1996). The Chinese 
Captains did not received salaries and were usually appointed on the basis of 
42 Later, they collected many of the taxes levied by the colonial administration. The most important revenue 
farm was opium; minor revenue farms ranged from market tax to pawnshops and cattle slaughter. After 
1934, the rights to collect taxes were auctioned as a fixed-term franchise to the highest bidder, see Houben, 
2002:74; for a detailed description of the pacht system, see Rush, 1990.
43 The market pacht was abolished in 1851 but the pawnshops were still in the hands of the Chinese until 
1904, see Hardjono, 1970: 21, 23. The names of Chinese opium pachters from Yogyakarta are absent in 
Rush’s account on ‘Opium Farm Chinese in Java’ (1990).
30
their wealth and social standing. Many of them came from among the Chinese 
pachters. The first Chinese Captain in Yogyakarta was a pachter, To In, who held 
the office between 1755 and 1764 (Carey, 1980; Sasongko, 1992). This office 
was terminated in 1934, and the last Chinese Captain of Yogyakarta was Lie Ngo 
An, a batik entrepreneur (Kwartanada, 1997:75).
In social life, there were indications that the Chinese were able to live 
together with the local community without friction. As they operated in a specific 
niche of the urban economy, there was rarely competition with the Javanese, so 
their relationship was based on reciprocity (Carey, 1986). As mentioned above, 
the Yogyakarta Chinese came from established Chinese communities in Java that 
had already been thoroughly acculturated. They had already adopted the lifestyle 
and language of the Javanese and often had inter-married.
Living close to the Sultan’s court, they developed an appreciation of Javanese 
culture.44 The Chinese pachter and tollgate keepers paid obeisance to the Sultan, 
as the Dutch officers did later (Hardjono, 1970:23). The first two Sultans, 
Hamengku Buwono I and II were known to have had mistresses of Chinese 
descent. One of their royal offspring, Prince Joyokusumo, became prominent 
in the early nineteenth century. During the Java War he served as one of Prince 
Diponegoro troop’s commanders.45 The palace also employed traditional Chinese 
healers.
During the reign of Sultan Hamengku Buwono III, the Chinese Captain Tan 
Jin Sing, was appointed to be a Javanese Bupati (high administrative official) with 
the title of Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Secodiningrat. Tan Jing Sing became 
the Chinese Captain in Yogyakarta in 1803. He is described as intelligent and 
skilful and able to combine the acuteness of the Chinese with the local knowledge 
of the Javanese. He was fluent in Hokkien, Malay, Javanese, and he also learnt 
Dutch and English. Tan Jing Sing had a very close relationship with the Crown 
Prince, and became the Prince’s friend, translator, and assistant. In 1912, he acted 
as a secret envoy in th e negotiations with the British, who agreed to support 
the Crown Prince’s accession. While most Chinese held themselves aloof of the 
44 The majority of Chinese immigrants to Indonesia were petty traders who did not belong to the gentry in 
their home country. It is understandable if they considered Javanese culture to be more refined than the one 
they left, particularly if they were from rural areas.
45 It was said that the Chinese also trained Diponegoro’s bodyguards in martial arts (Carey, 1984:8).
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political situation, Tan Jin Sing took a clear political stand. Tan Jing Sing provided 
supplies for the British troops when they attacked the palace to overthrow the 
Sultan Sepuh (Hamengku Buwono II) on 19-20 June 1812. In return for his 
loyalty and services, the Crown Prince, who then became Sultan Hamengku 
Buwono III, granted Tan Jin Sing a noble title and land. Tan Jin Sing converted 
to Islam and was appointed to be the Head of the Custom’s Department. He had 
two wives - the first, Chinese, and the second, Javanese. The descendants of Tan 
Jing Sing established a family association, called Paguyuban Trah Secodiningrat, 
Secodiningrat Clan Association, which still exists.46 Although the story of Tan 
Jin Sing has become, to some extent, a legend, he is seen as a symbol of total 
assimilation. Unlike most of his Chinese fellows, who avoided politics and stayed 
neutral, Tan Jin Sing showed decisiveness and declared a clear political stand, 
which was not without risk. One night, he was injured when a fanatic follower of 
the previous Sultan stabbed him (Hardjono, 1970:25). However, there were no 
indications that ethnicity line used to provoke anti-Chinese violence among the 
Javanese population at this time.
After Diponegoro’s rebellion against Dutch colonisation was suppressed in 
1830, the sultanate came under stricter colonial control and the Dutch colonial 
administration began to intervene in the daily affairs of the sultanate. Meanwhile, 
the economic role of the Chinese became inextricably linked with the fiscal and 
economic policies of the Dutch administration. While encroaching Dutch power 
over the economy eventually deprived the Javanese elite of economic power, the 
Chinese business elite were able to make progress and to expand into many different 
businesses. At the same time, however, for many Chinese it was also the period 
during which they suffered from discrimination. The Dutch rule introduced 
policies that curtailed the rights of the Chinese, restricted their mobility, and 
eventually, also enhanced ethnic differences and segregation between the Chinese 
and Javanese communities.
According to the status system in Dutch Indies, this colonial society was 
divided into three groups based on race: the first group was European; the second 
group was Foreign Oriental, including Chinese, Arabs and other Asians; and 
46 The above description of Tan Jin Sing is a compilation from several sources. See Carey, 1986:55-61; Wer-
doyo, 1990.
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the third group was the indigenous population. These categories implied a class 
system in which the European were the highest class, the Foreign Orientals 
next and the indigenous population at the lowest social and legal level, the least 
favourable position.  Consequently, the prestige of the Javanese elite declined 
considerably. This discouraged the Chinese to merge with the indigenous society 
because by doing so, their social and legal status would decline and they would 
lose some of their privileges (Hardjono, 1970:31; Skinner, 1961:357).47
During much of the nineteenth century, the Chinese were required by the 
Dutch authorities to live in the Chinese quarter. The zoning system, wijkenstelsel, 
was applied in Yogyakarta from 1835 through 1918 when the regulation was 
abolished. The designated Chinese quarters in Yogyakarta were Ketandan, 
Malioboro, Ngabean, and Kranggan (Kwartanada, 1997: 53). They could travel 
only if they had travel passes, reispassen. The difficult procedure and the high fee 
in obtaining a travel pass restricted the mobility of the Chinese. The Pass System, 
passenstelsel, had been introduced in 1816 and was abolished in 1916.48 Zoning 
and pass systems confined the majority of Chinese to the Chinese quarters and 
prevented them from mixing with the indigenous community. In short, the 
colonial segregationist policy played a central role in setting the two communities 
apart and sharpening the differences in their interests (Willmott, 1961:11-13, 
77-79).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, an emancipation movement 
emerged among the Chinese in the Indies. The movement nurtured their ethnic 
identity and pride of China and Chinese culture. Its political aim was to secure 
equal civil status with the Europeans.49 This movement was manifested in the 
establishment of Chinese schools, organisations, and voluntary associations. 
There were about 33 of these organisations in Yogyakarta between 1900 and 
1940. The larger ones included Siang Hwee, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
and Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, an education organisation, which were established 
47 See Furnival‘s characterisation of Java in the last half-century of colonial rule as a ‘plural so ciety’ (1939). 
Also see Coppel’s argument against Furnival. One of Coppel’s reasons to question Furnival was that Furnival 
imposed an ahistorical and static model on a much more complex and changing society (1997).
48 It is worth noting that at least until the end of the 19th century, there was also a regulation that made it dif-
ficult for Chinese from other regions to travel into Yogyakarta, see Hardjono, 1970:29-30.
49 For a detailed discussion on the Chinese nationalist movement in Indonesia, see Williams, 1960.
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in Yogyakarta in 1905 and 1907, respectively (Kwartanada, 1997:77-80). The 
national organisations claimed some success: the abolition of zoning and pass 
systems and wider opportunities for education. However, these successes caused a 
further break between the Chinese, who had become much more self-conscious, 
and the indigenous society. 
However, as it is clearly pointed out in the works of Hardjono (1970) and 
Kwartanada (1997), the relationship between the Chinese and the indigenous 
population in Yogyakarta during the last decades of the colonial period were 
relatively stable. Although these accounts concern primarily the relations between 
their community leaders, to some extent, they may reflect the situation in the 
communities at large. For example, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, the founder of Taman 
Siswa50 maintained a close friendship with Dr. Yap Hong Tjoen, a prominent 
Chinese ophthalmologist who established a famous eye hospital in Yogyakarta.51 
Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo, the founder of Budi Utomo, who opened his medical 
practise in the Chinese quarter, was also known for his good relations with the 
Chinese community.52 Indigenous nationalist and Islamic organisations often 
invited representatives of Chinese organisations to participate in their meetings 
(Poeze, 1988: 1-31).
The general perception of hostility between Chinese and Muslims in 
Indonesia, did not apply to those residing in Yogyakarta. In 1913, when anti-
Chinese riots provoked by Sarekat Dagang Islam occurred in the nearby city of 
50 Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, whose previous name was Suwardi Surjoningrat was from the noble Pakualaman fam-
ily. He joined a socialist party, Indische Partij in 1911, and was extradited by the colonial government from 
1913 to 1919. Upon his return from the Netherlands, he joined a mystical group in Yogyakarta. According 
to this group, there was a need to establish an indigenous education system that was non-governmental and 
non-Islam. In 1922, Ki Hadjar Dewantoro established his school called Taman Siswa, which strove to inte-
grate a modern European education system and Javanese arts. Taman Siswa refused to use the government’s 
curriculum and did not accept any government subsidies so it could maintain its independence. See Ricklefs, 
1998:260, 268, and Tsuchiya, 1988.
51 See Ki Hadjar Dewantoro’s speech, “Peringatan 25 Tahun Berdirinya Rumah Sakit Mata Dr. Yap.” For a 
detailed history of Dr. Yap Eye Hospital, see Yap Hong Tjoen, 1926. This hospital is a monumental contri-
bution from a Yogyakarta citizen of Chinese descent. It was so well known, that President Sukarno, Hatta, 
and other government ministers attended its twenty-fifth year commemoration celebration.
52 Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo graduated from medical school ‘Dokter Jawa’, later called Stovia, in Weltvreden. 
He worked as government employee in Yogyakarta until 1899. He believed the Javanese society could be 
improved by Dutch education. In 1907, he visited Stovia and encouraged the students to establish an organi-
sation to advance the interests of the Javanese elite. This organisation, Budi Utomo, was established in 1908. 
See Ricklefs, 1998:248-249.
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Solo, the Sarekat Islam53 of Yogyakarta in conjunction with Chinese associations, 
sponsored a performance for charity, Opera Derma Bok Sie Hwee. The proceeds were 
donated to the development of indigenous education (Surjomihardjo, 2000:123). 
Similarly, Chinese associations often cooperated with Muhammadiyah.54 In 1925, 
they formed a united front to promote inter-ethnic relations and established 
the Comite Pentjegah Penghinaan, the Committee for Preventing Insults. This 
committee succeeded in forcing a publisher who reprinted an old manuscript, 
Serat Darmogandul that offended both the Chinese and the Muslims to apologise. 
Although there was competition between the indigenous Muslim and Chinese 
entrepreneurs in the batik business, it did not lead to social conflict.
It is also worth noting that the relations between the Sultan and the 
Yogyakarta Chinese community were positive, as the Chinese community 
maintained their loyalty to the Sultan. They showed their respect to the court by 
presenting a marble plaque for the coronation of the Sultan Hamengku Buwono 
IX in 194055, and the Chinese associations organised various festivities to celebrate 
the coronation.56 Due to the Sultan’s role in maintaining the stability during the 
Japanese occupation and throughout the revolution, Chinese communities in the 
city of Yogyakarta lived in relative security during these years. Popular anger was 
vented towards the Dutch and the part-Dutch population, rather than against 
the Chinese.57
53 Sarekat Islam (SI) was founded in Solo in 1911 by Hadji Omar Said Tjokroaminoto. Originally, it was a 
movement of batik entrepreneurs from Central Java, Sarekat Dagang Islam, Islamic Trade Union, with the 
aim of protecting their batik trade against Chinese entrepreneurs. SI became more than an organisation of 
batik traders and developed rapidly into a more general political movement. See Kartodirdjo, 1973, and 
Shiraishi, 1990.
54 Muhammadyah was founded in 1912 by Kyai Hadji Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta. It was an Islamic reform 
movement in the Modernist tradition. It tried to abolish many, of what it considered, superstitious customs 
that were traditional Javanese-Muslim practices, such as selamatan, sacrificial meals, visits to holy graves, and 
recitations of magically powerful texts at life cycle ceremonies, thus clashing with traditionalist Muslims. The 
organisation was primarily non-political and concentrated on benevolent work by building health clinics 
and schools. See Nakamura, 1983.
55 In fact, the plaque was presented at the commemoration of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX’s 12th year of Ac-
cession to the Throne.
56  See Boedi, 1994, for a discussion regarding the relationship between the Chinese community with previous 
Sultans.
57 It was reported that possessions of some Chinese who lived on the outskirts of the city and in the Pecinan 
area were confiscated when the Japanese soldiers entered the city. See Kwartanada, 1997:196-203.
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During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese army seized some houses owned 
by Chinese and prominent Yogyakarta Chinese were arrested and imprisoned. 
Many Yogyakarta Chinese suffered from the Japanese order to register themselves, 
which required the payment of a high fee. A pass system similar to the former 
Dutch one, which restricted Chinese to travel out of the city, was reinstated. The 
attitude of the Japanese authority towards the Chinese softened after a number 
of prominent Chinese were willing to cooperate with them. The Japanese policy 
regarding Chinese culture encouraged the revival of a Chinese cultural identity, 
which fitted with the totok Chinese aspirations.58
Following the defeat of the Japanese, during the struggle of independence, 
violence against the Chinese erupted in various parts of Indonesia (Kahin, 1990; 
Lukas, 1989). After the proclamation of independence in 1945, the Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono IX quickly controlled the situation in Yogyakarta. The 
Sultan entrusted various youth groups, including the Chinese youth, with the 
maintenance of the stability and security of the area.  The Sultan also declared 
a guarantee for the safety of foreigners in the region as long as they respected 
Indonesian independence. To support the Sultan’s declaration, the Chinese 
organisations in Yogyakarta warned the Chinese communities to avoid anything 
that could jeopardise their position (Kwartanada, 1997:483). However, many 
Yogyakarta Chinese took refugee in the Dutch-controlled area, most went to 
Semarang.59
Immediately after the proclamation of independence, the majority of 
Chinese group declared neutrality, but many supported the struggle of the 
new Indonesian government against Dutch aggression. The leading Chinese 
organisation, Chung Hwa Tjung Hui (CHTH) adopted a ‘pro-Republik’ position 
against the Dutch. Under its coordinator, a lawyer, Ko Siok Hie, they assisted 
the republican government and military with financial aid and logistic support 
(Hardjono, 1970: 53-54). Another group of totok businesspeople from the 
Chinese association, Hua Lien Siang Hui, assisted the republican government by 
58 Traditionally, the totok Chinese were the group that strongly opposed the Japanese, due to their affirmation 
with China that was also occupied by the Japanese. For a detailed analysis on the Chinese collaboration with 
Japanese authority, see Kwartanada, 1997: Chapter IV.
59 Based on the stories of some refugees, hundreds of them were transported by trucks.
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financing their sugar trade.60 A number of Yogyakarta Chinese, including Tjong 
Kie Liem, Lie Djin Han, Ong Tiong Tjoei, Tjan Hing Tjoe, Tan Djoen Bie, and 
Tan Tjoe Ling, supported and participated in the revolution (Kwartanada, 1997: 
500).  They were later presented with medals by the Indonesian government and 
became members of the Indonesian Veteran Corps. The important role of the 
Yogyakarta CHTH during that period was also appparent when its leader, Dr. 
Sim Ki Ay,61 was appointed as an adviser for the Indonesian delegation to the 
Round Table Conference held in The Hague in 1949.62
The 1950-1965 Period
During the 1950s, after the transfer of sovereignty, a new policy shaped the 
Indonesian government’s treatment of the Chinese. While the official policy 
insisted that the Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent should be completely 
assimilated into the indigenous majority, no major efforts were taken to press their 
compliance. However, various measures were taken to promote the development 
of indigenous businesses at the expense of the Chinese. Granting preferences in 
the allocation of credit and import licenses to indigenous entrepreneurs tended 
to discriminate against the Chinese entrepreneurs.63 One of the schemes was the 
Benteng system, which granted monopolies to indigenous importers and exporters. 
This system had led to creation of the ‘Ali-Baba firms’: Ali, the indigenous front 
man who obtained the license, and Baba, the Chinese businessperson with the 
capital, who actually conducted the business (Thee, 2004; Mackie and Coppel, 
1976:13). Moreover, to foster business assimilation, the Chinese businesspeople 
were urged to find an indigenous partner and employ indigenous managers.
Pressures against the dominant Chinese economic role increased and 
culminated in 1959, when Presidential Decree, generally known as PP 10, 
60 Of course, not all Chinese were pro-Republik. There were many Chinese who were close to the Dutch before 
the war and who favoured the return of Dutch rule. See Kwartanada, 1997:495, and Twang, 1998.
61 Dr. Sim Kie Ay also served as the private physician of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX.
62  The Round Table Conference, which was held in The Hague in 1949, was convened to settle the dispute 
between the Dutch and the Indonesian governments. See Ricklefs, 1993: 224-25.
63 For an account on the economic measures concerning the Chinese prior to 1960, see Willmott, 1961:87-90. 
I will discuss this issue further in Chapter 4.
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banned the participation of ‘foreigners’ in indigenous businesses outside the 
capitals of regencies, municipalities and provinces. ‘Foreigners’ had to decide 
whether to close, sell or transfer their businesses to Indonesian citizens or move 
them to the larger cities. In practice, the regulation was applied to all Chinese 
businesses, regardless the citizenship status of the owners (Mackie, 1976:83-86). 
This regulation treated the Chinese-Indonesian businesspeople as second-class 
citizens.
Surprisingly, these discriminatory regulations sparked criticism not only 
from the Chinese press and Baperki, but also from indigenous politicians of 
other parties (Willmott, 1961:89). Baperki formed asso ciations to support 
Chinese Indonesian entrepreneurs and petty tra ders, in dealing with government 
discrimination (Liem, 1960). Since the beginning of its existence, Baperki has 
constantly fought against discriminatory measures. They also established many 
schools throughout the country to accommodate Chinese students.
The Chinese response to this discrimination was generally divi ded into two 
groups: those who advocated assimilation and total emergence into the indig-
enous society with cessation as a distinct ethnic group, and those who argued for 
integration, insisted that the Chinese should be treated equally as other Indone-
sian citizens and claimed the rights to retain their own culture. Intense debates 
were held mainly on the national level among the Chinese elite. The integration 
faction won the allegiance of many Chinese primarily due to Baperki’s strong 
stand on ethnic discrimination. In Yogyakarta, many peranakan Chinese became 
sympathizers of Baperki (Liem, 1960).
Generally, the repression of Chinese in Yogyakarta was relatively mild. 
The main factor preventing maltreatment may have been the leadership of the 
Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, who consistently opposed ethnic discrimination. 
Many influential leaders of indigenous social organisations, including prominent 
aristocrats, had close ties with Yogyakarta Chinese elite.64 This may have, 
to some extent, contributed to the less severe harassment of the Yogyakarta 
Chinese, however, it does not mean that they were exempted from institutional 
discrimination.  In 1957, factories owned by a prominent Chinese entrepreneur 
were nationalised by the Indonesian government, not by the local government. 
64 These relationships will be elaborated upon Chapter 4.
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In fact, according to senior businesspersons, economic measures appeared to have 
had less effect on Chinese businesses in Yogyakarta. Most of the Chinese-owned 
businesses in Yogyakarta at that time were not affected by the import and export 
regulations. Prior to the PP. 10 regulation that banned Chinese from rural areas 
was enacted, Chinese, for the sake of security, had already moved to the city during 
the Japanese occupation and the struggle for independence (Hardjono, 1970: 55-
59). While the execution of the government measure in other areas of Java was 
associated with anti-Chinese outbreaks, this was not the case in Yogyakarta.
As it had prior to the World War II, Yogyakarta experienced a flourishing 
of Chinese associations.  Basically, the Chinese remained a distinct ethnic group 
culturally, economically, and religiously, as the majority of Chinese still embraced 
traditional Chinese religion. This did not generate serious ethnic tensions in the 
wider society of Yogyakarta. This relatively peaceful coexistence was probably 
the result of the fact that the Yogyakarta Chinese never were indifferent towards 
their social environment. Although they retained their own culture, they always 
exhibited positive public spirit. Representatives of the Chinese community 
participated in inter-ethnic activities and substantially supported the society 
during the years of hardship. Many of them also showed interest in the Javanese 
culture.65 Dr. Yap’s Eye Hospital served many Indonesians. Most of the peranakan 
children transferred from Chinese schools to schools run by Protestant or Catholic 
organisations. Meanwhile, the mainstream Javanese community and the elite 
showed tolerance towards the Chinese as a distinct ethnic group, enabling them 
to develop a relationship based on mutual respect and reciprocity.
The 1965 Crisis
Following the military take-over in October 1965, there was a fierce attack on 
alleged members of the Communist party and their former allies. These hostilities 
affected the Chinese because the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), the Indonesia 
Communist Party, was closely linked to the People’s Republic of China, and anti-
communist sentiments easily spilled over into anti-Chinese actions. Anti-Chinese 
65 Some Chinese associations incorporated sections that were devoted to the Javanese arts, such as gamelan mu-
sic. During this time, a peranakan Chinese, Bah Menang, created wayang potehi, an adaptation of a Javanese 
puppet show. See Soelarto, 1980.
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hostility welled up to the surface. It was a period of frightening insecurity for 
most of the Chinese in Indonesia. In those days, there was a constant sense of 
insecurity and vulnerability to harassment, against which there seemed little hope 
of protection. Many Chinese suffered considerable losses or total destruction of 
their property by mob attacks and ransacking (Coppel, 1983; Mackie, 1976). The 
Chinese became easy targets of extortion demands by the military, the police, and 
criminal gangs, not only because they were perceived to be rich, but also because 
the authorities were unlikely to risk becoming unpopular by defending them.
The degree of pressure to assimilate to which Chinese people were subjected 
at this time, however, appears to have varied from one province to another. Local 
factors played an important part in shaping the course of events, but news of 
what was happening in other regions surely affected the Chinese throughout the 
country.
This time, the Chinese in Yogyakarta did not escape from the turbulence. 
However, according to the recollections of some infor mants, they seemed to 
have experienced less severe aggression than the Chinese in other parts of the 
country. They recalled a few cases of violence and minor incidents in the streets, 
in which Chinese men were physically abused. Only the buildings of PKI, and 
organisations affiliated to the PKI and Baperki were destroyed. Later, the military 
took over some buildings of Chinese organisations and schools. Several Chinese 
businesspersons reported that they also suffered from intimidation, threats, and 
demands for extortion. This was a period of tension for the Chinese in Yogyakarta. 
They were very aware that suspicion of Communist affiliations amongst the 
Chinese could easily turn into violence.
Tjun Hai, who was student at that time, recalled that very few Chinese 
dared to venture out their houses, particularly in the evening. Once, when he 
was going to the campus, people yelled at him, “Cina, Cina!” and spat at the 
ground with fury. Tjun Hai spoke of a traumatic family experience: In 1966, 
military personnel came to this house, which was located in the Chinese quarter, 
and arrested his father. They accused him for hoarding and hiding food supplies, 
which was regarded as a subversive crime. His father was sentenced to heavy 
punishment. The military also seized their house and prohibited them from 
taking anything. When Tjun Hai arrived home from school, he found his mother 
sitting on the terrace, her face drawn. They embraced, crying, not knowing where 
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his father had been taken and what would happen to him. Fortunately, a military 
doctor, who was his father’s old friend, managed to save his father’s life.66
A number of Chinese in Yogyakarta who were suspected to be members of 
Baperki were arrested and were subjected to harsh interrogations.67 They were 
sent to Buru Island along with indigenous detainees. 68 Most of them never 
returned. Gwan, former second treasurer of Baperki in Yogyakarta, was sent to 
a local prison for a few months. He said that the military men did not find 
any proof that he had hidden the list of Baperki’s members who supported PKI. 
However, the military seized his property and he was tortured badly, resulting in 
a crippled leg.69
In general, however, anti-Chinese violence in Yogyakarta was less extensive 
and happened more often at the individual level. The low profile political activities 
that the Yogyakarta Chinese maintained may be a reasonable explanation for this. 
Mass rallies focused their hostility on the communists (PKI) and did not lead 
to chaotic raids on Chinese. According to some Yogyakarta Chinese, there were 
no widespread attacks against the Chinese, such as looting, burning of shops, 
houses and cars. They had not heard of any assaults against Chinese people in the 
streets of the Chinese quarter. However, they had been told that small incidents 
occurred outside the Chinese quarters in which unknown individuals stoned a 
few houses and shops.
Overall, the Chinese in Yogyakarta seemed to have escaped from the worst 
of the 1965 crisis, although there was some spill over of anti-Chinese sentiments 
that adversely affected them. The crisis destroyed their businesses that had already 
begun to decline as the result of the hyperinflation in the 1960s.70  However, far 
more serious problems for the Chinese were caused by the political transition 
from the Old Order to the New Order regime established by the military.
66 For a complete story of Tjun Hai, see Susanto, 2001.
67 The number of Baperki’s members in the city of Yogyakarta in 1960 was 751 (729 peranakan Chinese and 
22 non-Chinese Indonesian), see Liem, 1960:38.
68 Buru is an island in the eastern part of Indonesia that was used as a special prison for the political prisoners 
of PKI. See May, 1978:24-40.
69 Another informant who lived in the Gunung Kidul regency at that time told me that he, together with other 
villagers (some of them were Chinese) who were suspected to be communists, were taken to a remote area by 
the military and shot. Somehow he survived. The majority of the victims of the ‘communist massacre’ during 
the post-coup period were indigenous Indonesians rather than Chinese. See Coppel, 1983: 58-61.
70 For an account of inflation during that time, see White, 2005.
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During the New Order
The New Order approach towards the ‘Chinese problem’ has been one in which 
the Chinese were appropriated much less space to assert their ‘Chinese-ness’.71 
This approach took the form of several official discriminatory policies and 
measures, unofficial mistreatment and covert discrimination.72 Although the 
core of the New Order’s assimilation policy was a continuation of the previous 
government’s policy, the implementation of assimilation measures were applied 
with much greater force. The Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia 
(SBKRI), the ‘proof of citizenship’ certificate that had been introduced earlier, was 
reinforced. This requirement has had an enormous impact on the lives of Chinese 
in Indonesia until the present time and has become a constant reminder of their 
second-class citizenship status.
The Basic Policy on Chinese Indonesians of Foreign Descent, which took 
the form of Presidential Decision No.240 of 1967, aimed at the elimination of 
ethnic exclusiveness and pushed the Chinese towards accelerated assimilation. 
This policy was implemented through a series of regulations that discriminatory 
in nature.73 Presidential Instruction No.14 of 1967 ordered that observance of 
Chinese culture that exhibit affinity with the country of their ancestors, i.e., 
religion, beliefs and traditional customs, could be performed only within the 
boundaries of the household or place of worship. Other legislation concerned the 
ban on the dissemination of publications or signs using Chinese characters and, 
as a result, no manifestations of Chinesen-ness were allowed in public places. 
Not only were Chinese-Indonesian citizens urged to replace their Chinese names 
with Indonesian names, but they were also urged not to speak Chinese in public 
places. With this suppressive assimilation policy, the Chinese were forced to hide 
or remove any signs of their Chinese-ness. It is important to consider the wider 
implications of these regulations.
The abolition of Chinese organisations or associations reduced access 
to social institutions that provided support or aid in times of need. The lack 
71 For a detailed discussion of the ‘Chinese problem’, see the previous chapter (pp. 2-3).
72 See Winarta 2004, “Racial Discrimination in the Indonesian Legal System.”
73 For a review of these regulations, see Tan, 1991:116-119.
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of access to these Chinese institutions affected their livelihoods because the 
financial networks and business relationships they had developed were centred 
on relationships of trust and enforcement, which depended on group identity. 
In the past, these institutions provided conciliation services that helped to settle 
disputes between Chinese businesspersons.
Chinese language schools have been central in the perpetuation of Chinese 
culture since the birth of Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, the Chinese Association, 
in 1901 (Suryadinata, 1978). According to Waluyo, a former student of a 
Chinese school, next to the family, the Chinese schools played a chief role in the 
transmission of cultural norms and socialisation of values conducive to business 
success. Certainly, Chinese language schools played an important role in the 
development of Chinese-speaking peer groups. Moreover, since a good command 
of the Chinese language was imperative in the operation of the overseas Chinese 
business networks, the closure of Chinese language schools represented a serious 
setback to Chinese commerce.74 
Another implication of the discriminatory New Order policy was their 
effect on the poor Chinese. For example, the welfare and development policies, 
which were intended to support the economically weak, were not accessible 
to poor Chinese because, as a whole, Chinese were officially categorised as a 
‘strong economic group’. Poor Chinese were no longer eligible for government 
support.75 
In 1975, Governor’s Instruction No. 898/1975 was issued in Yogyakarta. 
This by-law granted rights of land ownership only to indigenous Indonesians. 
With this by-law, Chinese were no longer entitled to the title deeds, and those who 
had possessed them prior to 1975 were forced to relinquish their land rights. They 
requested a new entitlement that allowed them to use the land for a specified time 
period, Hak Guna Bangunan (HGB), and subjected them to an annual leasehold 
payment. Consequently, it became more difficult for Chinese, who did not have 
74 The majority of Chinese students who attended the Chinese language schools were totok Chinese. It is 
widely acknowledged that the success of many totok entrepreneurs was partly rendered in their conversance 
with the Chinese language, which enabled them to access the overseas Chinese business network. See Twang, 
1998.
75 However, on the other hand, the New Order commitment to make progress in economic development, 
which underlay its legitimacy, opened a window of opportunity for Chinese entrepreneurs to progress, partly 
due to their ‘early start’. See Mackie, 1998:33-65.
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a certificate of ownership, to sell ‘their land’, and most importantly, to use it as a 
collateral in securing bank loans. Although this by-law is contrary to the national 
Agrarian Laws, no actions have been taken by the central government authorities 
to correct it.76
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the Chinese in Indonesia have endured long periods 
of uncertainty and disturbance, in their evolution from sojourners to citizens. 
They have often been treated as second-class citizens. Since independence, they 
have been pressured to completely assimilate into the indigenous society, while 
being subjected to economic discrimination to curtail their dominant economic 
position in the economy. Moreover, periodical outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence 
have jeopardized their lives and property.
Broadly speaking, the situation in Yogyakarta, in many ways, has been 
similar with the situation in other places. Chinese schools and social organisations 
were banned and the Yogyakarta Chinese were also under the pressure to totally 
assimilate into the local community. Also, like Chinese in other parts of the 
country, they did not escape from discrimination and administrative harassment. 
However, some respects of their situation have been different. They reside in a 
relatively less hostile environment, as indicated in the absence of outbreaks of 
anti-Chinese violence since the establishment of the Sultanate. The influential 
position of the Sultan in this special region has, to a great extent, contributed to 
the stability of the society.
The following chapters (4, 5, and 6) will deal with the responses and 
strategies of the Chinese in response to the pressures to assimilate, discriminative 
economic measures, insecurity, and discrimination. However, prior to embarking 
on those chapters, I will provide a general description of the Yogyakarta Chinese 
and the city in which they live, as well as the people with whom they interact, in 
Chapter 3.
76 This land ownership issue will be discussed further in Chapter 6.
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Chapter Three
Profile of the Yogyakarta Chinese Community
The City and Its People
Yogyakarta lies at the foot of the active volcano, Mount Merapi, in south-
central Java. The city was founded in 1755, as the royal capital of the Sultanate 
of Ngayogyakarto Hadiningrat. The Sultanate was established by the Treaty of 
Giyanti, which was negotiated by the Dutch, in which the Sultanate of Mataram 
was divided into the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Surakarta Sultanate (Ricklefs, 
1974). During the Indonesian struggle for independence, the capital of the 
newly proclaimed Indonesian republic was moved temporarily from Jakarta to 
Yogyakarta (January 1946 through August 1950).
The kraton, palace of the Sultan, lies at the heart of the city, which has grown 
in all direction around it. The kraton, which is the focal point of Yogyakarta’s 
traditional life, still radiates the spirit of refinement, which has been the hallmark 
of Yogyakarta for centuries.77
The original commercial district, Malioboro, is north of the kraton and 
features buildings with distinctive Dutch colonial-era architecture. At the 
southern end of Malioboro, on the east side of the street, is the main city market, 
Beringharjo, just north of the old Dutch fortress, Fort Vredeburg. Lined with an 
array of shopping venues, ranging from street vendors selling a dizzying variety of 
souvenirs to stores and shopping malls, Malioboro has become the most popular 
77 In the 16th century, Yogyakarta was the seat of the Javanese empire of Mataram, from which present day 
Yogyakarta has inherited a wealth of traditions. Although the Sultan’s Palace is formally no longer the centre 
of political power, most Yogyanese still have faith in its spiritual power. Many Yogyanese, particularly those 
from the rural areas, regard the Sultan more as their king, rather than as their governor.
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tourist shopping area in the city. Car, buses, and motorcycles share the road with 
bicycles, becak (tricycle pedicabs), and vendors’ carts.78 The slow lane along one 
side of the street has been turned into an elongated parking lot for motorcycles. 
As soon as the shops and the sidewalk vendors close their businesses around 
9 p.m., nightlife begins on Malioboro and goes on until dawn. Food stalls are set 
up along the sidewalk, and customers gather to eat, chat, or just relax and enjoy 
their suppers, sometimes entertained by buskers. This tradition of eating while 
sitting on mats on the ground,  lesehan,79 has become the allure of the nightlife 
on Malioboro. However, many local Yogyanese have become less interested in 
‘lesehan’ on Malioboro because its former relaxed ambiance has become more 
business-like in nature.
Yogyakarta is a densely populated city, with a population of approximately 
five hundred thousand people.80 Although the majority of the population is 
Javanese, the nature of the society is conspicuously plural. The city attracts people 
of different ethnic groups from all over the country, making Yogyakarta a mini-
Indonesia. Distinct from the Java nese majority, the Chinese represent the third most 
populous minority ethnic group after the Sundanese and Melayu (Suryadinata, 
2003). There are also a small number of Indians and Arabs in the society.
Civil servants comprise one-third of the population, while one-quarter 
works in the private sectors. Ten per cent of the population is engaged in trading, 
three per cent in industry, and 22 per cent are retirees.81 These figures indicate 
that the commercial and industrial sectors are not dominant in Yogyakarta. It is 
an administrative, educational and cultural centre. Although the wider Yogyakarta 
region has one of the lowest regional incomes in Indonesia, living conditions are 
78 For accounts on the development of modes of transportation in Yogyakarta, see Kikodoro and Kubota, 
1998:1593-160.
79 Lesehan, literally means ‘to sit on the floor in a relaxed way’. Currently, lesehan food stalls can be found in 
other parts of the city as well. Another nightly eating venue that is popular in Yogyakarta is angkringan, 
pushcarts with benches and tables where people gather, mainly to chat rather than to eat. Initially, they were 
eating stalls for lower-income people, however, several angkringan have become popular amongst diverse 
communities, such as artists, students, and journalists. It appears that through lesehan and angkringan, the 
Yogyanese have preserved their cultural identity in the face of modernisation and globalisation.
80 The population density is approximately 14,500 per square kilometre.
81 Source: Kantor Statistik Kotamadya Yogyakarta (Statistic Office of the City of Yogyakarta), 1996. The stu-
dents are estimated to account for about 15 per cent of the population.
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good, as it has the lowest infant mortality rate and the highest life expectancy 
in the country (Booth and Damanik, 1989: 283). The majority of population 
is Muslim (80%), followed by Catholics and Protestants (19%), Buddhists, 
Confucianists, and Hindus (1%) (Suryadinata, 2003: Chapter 4).
The Yogyanese are widely known for their refined character and mild 
manners. Generally, the Yogyakarta Chinese see the Yogyakarta Javanese as orang 
yang halus dan sopan, gentle, polite people who favour harmony over conflict.82 
A rather liberal stream of Yogyanese Islam and the eclectic nature of the Javanese 
culture are represented in the life of the Yogyanese with the royal palace lying 
in its centre.83 All of this has created a sense of an open, easy-going society with 
cultural highlights that have attracted people around the country, as well as from 
around the world.
For decades, Yogyakarta has been a popular tourist destination84 and an 
attractive place to obtain secondary and tertiary education. Tourism and education 
services have become the major industries in this region. The economic activities 
that developed in Yogyakarta are related mainly with these two fields, as can 
be observed from the number of universities, polytechnics institutes, boarding 
houses, computer shops, photocopy shops, motorcycle repair shops, internet 
cafes, hotels and restaurants, travel agencies, art galleries, and small handicraft 
industries.
In the late 1980s, nation-wide enterprises from Jakarta and international 
five-star hotels (Hyatt, Sheraton and Melia), retail chains such as Matahari 
Department Store and Hero Supermarket, and franchised fast-food restaurants, 
including Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonalds, opened in Yogyakarta. In 
the 1990s, major shopping malls were built and metered taxicabs appeared on 
the streets of Yogyakarta. On the one hand, Yogyakarta is growing into a modern 
commercial city, however, on the other hand, it aspires to retain its cultural life.85 
In the 2000s, in an effort to appeal to an international audience, the city motto 
82 For an analysis on the life principles of the Javanese society, see Magnis-Suseno, 1985. 
83 Thousands of Yogyanese participate in syncretic rituals that are performed regularly by Kraton for various 
occasions. It is worth noting that the pious Muslim group rarely criticise these rituals publicly.
84 Since 1998, international tourism has been on the decline, however domestic tourism has risen. See the 
Yogyakarta Province Tourism Statistics. 
85 Many visitors and tourists note that life in Yogyakarta is relaxed and comfortably paced. 
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“Yogyakarta Berhati Nyaman”,86 was replaced with the phrase, “Never Ending 
Asia”. This motto will soon be changed to “The City of Tolerance”.87 
The Chinese Quarters: Pecinan
The area off southeast Malioboro, the main street in downtown Yogyakarta is 
densely packed with buildings dating back to the 19th century. They have typical 
Chinese roofs, and small altars and other attributes of traditional Chinese religion 
hang on the upper walls. This area, Ketandan, was the first Chinese settlement 
in the city, and is now one of the wards of the wider Chinese quarter or Pecinan. 
The word, tanda, was the title of the officially licensed market tax collector, 
marktmeester. Ke-tanda-an signifies the residence of the tanda.88 The Chinese 
who lived in Ketandan were the well-to-do traders who collected market taxes on 
behalf of the Sultan (Hardjono, 1970:20). 
Ketandan is strategically located on the north side of the main city market, 
Pasar Beringharjo. Aligned to the main street, which was the key entry point 
into the market and the city, allowed the tanda to control the flow of trade. This 
served both their trading interests and their duties as tax collectors.
Chinese in Ketandan lived in two-storey shop-houses lining the narrow 
streets. The shop was on the ground floor, while the upper floor served as the 
living quarters. The two-storey buildings with typical Chinese roof-shapes were 
distinctive the Javanese houses. The fact that most of these Chinese houses 
doubled as retail outlets was unusual. 
86 The word berhati, which means “having a heart”, is also an abbrevitation from the words, bersih, clean, sehat, 
healthy, and indah, lovely. Nyaman means “comfortable”.
87 “The City of Tolerance” is based on foreign tourists’ impressions on Yogyanese hospitality and open-minded 
attitude towards pluralism. The fact that open conflicts between different religious and ethnic groups rarely 
occurr in Yogyakarta indicates that there may be some truth in the impression. Nevertheless, this spirit and 
practice of tolerance is not without challenges and whether the Yogyanese will be able to preserve it remains 
to be proven. For an account on Javanese tolerance, see Anderson, 1972; 2002.
88 It is common for the urban quarters in Yogyakarta to have names derived from the profession of its original 
inhabitants. For example, the ward name Gemelan is based on the profession of its residents who were horse-
shoe makers in the palace (gamel means “to strike metal”). Siliran was the residence of the servants whose job 
was to light lamp (silir) in the palace. Pajeksan was the area inhabited by jaksa (prosecutors) and Dagen was 
the residence of dagi (carpenters).
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During the middle of the 19th century, the small Chinese quarter in Ketandan 
gradually grew to cover a wider area. Beginning in 1835, when the colonial quarter 
system, wijkenstelsel, was introduced in Yogyakarta, all Chinese were required to 
live only in the Chinese quarter (Sasongko, 1992). The population of Pecinan 
grew, particularly with the arrival of new immigrants from China at the end of 
the century. The new residents spread to the nearby neighbourhoods on the west 
side of the main street, Malioboro, i.e., Gandekan, Beskalan, and Pajeksan. This 
formed the cradle of the city’s business centre.
During the late 19th century, the economic activities in Pecinan diversified 
in response to the needs of its growing population. In addition to trading, the 
Chinese also opened home-industries that produced food and drink, household 
equipment and furniture. Traditional Chinese drugstores, pawnshops, gambling 
and opium houses were established. As more merchants visited Yogyakarta, several 
Chinese opened hotels, boarding houses, and restaurants.
In the early of the 20th century, the Chinese quarter expanded to include 
Malioboro, Ngabean and Kranggan. Chinese shops spread out along the streets 
of Pecinan from the south end of Malioboro Street to the north end. Chinese 
stores in Ngabean, to the southwest of Malioboro, were engaged mainly in food 
trading and batik manufacturing, while Kranggan, further to the north, became 
the main residential area of the Chinese. In 1919, the wijkenstelsel was abolished 
throughout the country.
Presently, Ketandan is no longer the residence of tax collectors or the centre 
of the food trade. The tax system was abolished in 1882. Many shops have closed 
and some buildings are in poor condition. The once famous Kaping restaurant 
and several food stalls have long closed as well. One old hotel remains, but the 
building is poorly maintained. Currently, Ketandan is better known as the centre 
of gold and jewellery trading.89 Outside the Chinese gold shops, pushcarts that are 
owned mostly by gold merchants from Banjar are set up along the sidewalks.90
The Pecinan continues to be an integral part of the commercial centre of 
Yogyakarta. A few shops open since the colonial period, including Toko Tan, 
Toko 63, Toko Djoen, Toko Asia, Toko Bah Gemuk, Toko Wina, Restaurant 
89 The first gold shop, Toko Mas Kendil, was established in 1940s. More gold shops opened in the 1960s.
90 These Banjar merchants are from south Kalimantan. Many of them were gold craftsmen who worked in the 
Chinese gold shops.
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Tiongsan, and several traditional Chinese drugstores, are still in business. 
Tiongsan restaurant, as other shops with Chinese names, assumed an Indonesian 
name, Mahkota, as required by the government in 1967.91 Many formerly popular 
stores and well-known restaurants have vanished, including Toko Linggo, Toko 
Hien, Toko Obral, Toko Karunia, Restaurant Che Nam, and Toko Oen.
Pecinan, as the Chinese quarter of the early 1900s, lives only in the memories 
of the older generation. It is no longer a predominantly Chinese settlement. 
Although they are less visible now, the majority of Yogyakarta Chinese still live 
in these areas. As can be seen in Table 1 and 2, two out of three Chinese live in 
the areas that were formerly the Chinese quarter, where they constitute between 
four to thirteen per cent of the total population. In other words, it is safe to 
say that the present settlement pattern of the Chinese is relatively unchanged: 
most Chinese prefer to live either in or near the commercial heart of the city.92 
Nevertheless, Table 1 does show a significant shift of Chinese out of the former 
Chinese quarter. Between 1968 and 2000, the number of Chinese residing in the 
former Chinese quarter fell from 12,310 to 9,906 (19.5%), whereas during the 
same period, the number of Chinese residing outside the former Chinese quarter 
grew from 2,672 to 4,556, which would amount to an increase of 70.5%. One of 
the reasons for this increase, according to informants who have moved away from 
the former Chinese quarter, was the revised perception of the security outside the 
Chinese quarter. Formerly, many Yogyakarta Chinese felt it was not safe to live 
outside the Chinese quarter where only a few Chinese lived. This is no longer the 
case. There is also a growing tendency among the middle-upper class Chinese to 
separate their place of work and their residence. They have begun to move to new 
housing subdivisions in other parts of the city.
91 Interestingly, customers continue to refer to the restaurant as Tiongsan, and rarely recognise the Indonesian 
name, Mahkota.
92 See Liem’s assessment of Chinese settlement in Yogyakarta in 1960 (1960:41).
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Table 1. The Chinese population of the city of Yogyakarta, per district (1968 & 
2000)
Districts 1968 2000
Chinese quarter Chinese % Chinese %
Gedong Tengen 4, 029 26.89 2,538 17.55
Gondomanan 3,643 24.32 2,614 18.07
Jetis 2,285 15.25 2,253 15.58
Ngampilan 1,780 11.88 1,382 9.56
Danurejan   573 3.82 1,119 7.74
Total 12,310 82.16 9,906 68.50
Outside CQ Chinese % Chinese %
Tegalrejo 542 3.62 999 6.90
Gondokusuman 738 4.92 985 6.81
Mergansan 401 2.68 731 5.05
Umbulharjo 107 0.71 567 3.92
Wirobrajan 270 1.80 484 3.35
Mantrijeron 180 1.20 410 2.84
Pakualaman 427 2.85 380 2.63
Kraton 0 - 0 -
Kotagede 7 0.05 0 -
Total 2,672 17.84 4,556 31.50
Total Chinese Population 14,982 100 14,462 100
%: percentage of the total Chinese population 
Source: Penduduk Indonesia 1968 (BPS); Data Monografi Yogyakarta 2001, Propinsi DIY.
Table 2.  The Chinese as a percentage of total Yogyakarta population in each 
district, in the Chinese quarter (1968 & 2000)
Districts 1968 2000
Chinese quarter Total Chinese % Total Chinese %
Gedong Tengen 32,504 4,029 12.39 26,245 2,538 9.67
Gondomanan 23,756 3,634 15.29 20,455 2,614 12.78
Jetis 29,648 2,285 7.71 37,703 2,253 5.97
Ngampilan 28,502 1,780 6.24 23,035 1,382 5.99
Danurejan  29,875 573 1.18 30,461 1,119 3.67
Total district 144,285 12,301 8.33 137,899 9,906 7.18
%: percentage from the total Yogyakarta population in each district
Source: Penduduk Indonesia 1968 (BPS); Data Monografi Yogyakarta 2001, Propinsi DIY. 
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The Ethnic Chinese Population and Features
According to the statistics on the Chinese population in Java and Madura at the 
end of 1977, there were 13,526 Chinese residents in Yogyakarta (BPS 1980). This 
shows a relative decline compared to the totals in 1968, which was 14,972 people. 
Despite a difference of data-collecion methods and the possibility of inaccuracy, a 
plausible explanation for this decline is that a number of Yogyakarta Chinese have 
migrated to Jakarta, Semarang or Surabaya to pursue more promising careers.93 
Based on a provincial survey, the Chinese population in Yogyakarta in 2000 
was approximately 14,000 people, or 3.5 per cent of the total population.94 The 
majority of Chinese who reside in Yogyakarta today were born in the city in 
the 1950s and 1960s (Suryadinata, 2003:92), and belong to second and fourth 
generation Chinese families. There are also families that date back six or seven 
generations in the city. The remainder of the Chinese population arrived from 
other parts of Indonesia in the 1970s.
Peranakan and Totok
Culturally, the Chinese community was formerly divided into two groups 
- peranakan and totok - determined by the degree to which their life-styles were 
influenced by the Indonesian culture. Peranakan were Chinese with local roots. 
Usually, they were of mixed Chinese-indigenous parentage, and their life-styles were 
heavily influenced by the local culture wherever they lived. Their members spoke 
Indonesian or the regional language, such as Javanese or Sundanese. Most totok 
were the twentieth-century Chinese immigrants and their immediate descendants 
who were less acculturated and more strongly oriented towards China. Rather 
than speaking Indonesian, they spoke various Chinese dialects at home.95 
93 This possibility was proposed by my informants.
94 Source: Data Monograph Yogyakarta 2001. The BPS (Biro Pusat Statistik, Central Bureau of Statistics) 
Census 2000 provides a different figure, 9.900 people, in which the Chinese constitute 0.32 per cent of 
the Yogyakarta population (2001). Suryadinata (2003) suggests that because the survey was based on the 
respondents’ self-identification, many second and third generation Chinese identified themselves as mem-
bers of the local indigenous population. Some of them may have feared the stigma of being Chinese. There 
has been scholarly debate about the unexpectedly low figures for Chinese in the 2000 Indonesian National 
Census, See Mackie, 2005:97-101.
95 For a detailed description on the distinction between peranakan and totok, see Skinner, 1963:103-108.
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Peranakan Chinese made up the largest section of the Chinese community 
in Yogyakarta in 1930. To illustrate this, using the 1930 census, I have divided the 
Chinese into three categories based on the criteria of the birthplace of the father: 
the first generation, born in China; the second generation, born in Indonesia 
from a father born in China; the third generation, born in Indonesia from a 
father born in Indonesia.
Table 3. The Chinese population in Yogyakarta according to age and generation, 
1930.
1st generation 2nd generation 3rd generation Total
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
0-14 50 27 77 285 255 540 580 623 1,213 1,840
15-19 45 14 59 34 21 55 129 121 250 365
20-49 349 68 417 156 117 273 437 443 880 1,578
50+ 52 7 59 33 36 69 76 115 191 323
Unknown 1.066 211 1.277 450 421 871 1.083 1.542 2.625 4.807
Total 1.549 323 1.872 958 850 1.808 2.305 2.854 5.159 8.913
Source:  Volkstelling 1930, Vol.VII, Table 3, pp. 200-201 (Department van Economische zaken 1935)
As we can see in Table 3, the majority of the Yogyakarta Chinese community 
in 1930 were of the third generation.96 Liem (1960) and Hardjono (1970) confirm 
that this settled majority and its descendants comprised the peranakan Chinese 
community in the years leading up to the 1960s. 
Presently, it is impossible to calculate the number of peranakan and 
totok in Yogyakarta because of the absence of reliable data. However, it may 
be assumed that most of the Chinese in Yogyakarta are now peranakan. New 
Chinese immigrants are rare now97 and the Indonesian government has adopted 
a policy of cultural assimilation, hence, totok descendants have undergone an 
Indonesianisation process. In other words, appreciable numbers of totoks have 
96 Based on the 1920 census results, Coppel’s findings seem to point in another direction (1973:153). Accord-
ing to Coppel, more than 75 per cent of Chinese in Yogyakarta spoke Chinese in their home in 1920. The 
two findings are difficult to reconcile.
97 It should be noted that after independence, Chinese immigration to Indonesia ceased, therefore the totok 
community stopped growing.
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become peranakan in the sense that they have become acculturated and more 
oriented towards indigenous Indonesia.98 
The meanings of the terms ‘peranakan’ and ‘totok’ seem to have undergone a 
change. The categories are now regarded as inherited identities and, consequently, 
static in nature. It is often said, “Once a totok, always a totok.” Many peranakan 
considered the descendants of totok who live in Pecinan as totok, regardless 
of whether their mothers were Javanese. Peranakan, or baba (a term that also 
refer to peranakan, but which is less frequently used), are perceived to be the 
descendants of the earliest Chinese settlers. They define the term based on the 
length of residence in Indonesia, rather than socio-cultural adaptation. With this 
perception, there are probably more totok than peranakan in Pecinan.99
However in reality, peranakan and totok no longer exist as two separate 
social categories. It is only amongst the older generation that this distinction 
prevails. In fact, the relationships between the peranakan and totok groups are 
more open and interactive, thus further blurring the distinction. In the younger 
generation, which is the majority of the present Yogyakarta Chinese community, 
this distinction is rarely referred to and is of less importance. The previous 
significance and pervasiveness of the social divide between the two groups is 
diminishing. Both peranakan dan totok participate in the same social and religious 
groups, and intermarriage is more common now than in the past.
Speech groups
Linguistic distinctiveness underlies the cultural differentiation between the 
Chinese sub-ethnic groups; as such they will be referred to as speech groups. 
Segmentation into speech groups is relevant only within the totok community, 
as peranakan speak Indonesian.100 Segmentation in the peranakan community 
was based on social class, which encompassed wealth, educational attainment 
and family standing. In 1930, there were four major speech groups recorded in 
98 A handful of Chinese of foreign citizens (Warga Negara Asing/WNA) in Yogyakarta who might be counted 
as totok, have also been acculturated. Many of them are poor, so they cannot afford to pay the naturalisation 
costs.
99 Estimated by some peranakan Chinese in Pajeksan and Beskalan, see also Liem, 1960:41.
100 The upper-class peranakan families spoke mainly Dutch during the colonial period.
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the census101: Hokkien, Teochiu, Hakka, and Kongfu (Cantonese).102 Hokkien 
speakers were the dominant group in Central and East Java, as well as in 
Yogyakarta. This is understandable, as the Hokkien were the first Chinese to settle 
in Indonesia and their descendants who had assimilated with the local culture, 
have dominated the local Chinese communities in Java since the eighteenth 
century (Skinner, 1963:102, 107).
It should be noted that there is also a substantially sized speech group in 
Yogyakarta: the Hokchia speakers. It is not clear why they were not included 
in the 1930 census. Some Hokchias speculate that their absence in the census 
may be because they were considered to be a sub-category of Hokkien speakers 
because they also originated from the Hokkien province of Fujian. However, it 
is more likely that most of them arrived only after the 1930 census was taken.103 
Although population statistics of ethnic descent and speech group membership 
are not available after the 1930s, it is clear that Hokchia and Hakka speakers 
represent the prominent speech groups in Yogyakarta, both by number of 
speakers and socio-economic status. Before Chinese associations were banned in 
1967, there were speech groups associations in Yogyakarta, such as Hokchia Sin 
Sen Se, Hakka Kung Hwee, Cantonese Kwong Shauw Kung Hwee (Kwartanada, 
1997:84). 
It is generally perceived that each Chinese speech group has specialised in 
one particular occupation or economic activity.104 For example, Hokkien speakers 
acquired a reputation as skillful itinerant traders, Cantonese were noted as skilled 
artisans, and Teochiu speakers specialised in agriculture. Hakka speakers became 
small retailers or shop owners, while Hokchia speakers constituted the majority 
of moneylenders. While the Cantonese are still well represented in the furniture 
business, occupational specialisation is, generally, no longer the case. Speech 
group membership is no longer crucial in structuring social relations, which are 
currently based more on socio-economic level.
101 Volkstelling 1930, Vol.VII, Table 10, .304 (Department van Economische zaken 1935).
102 The regional home of Hokkien is situated in southern Fukien, China. Teochiu is from the hinterland of 
Swatow. Hakka is from the inland of Guandong province, and the Hakka’s western and southern neighbours 
in China are the Cantonese.
103 The Hokchia were among the last speech group to arrive in Java, in the late of 1920s and 1930s (Twang, 
1998:54). Most of them started their businesses as petty traders and moneylenders, known as mindring, in 
rural areas.
104 These specialisations are particular to Indonesia. See Skinner, 1963:101-103; Twang, 1998:54, 56.
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Although identification as peranakan or totok and classification by speech 
groups have become less important within the Chinese community, these socio-
cultural backgrounds probably still retain some relevance in regards to the 
accommodation processes in the economic, social and political spheres. These 
processes will be examined in the succeeding chapters.
Occupation and Economic Activities
Many Chinese in Yogyakarta claimed to be either a dagang, trader, or buruh, 
employee or labourer. The term dagang refers to both commerce and industry, 
and covers everything from peddlers to major corporate businesspersons. The 
term buruh also covers a range of diverse occupations in commerce and industry, 
both blue-collar and white-collar. It is often used as a presentation of modesty, in 
order not to be perceived as well-to-do or important, or to present the impression 
that the speaker is of a  lower income group, so that they will not be subjected to 
high charges, for example in paying school fees.
Statistics from 1968 provide a general idea of the types of economic 
activities of the Chinese in Yogyakarta at the beginning of the New Order.105 
According to these statistics, which made a distinction between WNI Tionghoa 
(Warga Negara Indonesia, Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent) and WNA 
Tionghoa (Warga Negara Asing, foreign citizens of Chinese descent), in 1968, 
there were 1,319 Chinese trading companies (896 owned by WNI Chinese and 
423 owned by WNA Chinese). While all gold shops and tailor businesses were 
in the hands of WNI Chinese, the bike shops (selling and repairing) were owned 
exclusively by WNA Chinese. WNA Chinese were also dominant in dental and 
photo studio businesses. There were 61 WNI Chinese and 91 WNA Chinese 
companies engaged in industries, such as furniture, ice, leather products, syrup, 
candy, cigarette, tea, and coffee powder.
The statistics of thirty years later, 1998, show that the number of Chinese 
companies, particularly the middle and large scale bu sinesses, increased.106 
105 Source: Biro Statistik DIY 1969, Statistik Pemda Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta 1968. For a description of the 
situation in 1960, see Liem, 1960:35-36.
106 The comparison of these statistics should be treated with caution since the sources do not provide the defini-
tion of the company scale. Moreover, the number of Chinese companies in the 1998 statistics includes those 
businesses owned by the Chinese of foreign citizenship who have since become Indonesian citizens.
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Although, the total number of both Chinese and indigenous companies had 
increased, the rise in the number of indigenous companies (from 2,788 to 8,236) 
was much higher than the increase in the number of Chinese companies (from 
1,319 to 2,487).  On the other hand, in the overall increase in large businesses 
(both Chinese and indigenous) between 1968 and 1998, the rate of growth in the 
number of Chinese businesses was faster than that of the indigenous businesses. 
Proportionately more Chinese than indigenous people make a living in trading 
activities (20% as against 11%).107 The Chinese remain dominant in certain 
businesses, such as car and motorcycles retail, gold trading, building materials, 
and electronics. However, the indigenous businesspeople are more dominant 
in silver and other handicrafts, transportation, hotel, and construction. The 
development of Chinese businesses in Yogyakarta will be discussed further in the 
next chapter.
Table 4.  Trading enterprises in Yogyakarta according to ethnicity, 1968 & 
1998.
Scale 1968 1998
Chinese % Indigenous % Chinese % Indigenous %
Large 4 17 20 83 126 26 355 74
Middle 119 39 194 61 701 31 1,590 69
Small 1,196 32 2,574 68 1,660 21 6,291 70
Total 1,319 32 2,788 68 2,487 23 8,236 77
Source: Biro Statistik DIY (1969), and Kantor Departemen Perindustrian dan Perdagangan Kotamadya 
Yogyakarta (1998).
While it may well be true that the majority of Chinese remain in the business 
sector, there are no statistics that identify the occupations of the Chinese or the 
number of employers and employees. Moreover, it is sometimes very difficult to 
draw the line between these two categories, because many white-collar functions 
are performed by sons, brothers, or other closed relatives who may be considered 
as part-owners of the business. It is also common that many Chinese workers have 
their own small businesses, usually in informal sectors, such as small food stalls 
or sundries stands in their homes. Many of them have become professionals as 
107 See the occupations of the Yogyanese as described earlier (p.45).
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well, such as doctors, lawyers, pharmacists, accountants, managers, beauticians, 
designers, and architects. As elsewhere, only a handful of Yogyakarta Chinese 
have become government employees; those that have are primarily in the fields 
of medicine and education.108 Presently, Chinese are rarely employed as shop 
assistants, moneylenders, drivers, nurses, or teachers. According to a source at 
Sanata Dharma University109, most Chinese graduates from that institute do not 
become teachers.
Religion
Until 1960, the larger proportion of the Chinese community in Yogyakarta, 
both peranakan and totok, embraced a variety of Chinese traditional religions 
(Liem, 1960:24-27).110 Various elements of beliefs and rituals, such as ancestor 
worship, the worship of household gods, the offering of incense, were practices 
more consistently observed amongst totok than peranakan. Many peranakan no 
longer understood the detailed rituals and ceremonies. It was not uncommon 
that peranakan mixed these practices with elements of Javanese religion, and 
tradition such as presenting wayang kulit (shadow puppet) performances during 
ceremonies in the klenteng, Chinese temple. In addition to these adherents of 
Chinese religions, there were about 2000 Christian among the peranakan. The 
Protestant Chinese in Yogyakarta had their own church, i.e., Gereja Tionghoa 
Kie Tek Kauw Hwee, one of the Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI, Indonesian 
Christian/Protestant Church) churches. Another Chinese church was Ho Kim 
Tong, now called Gereja Kalam Kudus. According to one of the founders, Koe Yoe 
Lioeng, many members of this church were Hokchia who came from Protestant 
families in China.111
108 There is a popular assumption that Chinese are having less interested in becoming public servants, however, 
Chinese feel that they are restricted or hampered from entering in the civil service. The truth may be lie 
somewhere in between these two perceptions.
109 Sanata Dharma University is a Catholic university that formerly specialised in teacher training education.
110 Traditional Chinese religion includes a wide range of beliefs and practises, which mix Confucianism, Tao-
ism, and Buddhism. For a detailed description on traditional Chinese religion, see Willmott, 1960:197-
207.
111 According to Twang Peck-Yang, a number of Hokchia were Protestants even before their immigration 
(1998:327).
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Although reliable data on religious affiliation was not available during the 
period of my fieldwork, it is safe to say that the majority of Chinese in Yogyakarta 
are Christians. They do not belong to the same church or denomination. There are 
numerous Catholics churches in the city, as well as several Protestant denominations. 
There are at least three major Protestant churches in Yogyakarta, whose members 
are predominantly Chinese, i.e., Gereja Kristen Indonesia in Ngupasan, Ge reja 
Alethea on Magelang Street, and Gereja Kalam Kudus in Beskalan. 
Although there are two old klenteng,112 and a few new Buddhist temples in 
the city, the number of Buddhists and Confucianists in the Yogyakarta Chinese 
community is small. The situation, which is completely different situation to the 
one in 1960, is a consequence of the New Order government restrictions on the 
practise of Chinese traditional religions.113 According to a prominent Buddhist in 
Yogya karta, many locally born Buddhists are affiliated with Tridharma, a religious 
association that combine the practise of three religious teachings:  Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Taoism.114 Members of the Buddhist community belong 
to different sects, such as Theravada, Buddhayana, Mahayana, Maitreya, and 
Nicheren. It should be noted here that the majority of Buddhists in Yogyakarta 
are not the locally born Chinese, but usually students from Sumatera and 
Kalimantan, who come to study at one of the city’s universities. According to an 
activist of the Young Buddhist Association of Klenteng Gondomanan, none of 
their members are Yogyakarta Chinese.
In regards to Islam, according to the head of the Perkumpulan Islam Tionghoa 
Indonesia (PITI), Chinese Indonesian Muslim Association, in Yogyakarta, its 
membership is estimated to be approximately 200 families. Many of them are 
members of mixed-marriage families, usually between the marriages between 
indigenous Muslims and Chinese mualaf, converted Chinese. Although not all 
Chinese Muslims are members of the association, he assumed that the actual total 
of Chinese Muslims in the city would not be much higher than this.
112 Klenteng ‘Fuk Ling Miao’ (Hok Tik Bio) in Gondomanan was founded in 1845, and Klenteng ‘Kwan Tee 
Kiong in Poncowinatan-Jetis in 1883, on land granted by the Sultan.
113 Further discussion of their accommodation in socio-cultural life will be presented in Chap-     ter 5.
114 As early as the 1930s, Tri Dharma or Sam Kauw (three teachings) followers associated themselves with 
Buddhism; the Tri Dharma association is a member of Perwalian Umat Buddha Indonesia (Walubi), the 
Buddhist Council of Indonesia (Brown, 1989: 107); see alsoWillmott, 1960:251-257.
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It is common to find members of one family professing different religions. 
Although many Chinese are Christian, they may still practise certain rituals or 
ceremonies of traditional Chinese beliefs, such as ancestor worship and worship at 
the family cemetery, particularly on special occasions on the traditional Chinese 
calendar. 
Education
When the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) School was opened in 1907, the 
Yogyakarta Chinese obtained acesss to modern education.115  One year later, the 
Dutch opened the Hollandsch Chineesche School (HCS), the first Dutch-Chinese 
school.116 Over the course of time, more Chinese students attended HCS. 
Children of totok and a small number of poor peranakan who were interested 
in preserving Chinese language and tradition attended the THHK School, while 
most of peranakan favoured the HCS. Even the Chinese community leader, Major 
Yap Hong Sing, the founder of THHK, sent his children to the Europeesche Lagere 
School (ELS), the primary school for Europeans. Later he opened his own HCS.
The main reason that the Chinese preferred HCS was that its curriculum 
was more oriented to practical life, so that its alumni secured jobs with relative 
ease. The curriculum of the Chinese school system did not fulfil job requirements, 
including Dutch language proficiency, in both Dutch and peranakan enterprises. 
Bing and Bun, two Hokchia men in Pajeksan, revealed that they could not secure 
jobs as shop assistants in Chinese-owned stores in the 1940s, simply because 
they were not able to speak and read Dutch. Moreover, unlike in the HCS where 
students could proceed to higher levels, the THHK School provided only primary 
school education.
Although the Chinese community placed a high value on education, not 
all of their children had the opportunity to pursue it. Approximately one-third 
115 The description of Chinese education in Yogyakarta during this period is based on a acompilation of infor-
mation from Kwartanada (1997:118-135) and interviews.
116 By the end of the Dutch rule, the number of Chinese schools and HCS was equal. The Chinese schools 
were: THHK (1907), Kwong Ying (Cantonese School, 1927), Tay Tong (1935), Li Chih (1936). The HCS 
schools were: HCS Gubernemen (1908), HCS Protestant (1917), HCS Mayor Yap Hong Sing (1927), HCS 
Catholic (1934). In 1919, a school for Chinese students using the Malay language, Maleische Chineessche 
School (MCS) was opened by a Protestant missio nary. 
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of the community could not afford to pay the school fees, particularly at the 
HCS schools. The majority of Chinese in Yogyakarta seemed to achieve sufficient 
education from primary school either in THHK or HCS. Only 15.6 percent of 
the entire adult Yogyakarta Chinese population was able to speak Dutch in 1940 
(Kwartanada, 1997:128).
During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), all Dutch language schools 
in Yogyakarta were closed.117 The Japanese authorities allowed the Yogyakarta 
Chinese community to have one Chinese school, Chung Hua Hsueh Hsiao 
(CHHH). This sudden change posed difficulties for the peranakan students from 
former HCS schools because CHHH used the Chinese language.
After Indonesia proclaimed independence, a number of peranakan students 
moved from CHHH to the Sekolah Rakyat Tionghoa Katolik, Catholic Chinese 
School, which was established by Catholic nuns in 1946.118 The Protestants 
later opened a primary school for Chinese. In 1957, the government passed 
a regulation that prohibited Indonesian citizens to study at foreign schools 
(Suryadinata 1993: 88-91). As a result of this regulation, more peranakan Chinese 
Indonesian transferred from CHHH to a new school called Bhinneka,119 which 
was established to accommodate the former CHHH students (Willmott, 1961: 
86). According to Liem, the majority of Chinese in Yogyakarta studied at either 
Bhinneka other Christian schools, such as De Britto College, Stella Duce, and 
BOPKRI secondary schools. Chinese parents seldom sent their children to the 
schools where Chinese were in a minority.
The majority of peranakan high school students elected to focus their 
studies on science, while a smaller number specialised in law and economics. 
Few chose to study language and literature. Very few attended vocational high 
schools. At the university, the most favoured fields of studies were medicine and 
pharmacy,120 because they were practical and economic - jobs were lucrative and 
easier to secure.
117 The following description of Chinese education from the Japanese occupation up to the 1960 is based on 
the Liem’s study (1960:32-35).
118 Later, Sekolah Rakyat Tionghoa changed its name to Sekolah Rakyat “St. Jusup”, and was closed after 
1965.
119 This school was managed by peranakan teachers associated with Baperki.
120 This is an account on the situation in the 1950s.
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Since the abolition of Chinese language school in 1967, there has been no 
differentiation between totok and peranakan in terms of their school preference. 
All of them go to the Indonesian language schools; the majority to Christian 
schools.121 Very few Chinese attend public schools and state universities. This 
is, in part, because there is a small quota for Chinese enrolment at these public 
schools and universities, and also in part because of their own reluctance to apply 
and attend these government-run schools.122 The three most favoured private 
universities among the Chinese in Yogyakarta are Atma Jaya Yogyakarta University, 
Sanata Dharma University, and the Christian University Duta Wacana.123 
In fact, the preference for schools is dependent upon socio-econo mic status. 
Relatively speaking, most Chinese of the lower-class achieve only primary and 
secondary education. They often prefer to attend high schools that focus on 
economics, such as Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Atas (SMEA), Economic High 
School.124 Middle-class Chinese have a better chance for higher education. They 
tend to target polytechnical education that requires a minimum time of study.125 
Roughly estimated, about two-thirds of middle-class Chinese youth managed to 
attain higher education. Those who study at the university prefer management, 
accountancy, and engineering, which in their view, offer promising job prospects. 
According to Simon, a prominent businessperson, most wealthy Chinese in 
Yogyakarta send their children abroad to study. In general, it can be said that the 
level of education among the Yogyakarta Chinese is better than in the past. Due 
to their better financial situation, the number of Chinese who achieve higher 
education, particularly from the middle-class, has increased substantially.
121 In fact, only certain Catholic or Protestant schools have a large number of Chinese students. They are the 
high and middle-class schools and are located not too far from Pecinaan, including Tarakanita elementary 
and junior high schools at Bumijo, Stella Duce junior high school on Dagen Street, Stella Duce high school 
in Kotabaru, and BOPKRI I  high school, also in Kotabaru.
122 This quota will be discussed further in Chapter 5 & 6.
123 This account is based on the information from some alumni and the alumni associations of these insti-
tutes.
124 These schools provide secondary education that gives basic skills for administrative jobs in companies, such 
as accounting, bookkeeping, and office administration.
125 In Indonesia, this type of higher educational institution is an akademi, academy.
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Organisation
Prior to Indonesian independence, the Chinese community was organised 
under the leadership of a Kapten Cina, Captain of the Chinese. In some places, 
including Yogyakarta, the Chinese community was led by a Major (Majoor), 
whose rank was higher than a Captain. This quasi-military system was established 
by the Dutch, and was used to mediate between the Chinese community and the 
colonial authorities.126 In 1934, the office of the Chinese Captain in Yogyakarta, 
who was at that time, Lie Ngo An, was terminated, and the administration of 
Chinese affairs was transferred to the wijkmeester, head of the ward.127 This 
wijkmeester position was maintained throughout the Japanese occupation, but 
was abolished after independence. Today, the Chinese, like all other Indonesian 
citizens, are organised under the Indonesian administrative system.
Modern voluntary Chinese organisations and associations began to develop 
in Yogyakarta in the early 20th century.  They were partly affected by the emerging 
nationalist movement in China.128 Between 1900 and 1940, about 30 Chinese 
organisations were founded in Yogyakarta. These early organisations included 
Tiong Hoa Siang Hwee, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce; Tiong Hoa Hwee 
Koan, a Chinese association; Kong Kauw Hwee, a Confucianist organisation; 
Tiong Hoa Kie Tok Kauw, a Protestant organisation; Hua Chiao Tsing Nien Hui, 
a Chinese student organisation; Chung Hsioh, a HCS student association; Tiong 
Hoa Hoe Lie, a Chinese women’s organisation,  various mutual-help associations, 
and funeral societies, such as Hoo Hap, Sam Ban Hien, Djien Tik Hwee, Boe Sie 
Hwee, Pak Hoo Tong, and Roekoen Tionghoa Toegoe. There were also speech 
groups and professional associations.129
During the Japanese occupation, all Chinese organisations had been forced to 
merge into a single body called Hua Chiao Tsung Hui (HCTH), Overseas Chinese 
Organisation. The Hong Oe, a prominent batik businessman, was elected as the 
chairman of the HCTH. His position came to resemble that of the former Chinese 
Captain during Dutch rule (Kwartanada, 1997:125; Hardjono 1970:48). After 
126 For further discussion of the Chinese officer system, see Lohanda 1996, and Coppel, 1976:23.
127 The Chinese used the term Lotia, see Kwartanada, 1997:75, and Willmott, 1960:160.
128 For a detailed discussion on the Chinese nationalism movement in Indonesia, see Williams, 1960.
129 For a description of Chinese organisations before independence, see Kwartanada, 1997:77-88.
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independence, Chinese organisations flourished again in Yogyakarta. In 1953, 
there were 17 organisations, including Chung Hua Sang Shih Hui and Hoo 
Hap, two funeral associations, Chung Chin Hui, a Catholic Chinese association, 
and Fu Nie Hui, the Protestant women’s union. In the 1960, most Chinese 
organisations adopted Indonesian names. For example, Chung Hua Shang 
Shih Hui became Perkumpulan Kematian Jogjakarta (PKJ, Jogjakarta Funeral 
Society) and today is the Perkumpulan Urusan Kematian Yogyakarta (PUKY, 
Yogyakarta Funeral Affairs Association); Hoo Hap became Budi Abadi (Eternal 
Nature); Chung Chin Hui changed to Perkumpulan Sosial Daya Murni (Pure 
Social Action Group), and Fu Nie Hui became Ikatan Wanita Kristen (Christian 
Women’s Association). It should be noted that the largest peranakan Chinese 
organisation, Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaran Indonesia (Baperki, 
Indonesian Citizens Consultative Body), also had a branch in Yogyakarta.130
Although Chinese organisations and associations were prohibited beginning 
in 1966, the Chinese still organised and were involved in social organisations. 
Throughout the New Order, two important funeral associations in Yogyakarta, 
PUKY and Budi Abadi, remained active. A group of Chinese businesspersons 
led by Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung Onggo Hartono,131 established a leading 
basketball club for Chinese youth. There were, and continue to be, leisure 
groups, which are more popular as jogging clubs or Hash Clubs, such as the 
Yogyakarta Hash Harriers and Mataram Has Harriers, and informal groups that 
gather at Karaoke venues to sing Mandarin songs. As mentioned previously, there 
is a Chinese Muslim Association, Perkumpulan Iman Tauhid Indonesia, formerly 
Perkumpulan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (PITI).132 In 1998, a group of Chinese 
and indigenous big businesspersons established Paguyuban Mitra Masyarakat 
(Pamitra), Society Partner Association. Its main focus was to help poor people 
in coping with the impact of the monetary crisis. Chinese associations emerged 
after the fall of Suharto in 1998, incuding Perkumpulan Bhakti Putera, and 
130 Baperki was probably the most important Chinese organisation after independence. It aimed at the abolition 
of racial discrimination against the Chinese. See Somers, 1965, and Coppel, 1976.
131 Paku Alam VIII (Prince of Paku Alam principality, an enclave within the Yogyakarta Sultanate) granted 
Onggo Hartono a title of nobility, Kanjeng Raden Tumenggung. This title is usually granted to commoners 
who have made a major contribution to the society (principality).
132 The name was changed so that the group would not be perceived as exclusively Chinese. After Reformasi in 
1998, the group reinstated its former name, Perkumpulan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia.
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Perkumpulan INTI Yogyakarta. The first one was originally a student association 
of the Chinese School. The second one was a branch of the national Perkumpulan 
INTI organisation based in Jakarta. All of these organisations, associations, and 
clubs are officially open to anybody interested in joining, but in actuality, very few 
non-Chinese apply to become members, with the exception in PITI and Pamitra. 
Recently, two speech group associations have been established in Yogyakarta, the 
Fujing Association, and the Hakka Association. Their concerns are primarily 
promoting cultural activities.
Conclusion
The Chinese represent approximately three percent of the total population of 
Yogyakarta. They are the fourth most populous ethnic group in the city. Today, 
they remain highly visible in the city’s economic life, predominantly in trade and 
self-employed business. However, there have been some changes over the years. 
Presently, less Chinese are shop assistants, while more are professionals. Although 
they remain heterogeneous, the distinction between peranakan and totok has 
been blurred, and the speech groups have evolved into cultural associations. 
During the New Order, the use of Chinese written language was suppressed, and 
there was pressure for Chinese to become more ‘Indonesian’ in outer appearance. 
However, since 1998, signs of a cultural revival have emerged and a number of 
Chinese associations have been established.
Under the repressive Suharto regime, when a Chinese lifestyle was, in many 
ways, restricted, the Yogyakarta Chinese persisted in searching for appropriate or 
tactical accommodations. Chapters 4 through 6 will examine how they managed 
to cope with the problems in their economic, social, and political lives. 
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Chapter Four
Economic Assimilation
Introduction
As mentioned previously, a popular statement in Indonesian and foreign media 
is that the Chinese control 70 percent of the Indonesia economy. Although the 
figure is arguable,133 the fact that Chinese own many companies and shops along 
the main streets of cities and towns has supported this public perspective regarding 
the economic domination of Chinese in Indonesia. Consequently, the stereotype 
that all Chinese are wealthy and enjoy better living conditions than the indigenous 
Indonesians prevails. Moreover, there is a widespread perception that the Chinese 
are wealthy because of favoured treatment by the authorities with whom they are 
linked through fraudulent collusion, and that the Chinese conduct their business 
dubiously.134 It is their predominance in the economy that has become a major 
133 George Aditjondro, a leading Indonesian sociologist, suggests that the Indonesian economy is actually in 
the hands of a few listed firms controlled by the government and foreigners. It is the remaining large private 
sector, which is controlled by a handful of Chinese business families in tandem with relatives of former 
president Suharto’s families and elements of the Armed Forces. In his view, the distinction between Chinese 
and non Chinese has blurred in the web of overlapping shareholding and directorship. Under the surveil-
lance and intervention of their powerful indigenous protectors, it is an exaggeration to say that the Chinese 
minority controlled the Indonesian economy. Is there a single Chinese business that extends across the 
whole country, as if it formed a unified network of activities? See Aditjondro, 1998, “The Myth of Chinese 
Domination”. The Jakarta Post (14 August), and Wibisono, 1981 (For reaction to his argument, which was 
interpreted as an apology for Chinese economic domination, see Lubis, 1981:90-95).
134 While much attention has been devoted to the negative aspects of the Chinese businesses, their critics have 
lost sight of any positive economic role of the Chinese businesspeople. For example, during the revolution, 
when the Dutch enforced a blockade on the Indonesian economy, Chinese smugglers played an important 
role in providing basic economic and military necessities to the guerrillas. This role was never mentioned. 
Also, as Twang’s study (1998) suggests, the social and economic relationships between the Chinese money-
lenders and indigenous peasants has not been as disharmonious as one might have suspected.
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source of envy and resentment. Outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence are often 
interpreted as an expression of the resentment of the poor indigenous people 
against the rich Chinese. Prior to the May 1998 riots, anti-Chinese violence was 
directed primarily towards property, not people. It was their symbols of wealth, 
e.g., cars, stores and houses, which were targeted and destroyed.135
Many indigenous Indonesians perceived economic dominance of the 
Chinese to be improper, unjust, and undesirable. This sentiment confirms that, 
generally speaking, the Chinese are still considered to be outsiders in the society. 
The fact that the Indonesian economy is perceived  to be in the hands of a small 
group of non indigenous Indonesians is considered to be unacceptable and needs 
to be changed. Since independence, the Indonesian government, in an effort 
to narrow the economic gap between the Chinese and indigenous population, 
has undertaken various policies intended to reduce the dominant position of the 
Chinese. However, despite these discriminatory economic schemes, the Chinese 
businesses have not declined. In fact, to some extent, they have increased.
This chapter deals with the diverse reactions of the Chinese in Yogyakarta 
to pressures that aim to reduce their economic interests. The questions to be 
explored are: How do they deal with stereotypical prejudices of their economic 
status? How do they cope with their predominant economic role? What do they 
do to narrow the economic gap between themselves and the indigenous people? 
How do they respond to discriminatory economic maneuvers and pressures for 
economic assimilation? I will attempt to address these questions by focusing on 
how the Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople raise capital, the connections with 
government officials, their relationships with the indigenous entrepreneurs 
and the larger society, and their management of labour. First, I will discuss the 
government policies and programmes that promote the indigenous Indonesian 
entrepreneurs that have adverse effects on the economic position of Chinese. I 
will then review the development of the Chinese businesses in Yogyakarta during 
the New Order period.
135 This class analysis suggests that the ‘Chinese problem’ is not a racial issue, but one that was created because of 
the economic gap between the haves and the have-nots. Many indigenous intellectuals favoured this perspec-
tive, which disregarded the racist tone behind the antagonism towards the Chinese. 
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Indigenising the Indonesian Economy
After Indonesia established independence, there was a movement to nationalise 
the Dutch-dominated colonial economy. It was intended that indigenous 
Indonesians control the economy.136  In principle, the government policies did 
not speak of pribumi or asli Indonesians, but of ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ economic 
groups. However, in practice, the ‘weaker’ group coincided with indigenous 
businesspeople and the ‘stronger’ group with the Chinese. From the viewpoint 
of the government and indigenous entrepreneurs, the position of the indigenous 
business sector during the colonial period was weak. Hence, the Indonesian 
government wanted to boost economic development by placing a high priority 
on strengthening an indigenous entrepreneurial class, which would at least match 
the economic position of the Chinese. To achieve that goal, the government 
adopted a series of measures to curtail the economic role of the Chinese. 
Since the 1950s, as pressures for preferential treatment of indigenous 
entrepreneurs grew stronger, the Chinese were subject to a long list of restrictions 
in their economic activities (Willmott, 1961:88-89). In April 1950, the 
Indonesian government launched its first affirmative action programme to 
promote the indigenous business, called the Benteng, or Fortress, programme. 
This programme gave priority to indigenous businesspeople to import goods. 
To facilitate the import trade, they were granted easy access to low-interest credit 
from the state-owned banks (Anspach, 1969; Sutter, 1959). Focusing on the 
import trade to promote indigenous economic dominance was seen to be an 
apt choice, since at that time almost all the export and import trade were in the 
hands of the Dutch and the Chinese. The government also expected that the 
Benteng importers could take the advantage of their privileged position as a base 
for capital accumulation, which would sustain their expansion into other sectors 
(Robison, 1986:44).
136 The term ‘national’ was never concretely defined, but in practice, it favoured indigenous entrepreneurs and 
excluded Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent (WNI Keturunan Cina). For a more elaborate account of 
this term, see Coppel, 1983:3 and Yoon, 1991:128-129. A comprehensive analysis on the play of national 
sentiment in economic competition between the Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs can be seen in 
Wertheim, 1964. See also Anspach, 1969; Dick, 2002.
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Along with the Benteng program, the government proposed that the 
Chinese entrepreneurs should find indigenous partners and make them co-
directors and joint-owners in their firms. They should also guarantee that at least 
fifty percent of the company’s shares were owned by their indigenous partners. If 
the indigenous partners did not have sufficient capital for an initial investment, 
they should be given one half of the company’s shares at the outset, with the 
understanding that they would gradually pay for them out of their shares of the 
profits (Willmott, 1961:88). In addition, the Chinese firms should also allow a 
broader participation of indigenous staffs in the management of the business. 
Another method of reducing the Chinese influence in the Indonesian 
economy was to exclude them from certain fields in which they were already 
entrenched. For example, licenses for textile imports were granted only to 
firms owned wholly, or mostly by indigenous businesspeople. Government 
Regulations PP 42 and PP 60 of 1954 made it illegal for Chinese to own rice 
mills. In September 1957, the government issued a decree that forbade foreigners 
to establish any new enterprises or expand existing ones. Ultimately, the Chinese 
were profoundly affected by Government Regulation PP 10 of 1959 that banned 
trade by foreigners in rural areas (Coppel, 1983:37-38). Although these regulations 
restricted economic activities of foreigners and were not officially or explicitly 
applied to citizens of Chinese descent, under the banner of economic nationalism, 
the government implicitly intended to eliminate Chinese entrepreneurs from 
major fields of business.137
Upon exposure to these discriminations, most Chinese became aware of 
their sensitive position in the country. They began to believe that even though 
they were Indonesian citizens, they were targets of government restrictions of 
their economic activities. However, the extent to which it affected their lives var-
ied, depending upon their reactions. Some found new outlets for their capital 
in fields where the restrictions did not apply (Somers, 1974). Others adopted 
a wait-and-see attitude in the hope that a change of government would bring 
better conditions, while converting their capital into gold and jewellery, housing 
estates, and other investments. Some accepted indigenous business partners or 
137 On economic measures concerning Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent during the 1950s, see Willmott, 
1961:74-76, 87-90.
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bought import licenses from indigenous businesspeople who had registered as 
importers only to secure government subsidies and import licenses, but whose 
firms existed only on paper (‘briefcase importers’). These relations were known 
as Ali-Baba partnerships, in which Ali, the indigenous partners who owned the 
import licenses, cooperated with Baba, the Chinese partner who had the capital 
and business skills. A small number of Chinese businesspeople were able to find 
officials who could be bribed to waive the official restrictions. Gradually, a new 
pattern emerged in which some Chinese businesspersons cooperated with high-
ranking government officials. This cooperation brought personal and economic 
benefits for both parties and became known as the cukong system (Coppel, 1976; 
Suryadinata, 1979). By doing this, these entrepreneurs could secure the majority 
of government projects and credits, acting as the business partners of the bureau-
crats.  In the early 1970s, 90 per cent of project aid ended up in the hands of the 
cukong, who had privileged access to government contracts, investment credits 
and other funds. So, even though the government supported indigenous entre-
preneurs on paper, this policy did not succeed: Twenty years later, the indigenous 
business sector remained the ‘weaker’ group.138
After 1965, the New Order government’s decision to reverse economic 
nationalism and to embark on a market-oriented economic strategy has opened 
the way for the Chinese to participate as fully as possible in economic life. The 
Chinese business communities were seen as key players in the national economy 
and as an ally in government plans to ensure sustained economic growth (Robison, 
1986; Mackie, 1991). However, their role as the motor of economic growth 
was minimally appreciated. Instead, the opportunities that opened up for the 
Chinese were the subject of much criticism. In response to this criticism, in 1974, 
state banks were allowed to provide credit only to those companies in which 
the majority of shareholders were indigenous businesspeople, and in which the 
majority of the board of directors also were indigenous (Sadli, 1988). Continued 
criticism led to the issuance of Presidential Decree No.14 of 1979, which granted 
preferential treatment in several economic sectors to the ‘economically weak 
group’ (Coppel, 1983:154).
 
138 For an elaborate account on the failure of indigenisation policies, see Yoon, 1991:138-1143.
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In order to tackle the problem of the economic gap between the Chinese 
and indigenous communities, during the early 1980s, the New Order government 
adopted a different policy from the indigenisation policy of the previous regime. 
Instead of indigenous favouritism, the new scheme prioritised the promotion 
of inter-ethnic working relationships. The phrase pembauran bidang usaha, 
assimilation in the business field, was coined to express Chinese-Indigenous 
cooperation in business. The use of the word pembauran, which simply means 
‘assimilation’, underlines the basic policy of the New Order on the ‘Chinese 
Problem’ (see Chapter One).  Pembauran bidang usaha was part of a general 
economic assimilation scheme. Through this program, the Chinese were urged 
to refrain from developing their economic endeavours on their own, and to 
undertake social responsibility in helping to develop the indigenous economy. To 
forge cooperative relationships between indigenous and Chinese entrepreneurs, 
the government introduced the bapak angkat, foster father, programme in 1984. 
Under this scheme, big companies assisted smaller companies, which were 
largely owned by the economically weak groups, by granting credit, contracts, 
management advice, job training, and other services (Yoon, 1991:131). Like other 
affirmative action programmes intended to facilitate the business assimilation, 
this foster father scheme proved to be cumbersome and ineffective in raising the 
economic viability of the indigenous small-medium enterprises.139 
Aside from the national policy and programmes, a notable indi genisation 
policy in Yogyakarta, Governor’s Decree of 1975, declared that only indigenous 
people could own land. This decree was intended as an affirmative action policy 
to protect land from being bought by non-indigenous citizens. The government 
was concerned that the Chinese, with their perceived strong economic base, 
would dominate the land market in Yogyakarta. Aaccording to this regulation, 
the Yogyakarta Chinese were required to return their existing certificates of land 
ownership to the state and apply for new rights. Non-indigenous citizens were 
entitled to have rights to use land or a building (hak guna bangunan, HGB). 
Although this regulation is actually contrary the National Agrarian Law, which 
does not distinguish between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens, it remains 
139 If there was any notable success with the indigenisation decree, it was achieved by a handful of relatives and 
cronies of the Suharto family. The rapid rise of their businesses, which were based on favoritism and blatant 
nepotism, has been justified with the argument that at least they were indigenous-owned businesses. 
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in effect as the only law of its kind in Indonesia.140 Chinese are also not allowed 
to reside or conduct business in certain areas of the city, namely the Kraton and 
Kotagede wards. Prior to Reformasi141, there was a similar restriction applicable 
to the Chinese in the Bantul regency. There was no official regulation explicitly 
stating this restriction, however, it was commonly acknowledged and Yogyakarta 
Chinese refrained from engaging in business in the regency. 
Although they have been discriminated against and pressured to assimilate 
and narrow the economic gap, the Chinese have, in general, been able to advance. 
How has this been possible? What problems have they encountered in the course 
of their economic development? How did they address them? Before answering 
these compelling questions in detail, I will first present an overview of the overall 
of economic development of the Yogyakarta Chinese.
The Development of Yogyakarta Chinese Businesses
The establishment of Jalan Solo (Solo Street) as as a new commercial centre in 
the city in the late 1970s, to some extent, marked the expansion of Chinese 
business. While the majority of Chinese businesses were concentrated in the 
Malioboro area, a small number of Chinese entrepreneurs attempted to develop 
new businesses along a stretch of Jalan Solo. As Anwar, an 80-year old Chinese 
businessman, recalled, in the early 1950s, there was a small traditional market 
across his drugstore on Jalan Solo. Other than that, there were very few Chinese 
shops in the area.142 Although Jalan Solo is a main gateway to the city from the 
east, at that time it was not seen as an attractive commercial area. However, after 
the political turbulence of 1965 had subsided, more Chinese began to set up 
their businesses there. At the end of the 1970s, the street was lined with many 
Chinese stores, including the first department store in the city, Gardena.143  By 
140 This issue will be discussed in length in Chapter 6.
141 Reformasi is the term commonly used for the post-1998 era, after the resignation of the authoritarian Presi-
dent Suharto, ending the three decades of the New Order period.
142 Before this, Anwar assisted his father, who was born in China, selling medicines from a stall in Beringhardjo 
market.
143 Gardena Department Store is owned by Indriyati (Lie Swie Ik), a Chinese businesswoman. She and her 
husband,Tan Ie Kong, started their business in 1960 –  a stall in Beringhardjo market  on Malioboro Street, 
and then moved to Jalan Solo to run a sundries shop. 
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the 1980s, this section of Jalan Solo had been transformed into a busy commercial 
thoroughfare.
It should be noted that the development of Chinese businesses in Yogyakarta 
was not always a smooth process, in the sense that they grew out of established 
businesses. In fact, many peranakan Chinese businesses that had flourished 
during the colonial period and after independence closed. For example, big 
Chinese enterprises in batik and transportation collapsed at the end of the 
Japanese occupation, primarily because major portions of their properties were 
confiscated by the Japanese army.144  It is not clear why they were not revived 
after independence. Possibly, it is at least partially because the entrepreneurs 
could not procure enough funds or raw materials due to the indigenisation policy 
of the Indonesian government, which favoured indigenous entrepreneurs and 
importers. Until the end of the Old Order in 1965, Yogyakarta did not witness a 
rise of prominent enterprises owned by Chinese.
In the first decade of the New Order period (1970s), when the oil-boom 
fostered growth in the Indonesian economy, the Chinese businesses in Yogyakarta 
were revitalised. The oil boom permitted rapid increase in government spending 
to build an economic infrastructure. The construction business, therefore, 
flourished at this time. Under the banner of a nationalist policy, preference was 
given to the indigenous contractors; many of whom worked together with Chinese 
partners. However, few Yogyakarta Chinese in engaging in joint-partnerships with 
indigenous contractors in order to secure government projects, primarily because 
they did not have enough capital. Indigenous and Chinese businesses alike were 
able to secure lucrative government contracts and develop their own projects 
through a patronage system.145 Although Chinese were not dominant in terms 
of numbers, most of the larger construction companies were owned by Chinese 
building contractors. However, most of the major government projects were 
granted to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Along with the growing property 
business, the number of building materials stores that were owned primarily by 
144 Another cause was the lack of raw materials and funds, since the Japanese closed down the Dutch importers 
and banks. See Kwartanada, 1997:351-361.
145 It was believed that the biggest Chinese contractor at that time won some major government tenders through 
his close connection with the top-ranking official in Yogyakarta. It was rumored that he became rich because 
of his patron’s protection of his gambling business.
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Chinese increased.  Some of these stores became very popular shop for specific 
items, including Toko Lancar, which sold paints, and Toko Gadjah Mada, which 
sold ceramic tiles and bathroom fixtures. 
Another lucrative sector that began to flourish was the transport business, 
cars and motorcycles in particular. Faced with inadequate public transportation 
facilities and services, motorcycles became an affordable alternative mode of 
transportation for Yogyanese, particularly students. The pioneer in this business 
was Heri, a young Yogyakarta Chinese businessman, who began a different type 
of business from his father, who was engaged in trading gold. He became the 
sole agent of Yamaha motorcycles in the city. This was made possible through 
his uncle in Jakarta who introduced him to his friend, a Chinese businessman 
who was the national distributor for Yamaha. Heri expanded his enterprise to 
include the sale of cars. He now owns several retail branches in Yogyakarta and 
neighbouring towns, all of which bear the name of his company, Sumber Baru 
Motors. His success was followed by other Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs 
who dealt with different brands of vehicles. While Chinese still dominate bicycle 
shops in Yogyakarta, they have also become dominant in the car and motorcycles 
businesses. 
Following the “October package” (Paket Oktober, Pakto) of bank reforms 
in 1988, which enabled the establishment of new private banks,146 Chinese 
enterprises began to engage in businesses that required large capital investments. 
By facilitating access to credit, Pakto provided an opportunity to Chinese 
entrepreneurs to establish new businesses. At the same time, it gave the consumers 
the opportunity to buy cars or motorcycles on credit. Through sales on credit, 
the motorcycle and, to a lesser extent, the car business boomed. This, in turn, 
stimulated the growth of related businesses, such as garages, mechanic stalls, tire 
shops, car accessories, and the oil business. The outlets of these businesses were 
mushroomed across the city. 
Other businesses, that expanded throughout the 1980s until the 1997 
monetary crisis (krismon) were those related to domestic appliances and 
entertainment products.147 During this period, the computer business in 
146 For an elaborate account of Pakto, see Hamada, 2003.
147 Indonesian economic growth was largely influenced by the expansion of domestic consumption. See Pierre 
van der Eng, 2001.
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Yogyakarta, pioneered by Chinese businesspeople, blossomed. The progress 
of technology leading to a computerised era and its close connection with the 
educational institutions boosted the computer market in Yogyakarta. Towards the 
end of the 1980s, this large potential market became a window of opportunity for 
many small and medium-scale enterprises (SME) dealing with computer trading 
and assembling, mostly owned by indigenous businesspeople and a sizeable 
number of  Chinese entrepreneurs. Only a handful of big computer companies 
exist in this medium-sized city, most of these are owned by Chinese.  One of the 
largest computer outlets in the city is Computa, which was established in 1983 
by Handoko, a young Chinese businessman. He started the first computer outlet 
in Yogyakarta with two employees working in a small, 15-m2 office. In the early 
1990s, his company employed 70 people, occupied a three-storey building of 
1000-m2, and had diversified their products and services. While the SMEs rely on 
individual buyers, the larger enterprises usually benefited from procuring major 
projects offered by public and private institutions in Yogyakarta and neighbouring 
cities.
Chinese businesses also developed in the industrial sector. While many 
Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs remained as small and medium-scale home 
industries, a few of them managed to expand their factories, particularly 
textile manufacturers, in the late of 1980s. Five out of eight textile factories 
in Yogyakarta are owned by Chinese.148 It is difficult for them to develop their 
businesses in the face of competition with larger companies in Java. A Chinese 
medicine manufacturer faced a similar situation. After many years of experience 
selling medicine, a business that he started with the support of his father who also 
sold medicine, he undertook to revive his aunt’s unsuccessful medicine factory. 
However, his business encountered difficulties competing with the existing giant 
medicine manufacturers. 
148 Before the New Order, many Chinese were engaged in medium and large-scale batik manufacture. Some 
of them were also engaged in cloth production that used manual tools (ATBM: alat tenun bukan mesin, 
non- machine weaving equipment). None of them remained in existence in the 1960s. In the 1980s, a 
young Chinese designer and businessman opened a batik store on Malioboro, Mirota Batik. He later opened 
several branch stores in Jakarta, Surabaya and Batam. Today, his store is probably the most popular batik 
and souvenir shop in town. He is also a board member on the government board for promoting local craft 
industries.
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More successfully, Sibalec, a Chinese company that was established in the 
late 1970s and manufactured light bulbs, began to flourish in 1980s. In 1996, 
the company decided to sell the majority of its shares to an American company, 
General Electric (GE). GE has taken over Sibalec and the original owner now 
holds only a minority share in the company. 
Another example of the development of Chinese businesses is Mirota, a 
company that originally produced milk powder and ice cream. This company, 
started by Mrs. Tan Kim Tik in 1960s, was initially a small family enterprise selling 
bread, cakes and snacks. While facing tight competition with large national and 
multinational corporations, it managed to maintain its market for approximately 
twenty years. Tan’s three children eventually expanded this modest business into 
various outlets, including a supermarket, a batik and souvenirs store, a self-service 
cafeteria and bakery, an antique shop, and a furniture factory.149 Many Chinese 
businesses in Yogyakarta repeated this pattern. They developed from a small 
enterprise into a bigger company and diversified into a wide range of businesses.
Finally, it is worth noting that although many Chinese had an opportunity 
to succeed during the growth of Indonesia’s economy, a number of them failed. 
During the course of my fieldwork, I often heard stories about small-scale Chinese 
home industries that had collapsed, particularly those that dealt with food 
production (Susanto, 2001). The establishment of Indofood, currently the largest 
food industry in the country and owned by a Chinese business tycoon, has swept 
many SMEs that produced similar products out of the market. When Indofood 
introduced the instant noodle package, many producers of conventionally cooked 
noodles lost a large number of their consumers. Similarly, numerous Yogyakarta 
Chinese producers of soft-drinks experienced a loss in sales when Coca Cola and 
Fanta were introduced on the local market. While a small number of Chinese 
entrepreneurs were able to develop their food stalls and shops into larger sundries 
stores or supermarket, such as Gardena Department Store, Mirota Supermarkets, 
and Ramai Family Mall, many stores owned by indigenous and Chinese were too 
weak to contend with the large retail companies from Jakarta, such as Matahari 
149 The Mirota companies seem to be the best example of the success of Yogyakarta-born Chinese family busi-
nesses. Not only have they continued to flourish when nation-wide retailers have begun to take a market 
share in Yogyakarta, but they have become one of the ‘iconic enterprises’ of the city.
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Department Store and Hero Supermarket. Many Chinese-owned shops in Pecinan 
and on Jalan Solo experienced a decline in business or closed.150  In this context, 
it would be more appropriate to say that the development of Chinese businesses 
in this sector has been in terms of quality, rather than quantity. 
In conclusion, despite decline in certain enterprises, many Chinese 
businesses in Yogyakarta, in general, developed significantly during the New 
Order. However, no local Chinese entrepreneur has grown extraordinarily rich 
or become a business tycoon. The successful businesses were those related to 
the government projects or the local market, such as construction, computers, 
motorcycle retail, and supermarkets.  Although some factories were built by 
Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs, their development was moderate. Retail 
businesses made some progress, however, in general, the Chinese enterprises that 
had a better opportunity for growth were those that were not in direct competition 
with larger national companies.
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the economic development 
of Chinese Indonesian businesses has been set against racial prejudice and the 
government effort to advance the indigenous business community. Since the 
pressures for economic assimilation, pembauran ekonomi, has been directed toward 
the middle and large scale Chinese enterprises, this section will focus on how 
these target groups accommodate various manifestations and implications of the 
scheme for economic assimilation. I will try to answer the question by focusing 
on the ways the Yogyakarta Chinese procure financial capital for their businesses, 
the relationships between them and the authorities or individual government 
officials and aristocrats, their relations with indigenous entrepreneurs and the 
larger society, and labour relations.
Finding Seed Capital for Conducting Business in Yogyakarta
The majority of Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs started with small enterprises. 
Successful businesses were able to gradually accumulate capital. In general, it took 
ten to fifteen years to firmly establish their companies. Most of them received 
150 The decline in the number of Chinese shops in Yogyakarta was also due to discontinuity of inherited busi-
nesses. Many children of shop-owners, after having completed higher education, no longer desired to man-
age their parents’ shops. They preferred to work as professionals in major companies in big cities. 
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the initial capital from their parents or family, but only one-third inherited the 
business from their parents. It was also common that children continued to manage 
their parents’ businesses, and then started their own enterprises after they had 
accumulated enough capital. According to Li Ing, a Chinese businesswoman,151 
most middle-class parents prefer that their children start their own companies 
rather than continue the family business. She claimed that parents are happier 
if their children’s companies outgrow their parents’ businesses. This is seen 
either as a test of their capabilities or as an extension of the family business. She 
inherited her father’s shop in Pecinan, while Toni, her older brother, opened his 
own stationery business and now has become one of the major office equipment 
suppliers in Yogyakarta. 
Often, a Chinese man who marries a daughter of a wealthy Chinese 
businessman in Yogyakarta continues to run his father-in-law’s business. Rudy 
is one of these businessmen. Originally from Semarang, Rudy met his future 
wife when he came to Yogyakarta to study in 1967. He did not finish his studies 
because his father’s business declined sharply. He began to work with his father-in-
law in a gold shop. He learned everything about gold trading from his father-in-
law during this time. After approximately seven years, his father-in-law provided 
him with capital to set up his own gold shop. However, after his wife’s father died, 
Rudy was asked to manage his father-in-law’s gold shop as well. Later, he also 
established an orchid nursery and expanded into the flower trade.
The fathers-in-law all claim that they carefully selected their sons-in-law based 
particularly on their perseverance, honesty, and capacity for conducting business. 
From their perspective, financial is not the only, or most important, condition for 
starting and conducting business. Honesty, strong will and perseverance are seen 
as essential personality traits that can attract joint-investment from other Chinese 
businesspersons. This becomes clear in Thung’s experience in esta blishing his 
business. 
Thung is not from a rich family that could have provided him with initial 
capital to open his own shop. After several years of working with an excellent 
record, his boss’s friend, Mr. Lim, provided Thung with a loan to rent a small 
151 Li Ing’s father is a Shanghai-born businessman who came to Yogyakarta in the early 1900s, and set up a 
laundry business, which was still very rare at that time.
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shop. He was entrusted to sell Mr. Lim’s agricultural products. He was allowed to 
repay the loan on flexible terms.  Lim’s involvement was not based on charity, but, 
rather, on astute business considerations.152 Lim placed his confidence in Thung 
only after long deliberations and with his friend’s recommendation; only then 
did he decide that he could count on Thung’s capability to expand his business. 
Thung was, essentially, an investment in human resources. 
It is obvious from Thung’s case that apart from personal characteristics, 
having a social network is essential in developing business. Most of my informants 
reported that they secure their jobs through their relatives or friends. They also 
said that the Chinese networks make it easier for a Chinese to get a job in a 
Chinese company. This is a form of preferential treatment for Chinese, which, 
in their perspective, is understandable and rational. They claim that one more 
and better information on people come from the in-group, rather from sources 
outside the community networks.  
The stories of Rudy and Thung, and recruitment system, to some extent, 
underlie the importance of ‘trust’ in the Chinese business community. Many 
Chinese businesspersons claim that they started their businesses without any 
financial capital and relied only on the trust of others. They were able to engage 
in trade because other people trusted them to sell their products on consignment. 
In order to secure trust, people must demonstrate certain qualities according to 
unwritten, but generally known rules. Trust arises out of one’s recognition that 
one has not only the power and resources to act, but also the personal desire to 
follow the norm of reciprocity.153 Furthermore, to judge trustworthiness is to 
judge, given the rules of interaction, how a person will act in a spe cific context 
(Hamilton, 1998:63). In short, trust represents social capital that is vital to 
economic life as physical of financial capital itself.
152 As Kao (1991:272) suggests, in Chinese society, relying on personal relationships is not merely a matter of 
emotionality but of rational calculations that rest upon whether the persons involved have integrity and 
credibility. 
153 Most anthropologists and sociologists of Chinese societies argue that personal trust in Chinese business is 
inseparable from the typical Chinese guanxi relationship. Guanxi is a term conven tionally referred to as a set 
of ties that are bound by norms of reciprocity. For an elaborate ac count, see Hamilton, 1998:57-63, and Yeo-
chi King, 1991. In Yogyakarta, this term is familiar particularly among totok businesspeople, and little known 
by the younger generation Chinese.
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A major method to procure capital was also related to the established 
investment network rooted in personal relationships of trust. The capital was 
provided in the form of a loan, which was accumulated through a system of 
pooling capital organised by various savings and loan societies or mutual aid 
associations, on either a temporary or a more permanent basis.154 In this financial 
arrangement, which was called either a hui or arisan, a group of people (between 
10 and 30) met regularly and contributed equal amounts to a common fund 
at each gathering. When the main purpose of the arisan was to help the less 
fortunate members, no factor of luck or interest was involved and the aggregate 
amount was lent first to the member with the greatest needy. The last ones to 
receive the loan were the members who joined primarily to help the others. This 
type of arisan was set up not only to help newcomers starting a business, but also 
to aid those who suffered from business failures.155 
Presently, the Chinese in Yogyakarta practise both the business arisan and the 
social arisan. The former, which is more popular with the middle-class Chinese, 
function as saving and loan clubs, serving as a back-up system to support them 
in times of need.156  In this context, the core function of hui has transformed 
from a mutual aid mechanism into an economic support system. The ubiquitous 
social arisan functions as a venue for meeting friends and relatives. The hui as a 
mechanism for accumulating capital for starting a business or for contributions 
to social or charity causes, is rarely organised. 
Despite the development of formal financial institutions, the reinvestment 
of profits and the informal financial arrangements that operate through networks 
of family, friends and associates, have been more important than government 
or private financing in starting new businesses. Chinese businesspeople in 
154 This system is comparable to the modern Indonesian arisan. Lont (2001), who studied arisan organisations 
in Yogyakarta, defined this term as a collective financial arrangement whereby participants make regular 
contributions to a kitty, which is immediately redistributed to each participant in turn. The sequence of 
disbursement is determined on the basis of a lottery, auction, or mutual agreement. See also Geertz, 1962.
155 This form of mutual aid was provided as long as the person in need was perceived by his/her fellow to be 
trustworthy. For an account on types of hui and the unique way of the Hokchia pooled capital, see Twang, 
1998:57-58.
156 ‘Piao’ (refers to a way of determining the disbursement of the collected monies through an auction) is a com-
mon practise in this arisan, in which members can request early allotment by agreeing to contribute more 
than the others. 
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Yogyakarta, particularly those engaged in SMEs are reluctant to use bank loans 
to start their businesses. In their opinion, only those who want to establish or 
operate big businesses need to obtain credit from the bank. The fact that few 
national banks were interested in opening branch offices in Yogyakarta, at 
least until the 1990s, is an indication of this low usage of bank credit.  Budi, a 
young Chinese entrepreneur who used bank loans to operate his manufacturing 
business, stated that most Chinese still manage their businesses in Yogyakarta in 
a traditional manner, and are not high-risk takers like the Chinese in big cities, 
such as Jakarta, Surabaya or Semarang. He also noticed that, in the perspective 
of conservative Chinese entrepreneurs, the state of being in debt is not regarded 
as a virtue. However, it may not be only this attitude amongst the Yogyakarta 
Chinese that explains their low use of bank services; it is also a matter of less 
access to bank loans. In Indonesia, the typical collateral to secure a loan from a 
bank is a certificate of land ownership, whereas the Yogyakarta Chinese do not 
have landownership rights.  
It is, thus, primarily through informal channels that the Chinese in 
Yogyakarta have been able to accumulate capital to start their businesses. This is 
part of an old pattern of mutual support, but it is also a response to the system 
that excluded them from loans or low-interest credit from state-owned financial 
institutions. The Yogyakarta Chinese were able to meet their own financial 
needs for starting and expanding their businesses with the capital investments 
from inheritance, networks of family, friends, and associates, trusted personal 
relationships, and accumulated income and profits.157 The latter two were the 
major sources of investment capital for Chinese in Yogyakarta.
The next section will deal with problems and accommodation in regards to 
the connection between Chinese economic activities and government intervention 
or obstructions. According to Mackie (1995:46), the Chinese Indonesians, more 
than any other Southeast Asian Chinese, must cope with two major obstacles. 
The first obstacle is array of covert discriminatory measures in a variety of illegal, 
157 Although the Chinese Indonesian has lost much of its Chinese traits, interestingly one can still see the resem-
blance of their finance arrangement with the Chinese elsewhere, especially on the connection between their 
access to capital investment and the guanxi-based personal networks. See Hamilton, 1998, and Eugene K.B. 
Tan, 2000.
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but accepted forms. The second is  the Indonesian political system, which is still 
highly patrimonial with a top-down power structure, in which access to crucial 
governments projects, subsidised credit, licenses, and monopolies depends largely 
on personal contacts with political leaders at the highest national and local levels. 
Under such a political system, political connections and protection have been an 
almost essential conditions for economic success for Indonesian businesspeople, 
both Chinese or indigenous.
Dealing with Bureaucracy
A Totok Who Is Trying To Stand Up For Himself
A Thiam ran a small shop that sold chemical dyes for batik painting. In the early 
1970s, he opened his shop in Ngasem, a neighbourhood within the boundaries of 
the Kraton, the Sultan’s Palace, where, traditionally, only indigenous Indonesians 
are allowed to reside. He rented a small shop from a Javanese and used this Javanese 
name on his business license. For several years, he did not encounter any problems, 
because the camat (sub-district head) was a friend of the shop’s owner. When he 
had to extend the license in the 1980s, a new government employee realised that, 
in fact, a Chinese ran the business. This was an opportunity for blackmail. A Thiam 
knew that it was just a matter of money. He did not mind paying it, but business 
was not very good at that time and the requested fee was very high. He refused to 
pay. He did not feel that he was wrong, because he was originally offered the space 
for his business. If anyone was to be blamed for misusing the license, it would be 
the shop’s owner. The official was upset and yelled at him: “Who do you think you 
are? If you do not want to pay, you had better go home to China. You earn a living 
here in my country, so you must pay!” A Thiam was really offended by that remark, 
and wanted to take the case to court. He said, “I am not afraid of a corrupt official, 
I will send him to jail, together with me if necessary!” However, his family was 
extremely worried and asked him not to proceed with the case. They advised him 
to cooperate with the official. They said, “After all, we Chinese would never win”. 
A Thiam chose to move his business away from the Kraton area, rather than pay 
someone who had insulted him. 
A Thiam’s case illustrates a common problem the Chinese in Indonesia face in 
dealing with government officials. The Chinese are often perceived as objects of 
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exploitation and racketeering. They often victimised and blamed when events 
run contrary to a desired outcome. The compliant reaction of A Thiam’s family 
reflects the common attitude of Chinese Indonesians. They acknowledged the 
weakness of their position and, in order to avoid further trouble, they attempt to 
minimise conflicts and avoid confrontation with the authorities. However, this 
is not to say that the Yogyakarta Chinese are not assertive. They are not afraid, as 
long as they are right, and they refuse to be treated unfairly. Unlike the middle-
class peranakan Chinese who are not so outspoken in defending their rights, 
middle-lower class totok Chinese and of ethnically mixed Chinese are bolder. 
According to several Chinese businesspeople, the Yogyakarta government, 
for the most part, does not discriminate against them. In fact, in some cases, 
they support the establishment of specific Chinese companies that can increase 
the local government income through taxes and that also create employment 
opportunities.158 
In the past, the local government of Bantul district was the only exception 
to this kind support, as it did not grant permits to Chinese businesspeole to 
establish their businesses in the regency. However, after Reformasi in 1998, the 
regency chief (Bupati) guaranteed a group of Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople 
that there would no longer be any discrimination against the Chinese who want 
to conduct business in the regency. He welcomed all businesspeople, including 
the Chinese, to participate in developing the economy of the Bantul regency. 
Treatment of the Chinese by government officials may not be consistent 
between administrative levels. The official treatment or application of policy may 
be friendly to Chinese at the higher level, but it could be antagonistic at the lower 
levels, or vice versa. It depends very much on the political and economic interests 
of the government officials who hold the power. Sometimes they may support the 
Chinese businesses, but at other times they restrict them.
The following case illustrates how the Yogyakarta provincial administration 
applied a policy that differed from the central government in Jakarta. SB was a 
light bulb factory under the direction of Sukaca. After graduating from Chinese 
158 However, as Herman, an outspoken Chinese professional, pointed out, there is reciprocation to the govern-
ment officials in return for their support. Although those high-ranking officials do not demand any payback, 
their support is considered to be mutuall beneficial. The practice of tahu sama tahu (mutual acknowledg-
ment) is prevalent amongst the Indonesian businesss community.
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school in Yogyakarta, Sukaca moved to Jakarta to look for employment. In 1975, 
he and his brother had the idea to build a light bulb factory. However, they were 
not able to get a license from the national office of the Department of Industries. 
Neither were they given a reasonable explanation. Later, they found out that there 
was collusion between government officials and Phillips Company, who wanted 
a monopoly of light bulb manufacturing. Sukaca returned to Yogyakarta and 
explored the possibilities of building the factory in his hometown. He discussed 
this with his friend who was the head of regional office of the Department of 
Industry in Yogyakarta. He received approval for his factory (SB). Other local 
government departments were enthusiastic and supportive. Initially, the product 
was sold only in the Yogyakarta province. After almost a year of production, 
Sukaca received a warning letter from the Department of Industry in Jakarta, 
demanding that he stop production and close the factory. The local government 
officials advised him to play hide and seek, i.e., to close the factory if there was to 
be an inspection from the national office and then to resume normal operations 
again after inspector left. This subversion was possible because the officials in 
Yogyakarta were notified prior the arrtival of the officials from Jakarta. This cat 
and mouse game continued for almost one year, until the members of the Dewan 
Pertimbangan Agung (DPA), National Advisory Council, visited the Department 
of Industry in Yogyakarta. They inquired into any problems regarding industrial 
development in the area, and they requested information about the SB case. After 
meeting and talking with the managers of SB, the members of the DPA, who 
were mostly retired generals, promised to discuss the problem with the officials 
in Jakarta. Two weeks later, a group of officials from the national office of the 
Department of Industry arrived from Jakarta to meet the SB managers. They were 
upset about the inquiry by the DPA and accused the SB managers of making a 
false indictment. In the end, SB was granted a permit to operate its factory.
The SB case indicates that the problem often does not lie with the official 
policy, but rather with the implementation of the policy by the state officials. 
In this context, differences in treatments are based primarily on the amount of 
a bribe, or on the proximity of the personal relationship between the Chinese 
businesspeople and the government officials. 
Relationships between the businesspersons and the officials vary widely. 
Usually, the connection is between people of equivalent levels, i.e., owners of 
middle-sized businesses deal with the middle-ranking officials, and small or 
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casual businesspersons make friends with the lower-ranking staff members in the 
government office that is appropriate with to their bureaucratic needs. 
The nature of the relationship also varies. Some relationships may be 
close and long-lasting, some may be more ceremonial, while others are either 
professional or casual. The first close and long-lasting type may be a patronage 
relationship.  The ceremonial ones tend to be rigid, since they are rather formal. 
Businesspeople tend to cater overtly to the officials. Professional relationships can 
be interpreted as partnerships; people know each other professionally and they 
meet often to handle the same affairs together. A gift in this relationship is meant 
as a reward, a gratuity. It is not viewed as bribery and it is given after services 
are rendered. Casual relationships occur only when the businessperson needs an 
isolated favour.
Loyalty is not a common factor in a ceremonial relationship. Some 
government officials are offended when some Chinese businesspeople forget 
them after they retire. One official stated, “When they need you, they worship 
you like a slave, but if you are no longer in position to give them benefits, then 
you are a nobody in their eyes”.159 However, a Chinese businessman who often 
make dealt with the bureaucrats said that many Chinese businesspeople view 
the government connections as investments rather than as personal relationships. 
The officials facilitate their businesses and then they receive payment in return. 
“That’s all. It’s just as simple as that!”
A stronger relationship was sustained in a case that was supported more by 
partnership than a patron-client or ceremonial relationship because the parties 
involved were of equal status. Waluyo’s expericence in establishing his business 
is an example of this kind of partnership. Waluyo is a member of a group of 
major cement distributors in Yogyakarta. He began this business in the early 80s, 
when his friend, a Chinese businessman and cement distributor in another town, 
wanted Waluyo to sell part of his quota of cement in Yogyakarta. Later, he was 
159 Some Chinese businessmen said that what they do is to accommodate the greedy character of some power 
holders and their family by spoiling them with money, gifts and various services (including sexual services 
if necessary). It is not a secret that some officials ask for this service, particularly those officials from Jakarta 
when they have a working visit to the region.. They acknowledged that some Chinese businessmen are very 
persistent in persuading those officials and their families. These kinds of businessmen know very well how 
to please those government or military officials, to make them feel “special”. In short, they try to impress the 
officials as if they could make their dream come true.
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introduced to the director of a sate-owned enterprise (Badan Usaha Milik Negara, 
BUMN) that handled the regional distribution of cement. Waluyo was appointed 
as to be a sub-distributor. Initially, Waluyo was alloted only a small quota, but 
this increased gradually because he maintained a good efficiency review. After 
several years, he was promoted and became a distributor, on equal statusl as 
the state distributor in Yogyakarta. He admitted that his success was dependent 
upon the nurture and support of the state enterprise. He started the business 
virtually without any financial capital, only with trust. He said, “I didn’t have any 
money to give the official in order to be appointed as a distributor. I never gave 
them anything to maintain the position. They trusted me because I conducted 
the business correctly and honestly”. Waluyo considers his relationship with 
the BUMN director to be a functional one. They are close as far as business is 
concerned. Waluyo respects the BUMN director because he does not misuse his 
position for his own benefit. The director told Waluyo that his success was based 
on his abiltiy to guide his BUMN to perform well, i.e., when all the distributors 
were doing their best and making their payments. He expected good work, not 
bribery. He encouraged his distributors to become independent. Waluyo highly 
appreciated this partnership based on fairness character without racial overtones. 
He hopes that he can depend on the system, and not just this one individual. 
These cases illustrate that the relationship between Chinese businesspeople 
and government officials differs, not only in the form, but also in the quality 
and type of relationship. It is not correct, then, to judge all connections beween 
Chinese businesspeople and government officials or institutions as corrupt 
collusion.  Some of them have established professional business relationships, 
especially with well-organised state enterprises (BUMN) that have reliable 
managers.160 In the light of a system approach, whenever the system does not 
discriminate or abuse power, then it is no longer necessary for the Chinese who 
want to do business legally and fairly, to resort to bribery. 
160  According to some Chinese entrepreneurs, they acquired credit at state-owned banks not because of collu-
sion, but because of a decision based on trust and professional considerations. Contrary to popular preju-
dice, the Chinese entrepreneurs are generally perceived by banks to betrusted clients. There have been, 
however, businesspeople who have betrayed that trust. Waluyo said, “We are annoyed by such unethical 
behaviour because it has affected the reputation of all Chinese”. Therefore, he advised to his indigenous 
friends who were bank managers, not to make generalisations about Chinese business people, but to make 
inquiries about the individual’s trustworthiness within the Chinese business community.
86
Unfortunately, despite a slight improvement in recent years, Indonesia 
continues to rank poorly on Transparency International’s corruption index. 
Many tenders for big government projects are manipulated behind the screen 
between the officials and their business partners, so the tender itself is only a 
formal procedure. Government officials leak crucial information about the most 
feasible prices for projects to their partners. Alternatively, the businesspeople can 
use a letter from a high-ranking official to win the tender.
It is interesting that the competition for the position of most favoured client 
often occurs amongst the Chinese themselves. In some cases, to prevent conflicts, 
the contesting businesspeople agreed beforehand to an arrangement for sequential 
access to tender. This system ensures that each company will get its turn to win 
the tender, however, the winner must pay the ‘waiting cost’, uang tunggu, to the 
other contestants. While some Chinese entrepreneurs may experience difficulties 
or face unfair treatment in the tender process, others can benefit from such a 
corrupt system. 
This may be a major reason why many Yogyakarta Chinese avoid dealing 
with the government, even though the government projects are generally the 
largest projects. They prefer doing business with private companies, or they will 
select those government departments that are considered to be less corrupt than 
the others. According to Freddy, a computer businessman, he and his suppliers 
worked with the government only if they managed to negotiate a fair contract 
because they are seen as a trustworthy, professional company. He added, “Of 
course, I don’t get as many government projects as those who have connections, 
but I have steady contracts with some ‘clean’ government partners”.
According to Handoyo who had many years of experience dealing with 
government officials, there are particular fields that are targeted by government 
officials as lucrative. These are the ‘juicy’ areas where there are ample chances to 
manipulate regulations and engaged in subtle extortion, in short to make a lot 
of money in a short period. These fields include construction, supply of goods 
for government offices, and big industries. In commerce, wholesale and retail 
trade, there are fewer opportunities and consequently less cases of government 
intervention. Chinese shopkeepers are primarily concerned with security and 
racketeering. They usually rely on individual’s police personnel, the military, 
or sometimes influential ‘preman’, hoodlums, as protectors.  Both regular 
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and irregular exactions are paid. These payments are not crippling to Chinese 
economic activities, but they are sometimes onerous.161
Chinese businesspeople adopt different approaches in dealing with the 
corrupt system and its officials. One manuever is to bend the rules. This can be 
seen in the case of tax avoidance, which is common in Indonesia. A common 
complaint in Indonesia is that the tax system in Indonesia is not reasonable and 
fair, so taxpayers often lie or hide their real situation, and submit false reports. 
Nevertheless, they claim that the tax inspectors never believe the reports. They 
always try to find mistakes and increase the tax payment. Yayuk, who handles the 
tax returns of some Chinese companies, reported occasionally the tax inspector 
teaches her how to manipulate the report in order to reduce the tax payment. Of 
course, these lessons are not free; the company pays them for the tips. There are 
businesspeople who see the corrupt inspectors as an opportunity to avoid taxes or 
to pay as little as possible,162 however, there are other businesspeople, like Waluyo, 
who employs a tax agent to handle his tax returns professionally. By so doing, 
he is able to minimise the chance of being exploited by the tax inspectors. He 
reports that the majority of Chinese businesses in the Malioboro area employ the 
same tax agent, a Chinese public accountant who gainned the trust of his clients 
through personal recommendations.163 
In sum, the Chinese businesspeople face a variety of situations, which, 
consequently require with a variety of responses. Shop owners do not need to 
establish any special relationship with power holders, as their businesses are 
not strongly dependent upon them. Their success is determined by free trade, 
which depends on supply and demand. The situation is very different from those 
businesses that deal directly with government’s projects or require government 
authorisation. There may be no other way to win the tenders or to obtain the 
161 A senior businessman showed me a stack of letters from government, police, and military offices asking 
for contributions (sumbangan/bantuan) to support their various interests (most of which were not personal 
needs). Some letters came from indigenous social organisations. These letters were sent to him as the chair-
man of a Chinese social organisation. He usually raised money by collecting contributions from the Chinese 
business community in Yogyakarta. He kept almost all the receipts for accountability. 
162 Some businesspeople do not deny that this is one of the reasons that enable businesspeople in Indonesia to 
become rich quickly, as their profits are not reduced heavily by taxes. 
163 In Western societies, it is usual for companies and individuals to employ tax agents to handle their tax 
returns. These are accountants qualified and licensed for this specialised task. Their role is to minimise the 
amount payable to the state by their client within legal limits.
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licenses without having special connections with the officials who make the final 
decisions. So, in certain businesses, the need to have connections or backup 
from officials is essential. This is applicable for both Chinese and indigenous 
entrepreneurs who know from experience that the restrictions and obstructions 
from the bureaucracy will cause inefficiency, and assume that connections with 
power holders will smooth their path. Some opportunistic businesspersons might 
voluntarily join the game that has been set up by the officials for their personal 
benefit, and pay a kind of tribute for the facilities and protection granted to them. 
Others have no choice but to resort to bribe because they fear that their business 
will collapse. Whether this fear is justified is difficult to determine, but there is 
always the danger that if they do not join the game, other businesspersons may 
use the opportunity and replace them.
The Relations between Chinese and Indigenous Entrepreneurs 
One major factor that have contributed to the absence of tension between Chinese 
and indigenous entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta is that business competition is not 
intense. There are few cases of direct economic competition between Chinese 
and indigenous businesspersons. Many of them are in different fields, and 
consequently have different targets and markets. The Chinese entrepreneurs are 
dominant in specific areas, including car and motorcycle dealerships, electronics 
stores, machinery and tire shops, and the gold trade. According to the Department 
of Commerce, the indigenous enterprises dominate the computer business, taxi 
companies, hotels, transportation, batik, silvercraft and handicrafts. In those 
enterprises where there are Chinese distributors and indigenous sub-distributors, 
they work together as partners. Since they operate on different levels of the same 
business, they do not compete with each other. 
It is also worth noting that business replacement, i.e., Chinese businesspeople 
taking over businesses that were traditionally run by indigenous entrepreneurs, 
such as batik and silvercraft, does not occur in Yogyakarta.  The batik business, 
for example, remains in the hands of indigenous businesspeople. On the other 
hand, some businesses that were traditionally dominated by Chinese are no 
longer exclusively in their hands. In the bakpia (a baked snack) business, for 
example, currently there are many more indigenous entrepreneurs than Chinese 
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who make and market the snack.164 These indigenous workers were formerly 
employed at Yogyakarta Chinese bakpia home industries and later opened their 
own enterprises. A Chinese businesswoman who has run a bakpia business since 
1971 said, “I don’t see the indigenous bakpia businesses as competitors. I think 
it’s good for the indigenous people to open their own shops so they don’t perceive 
the Chinese as dominating this business. My personal relations with my former 
employees are still good”. This is one examples of an indigenous home industry 
that developed through an internship with a Chinese business. The bakpia case is 
the most visible example of a natural development of pembauran ekonomi.
 Another example of the cooperation between Chinese and indigenous 
entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta, is the Tohib case. Tohib is the largest indigenous 
electronic store in the city. According to Suko, a Muslim Chinese who engaged in 
the electronic business, he helped his old friend, Tohib, establish his electronics 
business in 1984, by recommending him for loans from banks. Suko also 
introduced Tohib to his business connections in Jakarta so that he had access to 
merchandise that he could sell on consignment. In the beginning, Suko visited 
Tohib at his store and they discussed any problems that Tohib faced in his new 
business. In Some Chinese entrepreneurs have made major contributions to the 
development of small-scale handicraft enterprises owned by indigenous craftsmen, 
primarily by providing training and access to markets.
Nevertheless, joint business ventures between Chinese and indigenous 
entrepreneurs rarely occurr. Generally, most businesses in Yogyakarta are not 
big enough to require a joint-investment. Sali, a Chinese businesswoman who 
formerly cooperated with indigenous handicraft enterprises, suggested another 
perspective to the obstacles that prevent joint ventures:  a difference in working 
ethics. She said, “We play by a different set of rules, which they often cannot or 
do not want to follow. So, rather than creating a problem, I’d rather handle the 
business myself ”. 
The shop owners in the Malioboro area, who represent various ethnic groups, 
cooperate well. They established an association called Paguyuban Pengusaha 
164 Bakpia business has become an important home industry in Yogyakarta, since it is known as a ‘specific snack 
of Yogyakarta’, a gift to bring home by domestic tourists.
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Malioboro (PPM), Malioboro Entrepreneurs Association.165 The association 
aims to maintain harmony, kerukunan, among its members, and functions as 
their representative in dealing with the authorities and other economic actors 
along Malioboro Street.166  In early 1998, a group of Chinese and indigenous 
businesspeople established a social association called Paguyuban Mitra Masyarakat 
(Pamitra), Social Partners Association. The organisers explained that the business 
people in Yogyakarta were concerned about the severe impact of the economic 
crisis on the lowest income sector. Pamitra aimed to assist the poor by lightening 
their economic burden. These mixed ethnic group associations are a way for the 
Chinese businesspeople to form  alliances with the indigenous partners, not only 
in coping with the social impacts of the financial crisis, but also to incorporate 
the minority group’s interests into the majority group’s aim. To this day, the 
‘Malioboro incorporation’ has successfully prevented disintegration amongst the 
economic actors in the commercial centre of Yogyakarta.167
Labour Relations
The claim that Chinese companies prefer to employ Chinese workers is not 
solely based on prejudices. There is some truth in the statement, particularly 
in the past during the colonial period through the early years of independence. 
However, it should be understood in its proper context, and not be viewed as 
impermeable. According to Handoko, his grandfather told him the story of 
how Chinese built their businesses starting as small-scale family enterprises with 
limited capital. Family members (nephews, nieces, uncles, aunts, etc) pitched 
165 According to the head of PPM, a Chinese businessman, although the larger members of this association are 
Chinese shop-owners, race is not an issue. They are bounded by common interests as business people. It does 
not necessary mean that no individuals who think in racial term.  But when conflict of interest occurred, 
racial issue had never brought forward.
166 Having shared the economic activities with other groups, occasionally, the PPM have to deal with them, 
such as “Paguyuban Pengusaha Kaki Lima Malioboro” (Association of Sidewalks Traders), “Paguyuban Tu-
kang Parkir Malioboro” (Association of Parking  Organisers), and “Paguyuban Tukang Becak” (Association 
of Becak drivers).
167 Irregular meetings of all associations in Malioboro were held for consolidation. In conjunction with the 
city government, they managed to make Malioboro area free from political campaigns during the election 
periods, no party’s banners were allowed. 
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in to do the work. Although they were paid, it was not according to the labour 
market standard. However, if there was a sudden need for cash, for example, to 
pay doctor or school fees, they could borrow money or ask for assistance from the 
business owner.  These labour relations were not formal and were managed by a 
family system, sistem kekeluargaan.  In this way, the family businesses could be 
efficient and accumulate capital. It was because of this family arrangement that 
the Chinese business preferred Chinese employees. It was highly unlikely that the 
indigenous workers would be willing to accept the working condition and pay of 
the family arrangement. 
Currently, many Chinese companies have more indigenous, rather than 
Chinese, employees, and they also hire indigenous professionals as managers. 
However, the preference for recruiting indigenous employees may differ between 
Chinese companies. Some Chinese businesspeople continue to worry about 
Muslims and they prefer to hire Christian or Hindu workers because they believe 
that the latter are less confrontational with Chinese and more reliable.168 On 
the other hand, there are Chinese businesses that deliberately employ Muslims 
to prevent ethnic and religious stigmatisation. Many Chinese enterprises adopt 
pragmatist recruitment policies. 
A noticeable problem in labour relations between Chinese business peo-
ple and their indigenous employees is a gap between working values and stan- 
dards of achievement. Chinese entrepreneurs often complain about the work 
ethos of their employees. Many Chinese who engage in the export business 
have difficulty to encouraging their indigenous workers to finish a products on 
time and to fulfil the required standards. The situation is delicate. On the one 
hand,  the  Chinese  employers  perceive  the  indigenous  employees  as  lacking  of 
a mentality for hard working.169 On the other hand, the indigenous workers 
168 According to Tjun Hai, who prefer Christian employees, the stereotypical prejudice against Moslems has to 
do with the fact that many anti-Chinese movements were sponsored by Moslems, and many Chinese busi-
ness people are Christian. In addition, he said that indigenous Christians are sometimes discriminated in 
labour market (Moslems business prefers to employ Moslems) therefore as Christian he feels fair enough to 
favour on them.
169 Marcel, a mixed-origin Chinese, who supervised labours in furniture industry, told me that it was difficult to 
ask his workers to take overtime, as most of them preferred to hang out at the malls. Probably because most 
of them are youngsters, or the extra time money is not worthy. Some individuals said that they did not want 
to work hard to enrich the Chinese.
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feel that the Chinese employers exploit them without compensating them 
fairly.170 
These problems are solved in different ways. In general, the employers 
try to ignore the problem, while attempting to meet their expectancy through 
better recruitments. Some Chinese entrepreneurs strive to teach work ethos to 
their employees, or to provide them with professional training. Several Chinese 
businesspersons are aware that it is not only a matter of labour relations, but also 
a matter of cultural strategy. They maintain a familiar personal relationship with 
their employees. Oei Tjhan Hwat, for example, always writes a special poem as 
a present for the wedding of his employees. As Tjun Hai, a successful Chinese 
businessman, said: “If you employ Javanese workers, you must know Javanese 
culture.” Tjun Hai studied books on Javanese people and culture to learn how 
to win the heart of his employees, how to encourage their loyalty, and how to 
develop their sense of belonging to his company. 
Another story from the Employee’s Cooperative (Koperasi Karyawan) of 
the Samitex (textile factory) illustrates how winning the heats of employees is not 
always a matter of money. Since its establishment in 1983, the Samitex’s employee 
cooperative did not receive financial support from the company, however the 
company provided the cooperative by giving a small office, which also functioned 
as a warung. The cooperative serves more than 2000 Samitex’s employees as a 
savings and credits association, and also sells basic necessities at low prices. In 
2006, this cooperative received an award as one of the best cooperatives in the 
country.
Social Responsibility
In 1997, as the result of the economic crisis, a textile industry owned by a 
prominent Chinese company in Yogyakarta, decided to reduce the number of 
its employees. The workers protested this decision and asked the government 
to intervene. Eventually, the managers withdrew their decision to release any 
employees. They instituted a new shift system and a reduction of working hours. 
170 According to Waluyo, he did not discriminate indigenous and non indigenous employee in term of salary. 
His principle is ‘the rewards will be commensurate with the results made.” So in his opinion, it would be 
unfair if he gives equal remuneration without distinguishing between the hard-working employee and the 
casual one.
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Although this new system resulted in less pay for the employees, they accepted 
the conditions. The company finally granted the workers’ demands for salaries in 
accordance with upah minimum regional (UMR, regional minimum wages).171
The Chinese businesspeople in Yogyakarta are aware that their perceived 
dominant role in the economy is continuously under public scrutiny. The 
periodic outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence that have occurred elsewhere have 
alerted them to the possibility of similar outbreaks in their hometown. Many 
Yogyakarta Chinese have realised that they cannot rely on the protection of the 
authorities. They are quite conscious of the popular pressures that demand their 
atention to the needs of the society-at-large. Charity is the main characteristic of 
the Chinese business community’s accommondation to these pressures.172  
According to Anwar, an owner of several drug stores and a board member 
of the Indonesian Red Cross, individuals or associations of Chinese people have 
sponsored various charity activities with the intention of building a positive image. 
These activities included building mosques and contributing financial support 
to pesantren, Koranic school, Islamic orphanages, and other indigenous social 
organisations. Those organisations they choose to support are those perceived to 
be in a position to influence the larger indigenous society.  
During the economic crisis, Chinese’s companies regularly or ganised 
pembagian sembako, distribution of basic daily needs, including rice, sugar and 
cooking oil, for the less indigenous sector, particularly those who worked or lived 
in their neighbourhood, such as the pedicab drivers. If the poor indigenous people 
can be halped, they may have less inclined to join in any mass violence. 
Long before the financial crisis, three Yogyakarta Chinese businessmen 
organised a scholarship fund for the children’s of their employees and the less 
fortunate indigenous children, who lived in the area of their companies. Jumadi 
Stated, “These scholarship produce better results than paying protection money. 
In other words, social protection from the community is often more effective 
than protection from the police.”  
171 See Bernas, 23 Juni 1998.
172 In the past, two Chinese big entrepreneurs had made phenomenal contributions to the people of Yogyakarta, 
namely: the ‘Yap’ eye hospital and the ‘Gembiraloka Zoo’, which had rendered benevolent services to so-
ciety.
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In addition to charity, a handful of Chinese entrepreneurs wished to show 
their social concern in an effort to counter the popular image of the Chinese as 
pure economic beings. Besides his efforts to lessen the unemployment in the 
kampung where his factory operated, Tjun Hai focused greater attention to the 
kampung youth programs, particularly in sports. He occasionally joined the group 
of young kampung men who gather round the gate of his factory almost every 
night. Tjun Hai said: “I like to chat and play cards with them.”  Another Chinese 
businessman, Oei Tjhan Hwat, has been publicly recognised for his great interest 
and writing in Javanese poetry. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to note two cases of Chinese companies that took 
responsibility for the pollution produced by their factories.173 In 1994, a claim 
was made against the Sibalec light bulb factory. The waste from the factory had 
contaminated the ground water and the wells of nearby residents. The Yogyakarta 
government formed an investigative team that produced evidence that the pol-
lution had originated from Sibalec factory. Increasing publicity on the matter 
prompted the Bupati to organise a meeting between the company and residents. 
Eventually, an agreement was reached between the two parties. The agreement 
included compensation, repair of waste management facilities and monitoring 
of water quality.
Samitex, a textile factory located on the outskirt of Yogyakarta, caused noise 
pollution and contamination of the ground water in the nearby village. After 
residents affected by the pollution reported it to local officials, a series of meetings 
involving both industry and community representatives was held by officials from 
the government Environmental Bureau. Despite the failure of early negotiation, 
the company eventually accepted responsibility for the pollution, agreed to 
repair its waste management, to pay compensation, and installing drinking water 
facilities for the community. The community agreed not to make further demand 
on the factory for these problems.
173 This account is based on the following sources: Siti Megadianty Adam, 1997, “Kasus Sibalec”; Siti Mega-
dianty Adam and Takdir Rahmadi, 1997, “Kasus.Samitex.”  
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Conclusion
Although the Suharto government did not consistently impose discriminatory 
economic measures against the Chinese, the corrupt system of this government 
did affect the Chinese business community. For lucrative businesses, cultivating 
connection with high-rank government officials became essential. As with 
Chinese business people elsewhere, the Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople were 
also treated as a ‘milking-cow’, being a convenient targets of extortion. Despite 
this, a significant number of Chinese entrepreneurs have managed to survive and 
flourish in the business world. Others, however, have been unable to survive in 
the liberalised market competition.
Yogyakarta Chinese entrepreneurs adopted diverse strategies to accomplish 
and to protect their business interests. A small number of Chinese big business 
established patronage connection with authorities, some resorted to bribery to ease 
their business relationships, and others preferred to engage in businesses that were 
not connected with government projects. While it might assumed that conflict 
characterise the competition between the Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs, 
it did not. On the contrary, a small but significant number established venues of 
cooperation between them. Although most Chinese business employ indigenous 
managers and staffs, their preference vary: some take religion and ethnicity 
into account, while many others make their decisions based on professional 
competence.  
The Chinese accomplishment in business was not without cost. As we 
about to see in the next chapter, the Chinese have had much less space to assert 
their Chinese-ness. Their media, schools, cultural life, and organisations have 
been circumscribed. How did they handle this? Have they been able to deliver 
anything to counterbalance the pressures? 
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Chapter Five
Socio-Cultural Accommodation
Introduction
Besides the predominant role of the Chinese in the country’s economy, their 
real or perceived social exclusivity is also constantly a target of popular criticism. 
Chinese willingness to merge into the mainstream Indonesian society is continually 
questioned.174
Between 1967 and 1997, the New Order government demanded total 
assimilation of the Chinese in Indonesia and insisted that the process of 
pembauran, assimilation, be accelerated. The government considered culture 
to be the main obstacle in this process. To quote from the handbook for the 
resolution on the ‘Chinese problem’ in Indonesia: “Guidance to assimilate in the 
realisation of unity of the nation should be geared towards the establishment of 
unity in the value system, and therefore all forms of cultural affinity based on the 
country of origin should be removed.”175
The logic of the assimilation policy required the Chinese to relinquish 
their Chinese-ness and to be absorbed without trace into the indigenous society. 
Chinese-ness became, more or less, a forbidden cultural identity. The official policy 
of assimilation pressured the Chinese minority to erase as many traces of Chinese-
ness as possible, e.g., by assuming Indonesian names, or abandoning Chinese 
customs. This assimilation had to be realised through government-sponsored 
social engineering in the form of legislation that required the Chinese to abandon 
174 See Jahja, 1983 and 1991.His books contain a collection of the indigenous perceptions toward the Chinese 
in Indonesia.
175 Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Indonesia (Bakin), Coordinating Body for National Intelligence), 1979.
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their culture and exclusiveness. In 1977, the government established the Badan 
Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Bakom-PKB), the Communicative 
Body for the Appreciation of National Unity, which acted as the coordinating 
body to promote and accelerate the process of assimilation.176
Thirty-five years have passed since the New Order regime implemented a 
series of regulations that were intended to accelerate the process of assimilation. 
The formal manifestation of the government’s intent to assimilate the Chinese 
into the mainstream society took shape in various policies that were meant to 
suppress the Chinese identity. While there were no clear sanctions for those who 
ignored them, the regulations have, in general, discouraging effects. The general 
response has been compliance, albeit with covert reluctance, although there 
have been occasional attempts to ignore or maneuver around the regulations. 
The responses varied between different sections of the Chinese community. This 
chapter attempts to assess how the Yogyakarta Chinese have responded to the 
pressures to assimilate during the New Order. To what extent do ethnic Chinese 
Indonesian citizens preserve their Chinese identity or traits, and what kind of 
strategies have they adopted? What kind of identity developed in the process? 
How do they overcome the negative stereotypes or popular perceptions towards 
them? How do they deal with the regulations restricting their social activities?
Generally, it can be said there are two types of pressures: first, legal pressure 
from the government, and secondly, social pressure from the indigenous 
Indonesians. 
Regulations on Assimilation during the New Order
In his speech to the General Session of Parliament on the 16 August 1967, acting 
President Suharto appealed to Indonesian citizens of foreign descent to no longer 
delay their assimilation into the indigenous community (Coppel, 2002:22). The 
New Order government was determined to accelerate the assimilation process 
through regulations.177 These regulations were meant to eradicate the main 
176 Bakom-PKB was set up in every province. The role of Bakom-PKB will be discussed further in the next 
chapter.
177 On 9 December 1967, the government established the Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina (SCUT), Special Staff for 
Chinese Affairs, whose purpose was to assist the government to formulate policies regarding the Chinese and 
to supervise the implementation of these policies. See Coppel, 1983:131.
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obstacles to the process: ethnic exclusivity and cultural affinity to the country of 
origin.178
The first step in accelerating the assimilation process was the regulation 
issued in 1966 that promoted the replacement of Chinese names with indigenous 
names. There was an existing law (UU No.4 of 1961) that called for a changing of 
names, however, neither of these regulations were actively enforced. The Suharto 
government simplified the procedure to encourage the Chinese to adopt names 
that followed the local customs.
In order to foster complete and homogenous unity of the Indonesian 
nation, in June 1967, the government formulated a regulation on Chinese 
religion, beliefs and customs, which took form in Presidential Instruction No.14 
of 1967. According to this law, the manifestation of Chinese religion, beliefs and 
customs could lead to inappropriate psychological, mental, and moral influences 
on Indonesian citizens and hinder the process of assimilation. It, therefore, 
required regulation. First, the practice of Chinese religions should be observed 
only personally or privately within the family. Second, celebrations of Chinese 
religious festivals and traditional ceremonies could be celebrated only in places of 
worship that had been designated for that purpose. In other words, these activities 
could not be held in public forums.179
With the emergence of the New Order, Chinese organisations have been 
etiher banned or discouraged. The Chinese could only join organisations 
that were generally Indonesian in nature (Suryadinata, 1978:97). All Chinese 
language newspapers were closed, except for the government-controlled Harian 
Indonesia.180 The use of Chinese language and script in public was discouraged. 
The government Censor Board required the Chinese language spoken in 
Mandarin movies to be dubbed into Indonesian (Suryadinata, 1978:160).
Although Chinese language schools were prohibited in July 1966, the 
government allowed for the establishment of schools sponsored by private 
178 The most extensive published compilation can be found in the three volumes Pedoman Penyelesaian Masalah 
CIna di Indonesia, Guide to the Solution of the Chinese Problem in Indonesia, published by the Coordinat-
ing Body for National Intelligence (Bakin, 1979). It resembles, in a sense, “Final Solution” in Germany. See 
Beller, 1989.
179 See Joint Decision of the Minister for Religion, Minister for Internal Affairs, and the Attorney General of 
the Republic of Indonesia No. 67, 111, and 224 of 1980, translated in Coppel, 2002:  Appendix F.
180 See Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No.49 of 1967.
99
groups within the Chinese communities. The schools called Sekolah Nasional 
Projek Chusus (SNPC), Special Project National Schools, followed the national 
curriculum, but Chinese language was added as an extracurricular subject.181 
In Yogyakarta, there was only one SNPC, i.e., Sekolah Bhinneka. In 1975, all 
SPNC schools in Indonesia were closed because some of these schools allegedly 
used Chinese as the language of instruction. This abolition marked the complete 
curtailment of Chinese cultural influence through formal religious, social, media, 
and educational institutions.
Following Tan (1991), a review of the implementation of the regulations 
indicates that the restrictions were enforced most consistently on the use of 
Chinese script in public places, the sale of Chinese language publications, and 
the existence of Chinese language schools. The implementation of the regulations 
concerning their cultural lives was not always definitive and consistent, and often 
depended on the attitude of the local authorities towards the Chinese.
Stereotypes and Grievances of the Social Lives of the Chinese
Coppel (1983:5) extracted a composite stereotype of the Chinese from published 
sources, summarising indigenous Indonesians per ceptions of the Chinese:
The Chinese are clannish, and prefer to live in their own neighbourhoods. 
They cling persistently to their ancestral culture. Chinese who identify with 
Indonesia are not genuine and only pretend to be Indonesian for opportunistic 
reasons. This opportunism is characteristic of a people concerned with money, 
trade or business. They are not like Indonesians, who are dedicated to ideals, not 
material wealth.
Warnaen’s study (2002) on the perception of ethnic stereotypes prevailing in 
Indonesia revealed that Chinese are labeled as stingy and crafty. They are deeply 
integrated into their families and distrustful of outsiders. These stereotypes 
are commonly expressed in daily conversations amongst indigenous Yogyanese 
and give rise to popular grievances and accusations of exclusiveness and asocial 
attitudes of the Chinese.These perceptions leave the Chinese feeling uneasy. It 
is noed, for example, that Chinese prefer to live on streets or in housing estates 
181 For a detailed account of Chinese language schools in Indonesia, see Suryadinata, 1978b.
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where the majority of the residents are Chinese, rather than in the kampungs 
inhabited primarily by indigenous Indonesians, or that they rarely participate 
in social gatherings and communal work that are organised by the kampung 
residents. It is common to hear complaints about Chinese who seldom attend 
kampung meetings and, instead of participating in the communal neighbourhood 
guard duty at night (ronda or siskamling), prefer to pay someone to do it in their 
stead.
Another Chinese characteristic that has become the subject of criticism is 
their strong sense of community that leads to the formation of exclusive informal 
groups and social associations of which the memberships are predominantly 
Chinese. The fact that the majority of Chinese children attend private schools that 
have many Chinese students is seen as one example of this presumed exclusivity. 
There is also a perception amongst indigenous Indonesians that the Chinese 
consider themselves to be socially superior to others and, consequently, prefer to 
restrict social interaction with them.
Many Javanese thought that Chinese place too much emphasis on wealth 
and were not sincere in nurturing friendships. Even when they were kind to 
others, they always expected something in return. Three Javanese women, Mur, Ti 
and Eni, spoke about their friendships with Chinese girls at a prestigious Catholic 
school for girls. Their Chinese friends were generous and always treated them at 
the school cafeteria, but then they asked for small favours. While Chinese might 
interprete this interaction as reciprocity, it is perceived by the Javanese adversely 
as it counters the Javanese ethics of pamrih, that, ideally, one’s actions should be 
free and not be motivated by self-interest.182
Few Chinese would concede that there are grounds for these grievances. 
Many would rather say that these traits may be true of some Chinese, but they 
are not the general rule. It is difficult to determine to what extent indigenous 
Indonesians hold these perceptions and grievances, which may be far from a true 
description of the Chinese as a group.183 However, the frequency with which these 
images and complaints appear, and the arguments among the Chinese themselves 
about how to counteract them, suggest that they are far from unimportant.
An ethnic stereotype may produce an ethnic prejudice, an erro neous concept 
182 Pamrih is explored in Anderson’s “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture” (1972).
183 See Warnaen 2002 and Jaspar 1982.
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of a particular ethnic group, that tends to generalise characteristic views, e.g., ‘all 
Chinese’. In many indigenous Indonesian minds, the Chinese are either shop-
owners, well-to-do professionals, or big business tycoons. However, in reality, 
the Chinese community is highly diverse, and its members respond differently to 
these indigenous prejudices and grievances. 
Two Kampungs, Two Stories
The following description focuses on two kampungs where Yogyakarta Chinese 
live in Pecinan: Pajeksan and Beskalan. Pajeksan is on the north side of Gandekan 
Street, to the west of Malioboro Street; Beskalan is on the south side of Gandekan 
Street. These stories illustrate how two different Chinese communities responded 
to their respective residential situations.
Chinese houses are scattered throughout Pajeksan. Most of the Chinese 
who live in Pajeksan are descendants of totok fathers from Hokchia and Javanese 
mothers. They have lived there alongside their indigenous neighbours since the 
1950s. The majority of Pajeksan residents, both Chinese and indigenous, are 
employees or labourers. More Chinese than indigenous residents are engaged in 
business, such as small warung, sundries and food stalls, becak rentals, food home-
industries, charcoal business, and dressmaking. Both the Chinese and indigenous 
residents have achieved relatively similar levels of education, i.e., completion of 
secondary school.
In the 1950s, this kampung had a reputation for gambling and drinking. 
There was a high degree of unemployment and many young people were involved 
in petty crime and ethnically mixed gangs. The mixed indigenous-Chinese gang 
from Pajeksan, which was led by a Chinese, had a high standing among other 
gangs in town. According to Marsel, even today, indigenous Yogyanese from 
other kampungs who have conflicts with the Chinese of Pajeksan do not dare 
to cause trouble in this kampung. That is due not only to the reputation of the 
Pajeksan gang, but also to the strong kampung solidarity. The residents, both 
Chinese and indigenous, see themselves simply as orang Pajeksan, or Pajeksan 
people, particularly when they face intrusion from outsiders.184 
184 For discussion on ‘insiders’and ‘outsiders’, see Ellias & Scotson, 1996.
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Over a fifteen year period (1982-1997), two Chinese were repeatedly elected 
as Ketua RT, ward headmen. As Bimbim, a young mixed indigenous-Chinese, 
said, “Ethnicity and religion have never been social barriers in this kampung. 
Almost every night you can find Chinese and Javanese kumpul-kumpul, hanging 
out in the alleys or at warung kopi (stalls which serve hot coffee, tea and snacks), 
chatting or playing cards, sometimes until late in the night. All of the Chinese 
participate in ronda duty.” Even Chinese residents who have moved away, visit 
occasionally to attend kampung meetings or just to mampir, drop in to visit. 
They claim that they long for the intimacy that they do not find in their new 
neighbourhoods. According to Ging and Bing, who formerly served as the ward 
headmen, the Chinese in Pajeksan never felt that they were under pressure to 
merge into, or forced to adapt to, the indigenous society. Social adjustment 
in daily life is natural in Pajeksan; many, although not all, of its Chinese and 
indigenous residents have developed a mutual understanding. During the period 
of my fieldwork, I attended two wedding ceremonies of Chinese women and 
Javanese men. Mixed marriages are a common thing in Pajeksan. There have 
been, of course, conflicts between the ethnic groups; however, they have not 
focused on ethnicity.
The Beskalan kampong presents a different picture. Most Chinese who 
live here are middle-class peranakan, but there are also a number of middle-
class totok. The majority of them are engaged in trading and manufacturing 
businesses. Some residents have become professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, 
and accountants. Most of indigenous residents are middle-class employees and 
middle and lower-class labourers. 
Formerly, many Chinese associations were located here. Presently, there is 
only the Gereja Kalam Kudus, which is referred to as a Chinese Protestant church 
and that conduct some of its services in Chinese.185 The church now attracts those 
Protestant Chinese who prefer a Chinese language service, most of whom are 
originally from parts of Sumatera where they have used Chinese daily. The fact 
that this church maintains the Chinese language service and teaches Mandarin 
185 If most of the Chinese who live in this area are peranakan, one wonders, why they use the Chinese language 
in the church services. According to Jen, a young church activist, the church was established by totok Chris-
tians, but its members are mixed totok and peranakan. Prior to the New Order, the sevices were held exclu-
sively in Chinese; during the New Order, services were offered in both Chinese language and Indonesian.
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in Sunday school reflects the influence of senior members who are totok Chinese 
and the support of its peranakan members who are able to speak Chinese and 
approved the use of the Chinese language in this church.
The Chinese and indigenous residents in kampung Beskalan are separated 
by a street, although there are some indigenous families living on the Chinese 
side. All of the ward headmen in the Chinese section have been Chinese who 
were elected by the community.186 The segregated, albeit unofficial, nature of the 
residential area, to some extent, created a barrier for social interaction between 
the two ethnic groups. Even the Chinese rarely interacted with each other. Their 
houses were usually closed and the residents did not kumpul-kumpul in the 
kampong alleys as was done in Pajeksan. According to Li Ing, who has lived here 
since the 1970s, most Chinese in this neighbourhood were preoccupied with 
their businesses; they had little time even for their families. Only Chinese women 
attended the neighbourhood arisan, rotating credit association meetings. There 
were, however, other opportunities for Chinese and indigenous people in Beskalan 
to meet, such as at the daily market, regular religious gatherings, and meetings 
of the organising committee for Indonesian Independence Day celeberations. 
Occasionally, there are briefings from the sub-district or district administration 
concerning kampung matters in the neighbourhood meeting hall.
A problem arose with the issue of the neighbourhood night guard duty, 
because few Chinese were willing to participate personally. According to Parjo, 
the indigenous ward headman, many indigenous residents complained about the 
absence of the Chinese and refused to guard the Chinese houses if the Chinese 
themselves did not participate. They said that they did not want to be watchdogs 
for the Chinese. In the kampung meeting, the Chinese residents proposed to hire 
professional security personnel. The indigenous residents rejected this proposal 
and regarded it as a sign of exclusiveness and lack of social solidarity. Indigenous 
Christian residents played an important mediating role to lessen the tensions. 
The Chinese denied the accusation of exclusiveness and explained that they were 
only trying to be pragmatic. If, on the one hand, the indigenous residents wanted 
their participation in guarding the kampung, but, on the other hand, the Chinese 
186 RT (Rukun Tetangga) and RW (Rukun Warga) are the neighbourhood associations that manage various com-
munity affairs. They are the lowest level of the government administration system. See Sullivan, 1992.
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were too busy, then why not hire other people to guard their residences? This 
pragmatic approach addressed the security needs, but ignored the social element 
of the kampung patrol. This conflict revealed the different values and interests of 
the Chinese and the indigenous residents of Beskalan.
Quest for Identity
According to Wang Gungwu (1991:198), the Chinese have never had a concept of 
identity, only a concept of ‘Chinese-ness’, i.e., of being Chinese and of becoming 
un-Chinese. This implies that one could be ‘more Chinese’ or ‘less Chinese’, but 
this does not lead to a concept of identity.187 It can be said that this is an opinion 
the Chinese and indigenous Indonesians share. It is the Chinese-ness that became 
the target of eradication in the assimilation measures, so that the Chinese in 
Indonesia would cease to be Chinese. The responses of the Yogyakarta Chinese to 
the attempts to erase their Chinese-ness can be distinguised into four categories.
The first group can be referred to as the natural assimilationists. These 
Chinese do not perceive assimilation to be a problem. On the contrary, they 
believe that it is a natural thing for Chinese to gradually merge into the local 
indigenous society. However, unlike the assimilationist group in the 1960s that was 
driven by political consciousness, these natural assimilationists are not products 
of political postures. They do not bother to offer excuses; they just assimilate 
silently.188 Most Chinese who belong to this group are lower and middle-class and 
are engaged in the non-business sectors, primarily in socio-cultural occupations, 
such as journalists, artists, and painters. Among the prominent figures of this 
group are the well-known painter Sidik Martowidjoyo and the famous dancer- 
comedian Didik Ninik Thowok. They are usually descendants of mixed-ethnic 
marriages, but they are somewhat different from peranakan who have developed 
a distinct culture of their own. Their way of life and attitudes are more akin to 
187 In their study of the Chinese and Chinese-ness, cultural studies theorists have criticised the hegemonic 
formation in discussions of the Chinese. They point out that the search by overseas Chinese for an authentic 
Chinese meaning is inherently flawed and futile. They argue that the notion of Chinese and Chinese-ness 
are contingent, often multiple and evolving (Wong, 2003). See also Ang Ien, 1994.
188 Hardjono (1970:44) called this group, ‘the silent majority’, those who silently integrate into the indigenous 
community.
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the local Javanese. Their characteristics have been disassociated from the negative 
stereotypes of the Chinese, such as being clannish, economically motivated and 
socially exclusive. It is not surprising that many of them have virtually disappeared 
into the local indigenous society. In Javanese, these assimilated Chinese are known 
as kasno, which is abbreviated from bekas cino, former Chinese.
It should be noted, however, that the situation is not always static. Some 
young natural assimilationists I met in Pajeksan, Jogonegaran and Kemetiran, 
who are longer recognisable as Chinese, say that their feelings of ‘being Chinese’ 
sometimes fluctuate. Although they know that they are only half-Chinese, they 
still feel an affinity to the Chinese community in particular situations. When the 
sky in Jakarta, Solo and Kebumen turned red because of fires, and Chinese people 
were looted and killed, they too felt the pain. They were upset when indigenous 
Indonesians repeatedly blamed the Chinese as the cause of Indonesia’s financial 
crisis.
In the taxi, on the way to her home in Pajeksan, Susi listened while the driver vilified 
the Chinese as the evil ones who devastated the indigenous economy by conducting 
deceitful business. He did not realise that Susi was part-Chinese, because she 
resembles her mother, a Javanese woman. The taxi driver did not suspect anything 
when Susi tried to explain that the Chinese were not the only ones hoarding food 
supplies, but that there were also wealthy Javanese merchants doing the same thing. 
Nevertheless, the driver ignored her comment. She was very offended.
Another story from Yayuk also suggests the possibility of identity change. 
She was raised in mixed-ethnic family who lived in an indigenous kampung. 
Most of her friends in the kampung and at school were Javanese. She saw herself 
as a Javanese, even though her father was totok Chinese. This changed, however, 
when she started to work in a Chinese company where most of her colleagues were 
Chinese. This Chinese environment gradually influenced her sense of identity, 
and today she feels that she has become ‘more Chinese’ than Javanese in her way 
of thinking, although less so in her attitude. She said that her Chinese friends 
in the company also shared her feelings. Nevertheless, Yayuk kept her father’s 
principle that they belonged to the local community, and eventually, like all her 
sisters, she married a Javanese man, a friend from secondary school.
Members of this group rarely experienced racial discrimination, largely 
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because they resembled indigenous Indonesians, rather than Chinese. Interesting 
stories surface from this issue of physical appearance. Bimbim, who does not 
appear to be Chinese, went to a government office to request a form that was 
required for Chinese who plan to get married. The official did not believe that 
Bimbim was Chinese and accused him of deception. Fortunately, a senior official 
who happened to know Bimbim’s father well was able to moderate the dispute. 
He told Bimbim not to fill out the form because he was accepted as indigenous, 
not Chinese.
The second group is made up of the opportunistic assimilationists. Many 
of them are uneasy with their Chinese label because it may lead to difficulties. 
To some extent, being Chinese in Indonesia may be risky, as Chinese have been 
convenient targets of harassment, exploitation, abuse, and violence. Therefore, 
to avoid any problems arising from their ethnicity, some Chinese attempt to 
disguise or camouflage it in various ways. They adopt Indonesian names, wear 
batik attire at formal occasions, and show interest in the assimilation programme 
and indigenous culture, not because they are genuinely enthusiastic about it, but 
merely as a cover. At the extreme end, a number of them publicly reject their 
Chinese-ness. Some members of this group have converted to Islam.
By doing this, they claim that they are already ‘indigenous’ and hope that 
they will no longer be associated with the unfavourable stereotypes of the Chinese. 
In Javanese, this second group is called Kirno, which stands for mungkir, deny, 
Cino, Chinese; an acronym used to criticise Chinese who denied being Chinese. 
Most Chinese of this group belong to the middle-class business community. The 
motivation behind their assimilation is to escape from a difficult situation or 
discrimination encountered in their businesses. The opportunistic assimialtionists 
assume that discrimination is not aimed at the Chinese as a whole, but rather, at 
those Chinese who refuse to assimilate to dominant norms.
Members of this group, as well as others, have been creative in adopting 
Indonesian-sounding names. They usually adopt the names that correspond to 
their Chinese surname phonetically or in meaning. For example, the surname 
Lim may be transformed into Limanto or Salim, and the name Oei may change 
into Wijaya, both names meaning ‘victorious’. Often, conversions to Islam are 
superficial and they become nominal Muslims or ‘Islam KTP’ (identity card 
Islam). The indication on the identity card (kartu tanda penduduk, KTP) of Islam 
as their religion may help to deflect any discriminatory treatment. They often 
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flaunt charity activities by exposing them to media coverage. In these ways, this 
group’s assimilation appears to be superficial.
In actuality, members of this category have not abandoned Chinese culture 
or distanced themselves from the Chinese community. They still celebrate Chinese 
New Year and perform traditional Chinese marriage and funeral ceremonies. Most 
of them also belong to a Chinese funeral society or other predominantly Chinese 
clubs. Their denial of being Chinese is purely for the purpose of promoting a 
favourable image in the indigenous community.
The third group can be referred to as the symbolic assimilationists. For them, 
being a good Indonesian citizen does not necessary mean ceasing to be Chinese. 
According to this group, assimilation is not an escape from discrimination, but 
rather, its effect. They claim that the process of assimilation is not a natural 
one, but is forced upon them by the New Order government; therefore, their 
responses are not natural either. In facing the pressures of assimilation, their 
general response has been one of compliance. They accommodate the pressures 
at the least possible cost. Although they acknowledge inter-ethnic marriage and 
religious conversion, this group opposes the use of these social processes for the 
purposes of assimilation. For the symbolic assimilationists, it is the attributes of 
culture that matters in the government-imposed assimilation, not the essence. 
Their accommodation is, basically artificial, behavioural adjustments without 
changing their basic way of life.
According to this group, whose members are primarily upper middle-class 
businesspeople and professionals, the demand for total assimilation is an absurd 
notion. As one of them asked, “How can a duck become a chicken?” They do 
not believe the Javanese way of life would conform well to their way of living, 
of which they are proud.189 Often, an implicit pride of being Chinese resonates 
in their remarks.190 For instance, they remark on how the Chinese always work 
industriously, enhance their successes, initiate development programmes in their 
189 At this point, it is important to note that mutual negative stereotyping between Chinese and indigenous 
people exist. Generally speaking, the Chinese perceive indigenous people to be sluggish, less hard-working 
and unreliable.
190 They also keep up with the recent events in China. I could see enthusiasm in their faces when we talked 
about the remarkable development of China. Apparently, the fact that China is now growing as a prominent 
economic power in the world, to some extent, influences their pride in being Chinese. See Koning & Su-
santo, 2007.
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kampungs, and never give up striving for a better life.191
However, they tend to be indifferent in response to indigenous criticism 
of the apparent Chinese fervour in making money. Pak Andi, an outspoken 
Yogyakarta Chinese whose grandmother is Javanese, said, “We cannot be like 
them and live on a day-to-day basis, never thinking in a long-term perspective. 
They can do that, perhaps, because they take this land for granted and they 
can rely on their fellow-countrymen. But we have to struggle to survive. The 
indigenous people criticise the Chinese without being aware of the problems we 
are facing. We’re not crazy about money. Many Chinese are poor. But, we must 
earn a living, otherwise we won’t be able to live here.” Many Chinese in this 
group who share Pak Andi’s view emphasised that they do not care about what 
people say, as long as it is not illegal or inflicts a financial loss on anyone.
The fourth group consists of the cosmopolitan assimilationist. This group 
is the result of the process of Indonesianisation during the New Order. They 
are the younger generation of Chinese who feel totally Indonesian. Members of 
this group are no longer able to speak Chinese and no longer practise or observe 
anything related to Chinese culture whatsoever. They live exactly like other young 
urban Indonesians of their generation. Their only Chinese traits, if any, may be in 
their physical appearance.
Since the Chinese traditions are foreign to them, they do not see the 
absence of these traditions in their lives as a problem. They were not raised under 
circumstances where Chinese or peranakan culture had an effect on their lives. 
They know nothing about the assimilationist-integrationist debates in the 1960s. 
Therefore, they do not feel any loss of culture, nor do they have any desire to fight 
for its survival.
Their lifestyles are derived from the modern, cosmopolitan Indonesian 
culture that does not belong to any local tradition. Their families may no longer 
celebrate Chinese New Year, but they do observe Christmas and the international 
New Year. Moreover, like other Indonesians of the younger generation, they are 
more akin to modern Indonesian or western music and dance. According to some 
191 A peranakan Chinese remarked that the stereotype of the hard-working Chinese more appropriate applied 
to the earliest migrants and totoks Chinese. He recalled that until the early 1970s, most peranakan-owned 
shops on Malioboro closed between 2 and 5 p.m. for an afternoon rest and reopened in the evening. For the 
mutual stereotypes between the peranakan and the totok, see Chapter 3.
109
young Yogyakarta Chinese in Pecinan, very few young Chinese in their social 
circle own Mandarin song collections. Most of them are, however, familiar with 
Indonesian or western popular music and idols.192
Although these cosmopolitan assimilationists really considered themselves to 
be one hundred percent Indonesian, their convictions are challenged repeatedly. 
In the face of covert discrimination and periodic anti-Chinese violence elsewhere, 
some of these young Chinese begin to realise that they are not fully accepted as 
Indonesians, and then they begin to distance themselves from the indigenous 
majority. It is this group of Chinese who sometimes experience identity crisis. 
Generally, however, many of them remain positive about their identities as 
Indonesians. They are quite critical and open-minded in understanding the 
disadvantaged position of the Chinese in Indonesia, in the sense that they do not 
see it as an isolated Chinese problem, but as the result of the poor management of 
the country’s political and economic health. Several educated Yogyakarta Chinese 
are aware of general injustice in Indonesia, and that the indigenous people of 
Aceh, Papua, and other areas are also victims of it. In other word, they do not 
view their situation as purely ethnic-base. Very few members of this group joined 
the new Chinese associations in Yogyakarta that emerged after Reformasi.
It is difficult to determine exactly which of these groups is the largest. 
However, if we risk simplification by referring to the National Census 2000, 
which indicates that the majority of Yogyakarta Chinese population belongs to 
the younger generation (see Chapter 3), it can be assumed that the cosmopolitan 
assimilationist and the natural assimilationist dominate the present community.
Residential Strategy
Most Yogyakarta Chinese live in Pecinan neighbourhoods, areas where they have 
lived for centuries, as required by colonial law. It was a ‘perfect’ place for those 
who engaged in commercial trade, so it is reasonable that they remain there. 
192 This was the general case until to the end of the New Order. In 2002, a shift occurred when a Taiwanese tele-
vision series, Meteor Garden, became the most popular drama serial in Indonesia. The actors, four members 
of a Taiwanese boy band known as F4, suddenly rocketed to stardom.Their hairstyles became the fashion 
among many urban Indonesian boys. According to Feny, a Yogyakarta Chinese girl, her infatuation with F4 
was similar to her previou fascination with other western boy bands, so her fondness for them had nothing 
to do with her ethnicity.  F4 was later replaced by Korean movie star. Indonesian and American music pop 
stars continue to rank among their favourite artists of young people.
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Nevertheless, today, this area is no longer an exclusive Chinese quarter. The 
Chinese has become a minority amongst indigenous residents. In this context, it 
can be said that the discourse on the ethnicity of the Yogyakarta Chinese residential 
pattern is largely a matter of misperception or prejudices on both sides.
Although many symbolic assimilationists acknowledge that some Chinese 
live apart from the indigenous society, they do not think it is because of a desire 
to be exclusive. One symbolic assimilationist said, “The fact that we live in a 
predominantly Chinese residential area, does not mean that we distance ourselves 
from indigenous people. We do have close indigenous friends and occasionally, 
visit each other at our homes.” If they do not participate in social activities in the 
community, it is simply because they are very preoccupied by their work; it has 
nothing to do with ethnic prejudices. They claim it is a common characteristic 
of modern urban life.
A number of Chinese businesspeople expressed their reluctance to live in 
indigenous kampungs. Their reason is simple: to avoid problems. They worry 
that they may be ostracised by the indigenous neighbours. Another argument 
is that they want to avoid being caught in a position where, by refusing to lend 
money to a neighbour or failing to join communal activities, they foster an 
unfavourable reputation. Of course, this may not happen, but they belief that 
there is a tendency to see the Chinese as rich and as potential sources for financial 
aids. It is difficult to be socially accepted if one refuses to be generous. In other 
words, it is the desire to avoid treatment of the Chinese as a ‘milk-cow’ that 
prevents them from living in indigenous kampungs.193 The advice is usually, “If 
you are not able to adjust to the indigenous community and participate in the 
kampung activities, it is better not to live in their kampung!”
The question of whether they must or are willing to make adjustments 
while they still have other options, is, of course, arguable. The fact is that many 
Chinese prefer to live within their ethnic group, although not necessarily in 
a Chinese compound. They realise that, to some extent, they have different 
lifestyles from the indigenous community, and since it is not easy for both sides 
to accept the others as they are, they avoid trouble by living within their own 
193 Again, it should be noted that this is not always the case. There are kampung where Chinese and indigenous 
people live harmoniously together.
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group. At this point, it should be noted that the reasons behind their preference 
for any particular location may differ; there is no collective reason. Preferences 
of Chinese entrepreneurs are based on pragmatic reasons. On Malioboro, the 
commercial centre, where Chinese are predominant, the communal activities fit 
in with the schedule of their businesses. In fact, there are not many communal 
programmes or social obligations. Therefore, this is a suitable place for Chinese 
businesspeople to live and work. Moreover, many Chinese who lived in the old 
Chinese quarter for a long time still believed that it would be more secure to stay 
together. As one of them said, “Who will help you if there are no Chinese in your 
neighbourhood?”194 Many of lower-middle class Chinese said that they could not 
afford to buy new houses in other areas.
Today, many Chinese no longer view the old Chinese quarter in the 
Malioboro neighbourhood as a residential area. It has become overcrowded. For 
the well-to-do Chinese and the younger generation who are in a better economic 
position, the Chinese quarter was never a fashionable neighbourhood. They 
prefer to live in modern housing estates in the nearby suburbs. Generally, the 
residents in these housing estates in Yogyakarta, both for the middle or upper 
class are from ethnically mixed groups. 
Nani, Wahyu, Junaedi, and Gunawan, who live in middle and upper 
class housing estates, suggest that the neighbourhood in these subdivisions is 
comfortable, because Chinese and indigenous families who live there share a 
similar social standing and background, which creates mutual understanding. 
For instance, since most of the homeowners are very busy entrepreneurs and 
professionals, they do not have much time to socialise. They understand how 
people are preoccupied with their activities outside their neighbourhood, 
e.g., in their place of employment, business or social association, and sports 
club. Therefore, they employ security guards to guard their complex and use 
a cleaning-service agency to perform the tasks they do not do themselves.195 
It is public knowledge that the people who live in the middle and upper class 
housing estates tend to be individualistic. Their social interaction is confined to 
194 During the struggle for independence (1945-49) and in late 1965, many Chinese who lived in indigenous 
kampungs outside the city took temporary shelter in their relatives’ homes in town (Pecinan).
195 In many upper-middle class housing areas, the housing developers provide the security and cleaning ser-
vices.
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whatever is deemed absoulutely necessary. Communal gathering and activities are 
minimalised in order to spend more time with their families or to work on their 
businesses. Sharing this common lifestyle, the indigenous residents, in general, 
do not perceive their Chinese neighbours’ behaviour as unusual.
Religion
The phenomenon of Chinese converting to Christian is not recent. The 
Chinese have established churches since colonial times (Brown, 1989:97-
119). Nevertheless, it was only in the New Order era that there was a massive 
conversion to Christianity among the Chinese. Some Chinese said that they 
converted because they were trying to avoid being tagged with a Chinese 
identity, i.e. that they were Buddhist or Confucianist. Due to pressures from 
government regulations, Confucianism was restricted and discouraged. Many 
Chinese, especially peranakan, were reluctant to be associated with this religious 
affiliation, which had become a prime target of criticism by indigenous people 
(Suryadinata, 1978:121-162). It was not a matter of what they believed, but what 
they perceived was safe. However, if it was only a question of security, it is unclear 
why the majority of Chinese choose to convert to Christianity rather than Islam, 
which is the religion of the majority of Indonesians. Would they not be more 
secure if they were Muslims?
There are various personal reasons why many Chinese preferred Christianity 
to Islam196. The general answer is that religion is a matter of faith and cannot be 
forced upon anyone. Some Chinese believe that Muslims are against the Chinese, 
quoting evidences of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, which was allegedly 
incited by Muslim activists. Because of this, many Chinese perceive Islam to be 
militant religion that promotes fear, rather than peace. They feel that the Muslims 
dislike Chinese and, therefore, feel threatened. Moreover, some Chinese think 
that becoming Muslims means renouncing their Chinese identity.197
The fact that most Chinese converted to Christianity and not to Islam is 
196 To explore the conversion to Christianity from a broader perspective, see Hefner, 1993.
197 For a detailed discussion on this issue, see The, 1993:55-99; 1965:67-83; also Jacobsen, 2003.
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seen as an indication of Chinese reluctance to assimilate into the indigenous 
society. They kept their distance by choosing a religion different from that of 
the Indonesian majority. In this way, the choice of being Christian could be 
interpreted as an attempt to resist the pressure to adopt an indigenous identity.
Many symbolic assimilationists do not believe that becoming Muslim will 
guarantee them full acceptance by the indigenous majority and promise them 
greater security. When anti-Chinese violence occurred on Java, Muslim Chinese 
became victims as well. According to Haji Kwik, a prominent Muslim Chinese 
in Yogyakarta, being Muslim does not automatically help them in developing 
their business or deal with corrupt officials. A Muslim Chinese businesman said, 
“Money is the most important thing in solving problems with or getting support 
from those corrupt bureaucrats and military men.” In business, religion does 
not matter, because the broadest business network is not in the hands of Muslim 
businesspeople.
The fact that Muslim Chinese have their own association, Per himpunan 
Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (PITI), Association of Indonesian Muslim Chinese, 
indicates they have not completely merged into the indigenous Muslim society. 
The Muslim Chinese group in Yogyakarta has its own arisan, Koran reading club, 
and newsletters. Some members of PITI said that they decided to become Muslims 
because they believe that Islam is a good religion, not because it is the religion 
of the indigenous people. Haji Kwik said, “We must not forget that Chinese in 
China became Muslim long before Islam came to Indonesia. And even if we have 
the same religion as indigenous people, our way of thinking and lifestyles are not 
similar.” Some Muslim Chinese also feel uneasy that the indigenous Muslims 
often doubt their devotion to Islam or suspect their motives in becoming Muslims 
(Legowo, 1986). In response to this less-than-friendly attitude by indigenous 
Muslims, the Chinese Muslims created separate associations. It is very rare that 
Muslim Chinese join either Muhammadiyah or Nadhatul Ulama, the two main 
Islamic organisations in the country. 
Some Muslim Chinese acknowledge that there is an advantage to being 
Muslims, in the sense that the indigenous people respect them more or at least 
refrain from harassing them as they might other Chinese. This is especially true 
if they have made a haj pilgrimage to Mecca and become a haji. For example, 
although the Chinese in Yogyakarta are not entitled to own land, Haji Budi 
Setyagraha, the head of PITI, received his certificate of land ownership by 
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revealing that he was a haji.198
It should be noted that many Muslim Chinese, in particular the opportunistic 
asimilationists, retain membership in the Chinese associations. Despite any 
criticism regarding their conversion, they still belong to the Chinese community. 
In fact, some prominent Muslim Chinese, like Haji Budi Setyagraha, Haji Tun 
and Haji Kwik, have become middlemen between the Chinese and the Muslim 
communities. They attempt to prove that the negative stereotypes on Chinese 
are not the general rule. Haji Kwik is frequently invited to indigenous Muslim 
gatherings and, through his preaching, he emphasises that the true Muslim should 
not be racist or prejudiced against other ethnic groups.
In the Christian Chinese community in Yogyakarta, there are more 
Protestants than Catholics. This is interesting since the Protestant churches are 
less tolerant than the Catholics Church towards Chinese traditional rituals, such 
as burning incense and praying for their ancestors.
One possible reason for the preference Protestantanism is that certain 
denominatons of Protestant churches allow their followers to establish their own 
churches. In other words, there is a space for individualism in the Protestant 
church, hence, there are churches whose members and boards are predominantly 
Chinese and congregations who sing their hymns in Chinese, teach Mandarin 
in their Sunday schools, and sometimes invite preachers from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.
The Catholic Chinese religious activities are more integrated into the larger 
Catholic community because Chinese are a minority in that church. Generally, 
the relationship between Chinese and indigenous Catholics is positive. Religious 
gatherings are hosted in members’ houses, both Chinese and indigenous. Mixed 
marriage is not uncommon. Several upper-class peranakan Chinese are respected 
leaders in the local Catholic community. They are enthusiastic in organising social 
and religious activities, such as pilgrimages to sacred sites and charity bazaars. 
Chinese and indigenous Catholics frequently work together to raise funds for 
church renovation.
In conclusion, it can be said that religious allegiance overrules ethnicity 
198 The dispute concerning his certificate of land ownership is discussed in the next chapter. The situation for 
Muslim Chinese in Indonesia is diametrically opposed to the situation of Muslim Chinese in Malaysia, 
where they are considered to be bumiputera or pribumi, and have indigenous status. See Lam, 2004; Tan 
Chee Beng, 1988.
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only occasionally, more often amongst Catholics than Protestants. Meanwhile, 
ethnicity still plays the major role amongst Muslims.
Chinese Organisations
What did the Chinese do after the New Order government denied them the right 
to organise groups based on ethnicity? In general, to safeguard their interests, 
their social groups were broadened into general associations that were open to 
everyone, not exclusively to Chinese. Their basic principles and goals, as well as 
membership, were general and not particularly Chinee. For example, the basic 
principle for all social organisations was based on Pancasila, the state ideology,199 
and the goal was to advance the welfare of its members. As the definition of a 
Chinese association or organisation was not clearly stipulated, the ban on Chinese 
organisations was interpreted to refer to the obvious use of Chinese names and 
themes. The symbolic asssimilationists used this interpretation and created a 
loophole that provided them with an opportunity to organise a group to serve 
Chinese interests. They had to be careful and clever enough to camouflage their 
organisations in such a way that they did not attract suspicion. 
The younger generation of Chinese, the cosmopolitan assimi lationists, in 
Yogyakarta do not think about Chinese associations in the same terms and with 
the same spirit as their elders. The desire to have Chinese associations similar to 
those in the past is fading. Many have said that the demands and needs of this 
era are different. The Chinese themselves have changed. Most middle and upper-
class Chinese prefer to join modern clubs that are more popular and prestigious, 
such as the Rotary and Hash Harriers Clubs. Their interests and reasons for 
joining or forming an association now are more pragmatic and functional than 
ideological. Nevertheless, many opportunistic and symbolic assimilationists do 
choose an organisation that has many, if not all, members of Chinese descent. 
People judge whether an organisation is Chinese according to the majority of its 
membership and board. These associations organise a variety of social activities, 
such as arisans, sports events, karaoke singing sessions, and tours.Yogyakarta 
199 The Suharto government imposed Pancasila as the sole principle for all social and political organisations. See 
Vatikiotis, 1993:Chapter 4.
116
Chinese avoid forming business organisations, was reasonable since they are 
trying to avoid the stereotype that Chinese form a united business front against 
the indigenous entrepreneurs.
According to some leaders of Yogyakarta Chinese associations, it is not 
important whether or not their organisations are labelled Chinese. When they 
established badminton or basketball clubs, they chose not to identify the groups 
as Chinese.  In fact, they do not want to attract public attention to themselves. It 
was more important that they could join with other Chinese in a social activity.
Times have changed. Affinity based on ethnicity has gradually been 
abandoned. Natural assimilationists, cosmopolitan assimilationists and lower-
class Chinese were not involved with exclusive Chinese associations. Middle-class 
Chinese join professional clubs because they are interested in the club’s activities 
and facilities, not because of primordial ties. They feel it is natural to socialise 
with people with whom they have much in common rather than joining a club 
only because there are many Chinese members. Chinese predominance in certain 
associations may not be intentional. For example, Rotary clubs in the Chinese 
quarter are predominantly Chinese because new members are selected based 
on other members’ recommendations. It is open to question whether member 
recommendations are free of ethnic prejudices.
However, ethnic affinitiy does remain a primary consideration in selection 
of members in certain associations. Although these groups do not intend to 
be exclusive, there may be a feeling that it would be difficult to synchronise 
people from different cultural backgrounds. Some have admitted, though, that 
ethnic prejudice is a factor and that Chinese and indigenous persons sometimes 
scarcely trust each other. Nevertheless, many Chinese associations try to avoid 
the impression of being exclusive, so they invite indigenous friends to joing their 
organisations. It is also common in Indonesia to have government or military 
officials in an organisation as a pelindung, protector, who serves to discourage any 
possible interference against the Chinese associations.
In conclusion, the government’s ban on the Chinese organisations did not 
prevent the Chinese from forming their own associations, which successfully 
transformed into general associations. As the years have passed, primordial affinity 
has been left behind. Most of these groups no longer have binding affinity with 
Chinese-ness; they are similar to other public associations. 
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Funeral Societies
The funeral society is probably the most important association that serves 
traditonal Chinese concerns. It is the last bastion of Chinese tradition, since the 
funeral association was the only Chinese organisation that was allowed to remain 
in existence when all other groups were banned. To some extent, they also function 
as mutual-aid associations. There are two funeral associations in Yogyakarta - 
Budi Abadi and Perkumpulan Urusan Kematian Yogyakarta (PUKY).
Although few Chinese rituals for funerals are maintained, the existence of 
the funeral association themselves is significance for retaining Chinese traditions. 
For example, the Chinese usually keep the deceased body for several days before 
the burial or cremation. Generally, the more prominent the family, the longer the 
waiting period, allowing more time to mourners to arrive to attend the funeral. 
Accessories, such as incense, funeral clothes of the mourning family, pieces of 
cloth with Chinese script to express condolence from the mourners, and funeral 
decorations, are used for the ceremony. 
It is usually the Buddhist or Confucianist Chinese and totok families who are 
more interested in conducting Chinese funeral rituals. The Christian and Muslim 
Chinese adopt the funeral ceremoniess accord ing to their religion. If members 
of a family adhere to different religions or cultural orientations, they sometimes 
combine the ceremony with Chinese rituals. Regardless of religion, the choice to 
perform these rituals is often dependent on the generation the mourning family. 
The older generation Chinese who were born during the colonial period retain 
these practices. In the perspective of the younger generation who were born in the 
New Order era, the Chinese funeral rituals are expensive and inconvenient.
Funeral services arranged by the associations are still important in the 
Yogyakarta Chinese communities. Most importantly, it is a matter of practicality. 
Many Yogyakarta Chinese in Malioboro area live in small houses. The family in 
mourning often encounters difficulties organising the funeral, as their friends and 
other relatives may be too busy to help, so it is easier to use a professional funeral 
service. Very few Chinese conduct the mourning services in their own homes and 
use the funeral parlour, at least for some of the services.
The fact that the funeral associations help Chinese families in organising 
their funeral highlights a difference between the Chinese and the indigenous 
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communities. While indigenous people always have the funeral ceremony in 
their kampung, Chinese who live in the same kampung conduct their mourning 
services at the Chinese funeral parlour. Poor Chinese who cannot afford to pay 
for the services of the parlour receive assistance from PUKY or Budi Abadi. 
Observing Chinese funerals at the funeral parlour does not necessarily mean that 
the Chinese are still attached to the old traditions and community. For many, the 
reasons is practicality, and perhaps more importantly, to avoid being conspicuous, 
as it is prohibited by law to perform their traditional rituals in public.
 Chinese culture resurfaces at the Chinese parlour, in the sense that the rituals 
are a celebration of ‘being Chinese’. The funeral association places an obituary in 
the local newspapers to inform the relatives and friends of the deceased about the 
service. Most of the mourners are Chinese and they express their condolences to 
the family by clasping each other’s hands in front of their chest and shake them 
up and down. After praying and paying respect to the deceased and the family, 
they offer a contribution and gather to chat with other mourners.
Many of those in attendance know each other, and if not, are soon 
introduced. It is a reunion of sorts for many people. The funeral becomes a venue 
for renewing acquaintances since they have little opportunity to meet on a daily 
basis. Some businesspersons said that it is not unusual that business deals may 
develop from small talk in the funeral parlour. The Chinese do see the condolence 
visit as an important social obligation.
It is difficult to determine whether the small number of indigenous 
people who pay condolence visits to a Chinese funeral indicates a distance in 
relationships. According to some Muslim Javanese, they do not attend the funeral 
ceremonies for religious reasons, because they are not allowed to participate in 
Christian, Buddhist or Confucian rituals. They may visit the mourning family in 
their home. However, this was not the case in Pajeksan, Beskalan and Kemetiran, 
where many indigenous neighbours attended services at the funeral parlour 
when their Chinese neighbours died. The funeral association provided a bus to 
transport the mourners to the funeral parlour. In 1978, the funeral of Tan Poo 
Kiem, the leader of Hoo Hap, who lived in Beskalan, was extraordinary.Tan Poo 
Kiem maintained close ties with many indigenous people and they paid their last 
respects to him by lining the streets when his coffin passed.
The Chinese have their own special cemetery, where many of tombs and 
ornaments are typically Chinese. Regardless of their religion, most Chinese 
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bury their family members in the Chinese cemetery, although some Chinese, 
particularly peranakan Christians and Muslim Chinese, are buried in public 
cemeteries. Some Chinese prefer cremation.
There is only one Chinese cemetery in Yogyakarta, Makam Gunung 
Sempu, located southeast of the city on the slopes of Gunung Sempu. Their 
old cemeteries in town have been closed and replaced by indigenous housing 
tracts and offices. The reason for the closure of the Chinese cemeteries was urban 
renewal. There was no open protest against this policy. The Chinese have learned 
to keep silent, because they know it is not worth fighting over these matters. In 
fact, some of the old cemeteries had long been abandoned, since many of the 
families of the deceased buried there had moved away or died. The government 
did not compensate anyone upon closing the cemetery. Since it was expensive to 
relocate the graves, some families retrieved the bones and cremated them because 
it was easier and less expensive. The new cemetery at Gunung Sempuh is more 
suitable to the Chinese ideal of being bured on a hillside.200 It is one of places 
in Yogyakarta, besides the Chinese temples in Gondomanan and Poncowinatan, 
where it is possible to see something characteristically Chinese.  
Perkumpulan Kematian ‘Budi Abadi’ (funeral association)
This Chinese association was established in 1932 as Hoo Hap, a social 
organisation that aimed to advance the welfare of its members and to maintain 
Chinese beliefs and traditions. It has three divisions: martial arts, funeral services, 
and religious services. It was believed that Hoo Hap was also a secret society. In 
1960, it became the Perkumpulan Budi Abadi (PBA).
The chairperson claimed that PBA is the only Chinese association that 
remained in existence after the New Order took power. They had a Chinese 
praying Chamber and conducted its rituals, a lion dance (barongsai), Chinese 
martial arts, and other traditions. In the past, some members of Hoo Hap also 
played gamelan, the traditional Javanese music ensemble. A gamelan is still stored 
in the PBA chairman’s house. Budi Abadi is able to survive because it was never 
involved in politics, nor were its members affiliated with any political groups. 
200 It is interesting that this cemetery is located in the Bantul regency, where the Chinese were not permitted to 
conduct business.
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Perhaps, more importantly, they kept a low profile and law-abiding attitude.201 
Another board member noted that PBA always kept its distance from Baperki, so 
that it passed government screening and was declared to be clear of communist 
elements.202 Nevertheless, after 1965, the membership of the PBA dwindled in size 
and importance, and the group became insolvent. Moreover, a conflict of interest 
between board members further weakened its position. When its charismatic 
leader, Tan Pho Kiem died in 1973, there was no reason for government officials 
to intervene in PBA affairs.
Since 1996, the younger generation has taken over the leadership, and 
PBA has slowly begun to develop again. As the new chairman said, they want 
to transform PBA from being an exclusively Chinese association to a public 
organisation that aims to appreciate Chinese culture. PBA has now opened its 
membership to indigenous people.
The indigenous individuals who join PBA are interested in learning about 
Chinese culture. Most of them are interested in PBA because they admire its 
sense of fellowship and they want to learn Chinese martial arts. Although they 
are Muslim, they do not mind following the rituals in Chinese tradition. Tulus,203 
one of the Javanese members, stated that he sees Chinese culture as one of great 
cultures of the world that belongs to everybody in this earth. He likes Chinese 
culture as others may like ballet dance, jazz, or tennis, without questioning its 
origins. He wishes that his Javanese colleagues and Chinese friends in PBA would 
share this perception.
Perkumpulan Urusan Kematian Yogyakarta (PUKY)
In 1965, some board members of PBA established a new funeral association 
called Perkumpulan Urusan Kematian Yogyakarta or PUKY. According to a 
senior member of PUKY, the split from PBA was due to a difference of opinion 
201 During my visit to PBA, I saw photos of the late Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX initiating the Chinese New 
Year celebration at Hoo Hap. The Sultan was always invited to open the ceremony. Usually, he attended the 
event. The present chairman did not speculate that Sultan’s involvement helped to support PBA standing.
202 He said that Hoo Hap was affiliated with the Kuo Min Tang (China Nationalist Party), which fought against 
the communists led by Mao Zedong.
203 Tulus is the head of the public relations department in PBA and is a senior trainer of Chinese martial arts.
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about the orientation of a funeral association. While some members wanted to 
maintain the social function of a funeral association, others wanted to turn it 
more into a business.
PUKY has succeeded in attracting upper and middle-class Chinese as its 
members, so the association has been able to amass a considerable amount of 
money for investment. Many Chinese are more interested in using PUKY services, 
rather than those of PBA, due to their better facilities. PUKY is aggressive in 
its marketing strategy, and its board members are prominent businesspeople in 
Yogyakarta. PUKY is attractive also because of its modern image and its lack of 
attachment to a traditional Chinese association.
Although people see PUKY more as a funeral firm, its concerns are 
not limited to funerals. Like PBA, it occasionally organises social or charity 
programmes to help the urban poor. According to some informants, PUKY can 
now be seen as an important Chinese association, therefore some big Chinese 
businesspersons use PUKY as a vehicle to pursue their business interests. As the 
government perceives PUKY as leaders in the Chinese community, they are able 
maintain close relationships with high-ranking officials in the Yogyakarta regional 
administration.
Conclusion
After being pressured for more than three decades to abandon their Chinese-
ness, changes are undoubtedly occurring within the Chinese community. Clearly, 
assimilation in Yogyakarta has progressed in terms of their identification and 
social interaction with the local community. However, similar development 
has not progressed far in funeral societies, Protestant churches, and special 
associations. Although they remain distinctive, the Chinese community is no 
longer an isolated group. Broadly speaking, ethnic affiliation has been left behind. 
The transformation of ethnic-based associations to general associations has been 
successful.
However, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, when the space for Chinese 
cultural expression gradually expanded, there were signs of revivals of Chinese 
associations. Interestingly, the euphoria within the Yogyakarta Chinese community 
was not as great as it was in other cities. The local community caustiously 
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maintained a wait-and-see attitude. How did the Yogyakarta Chinese respond 
to the newly opened space for Chinese cultural expression? How did the new 
government policy towards the Chinese implicate the Yogyakarta Chinese lives? 
These questions will be addressed in Chapter 6, which will begin with a tracing 
of the political activities of the Yogyakarta Chinese since colonial period and a 
discussion of the changes during the New Order. The discussion will proceed to a 
special case of landownership rights that is unique to the situation of the Chinese 
in Yogyakarta.
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Chapter Six
Political Accommodation
Introduction
According to Coppel (1983), if the Chinese in Indonesia became politically active, 
they would be entangled in a dilemma. If they were active in politics, they would 
be suspected of having seditious motives, but if they supported the authorities, 
then they would be labelled opportunistic. If they steered clear of politics, they 
woud also be labelled as opportunistic because it would be said that they were 
only interested in making profit. In fact, the same would be true of indigenous 
Indonesians, but the same sentiments were seldom voiced in reference to them. 
Historically, only a relatively small proportion of Chinese have become involved 
in politics.
The New Order regime, which focused on economic growth, deliberately 
attempted to lead its citizens away from political activities so that they could 
concentrate on building Indonesia’s economy. The Chinese, who had just 
undergone a traumatic experience during the 1965 transition of political power, 
were discouraged from becoming involving in political activities. Not only were 
Chinese political organisations and pressure groups prohibited, but most Chinese 
were afraid to be politically active. Only a few politically conscious Chinese and 
businesspersons were interested in informal politics. Questions arise: How did 
they channel their political aspirations? What kind of strategies did they employ 
to advance their interests? How did they respond to the state curtailment of their 
civil rights?
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Political Trajectory
Chinese in Indonesia have been interested in politics in the sense that they are 
concerned with the authoritative allocation of values in one way or another. 
However, only a few of them have been actively involved in Indonesia’s political 
struggle. The central feature of modern Chinese political thinking in Indonesia 
revolves around the pro blems of national identity, including political and cultural 
iden-tity. According to Suryadinata (1979), there were three major political 
streams  among the peranakan Chinese community during the colonial period: 
1) The Sin Po group, which advocated Chinese national identity. It urged the 
Chinese in the Indies to repudiate their status of Dutch subjects and to avoid local 
political institutions, but to actively participate in politics in China. Although 
Sin Po nationalists did not intend to co-operate with the Dutch, they wanted 
equal legal status with the Dutch. 2) A group of Dutch-educated peranakan 
businessmen and professionals who established a political organisation, the 
Chung Hwa Hui (CHH), in 1928, which advocated the acceptance of the status 
of Dutch subject and active participation in local political instituti ons, including 
the Volksraad (People’s Council). The CHH supported the Dutch colonial 
government, but wanted to retain Chinese iden tity. 3) A group of peranakan 
journalists and lawyers who established a political party, Partai Tionghoa Indonesia 
(PTI), Chinese Indonesia Party, in 1932. The party urged the Indies Chinese to 
identify themselves with Indonesians, and support the creation of an independent 
Indonesia. However, the PTI did not advocate the complete assimilation of the 
Chinese into Indonesian society, which would involve changing Chinese names, 
intermarrying with Indonesians, and embracing  Islam. Despite their differences, 
it appears that these three groups had one thing in common, i.e., they wanted to 
retain Chinese identity.
According to several members of Chinese associations, the CHH group 
was dominant in Yogyakarta during the 1940s. Many of the CHH supporters 
were alumni from the Dutch-Chinese schools,204 who felt that the livelihood and 
security of the Chinese would be better assured under a Dutch administration. 
CHH’s dominant position was due also to the influence of its leaders, most of 
whom were prominent local peranakan Chinese, notably the highly respected 
204 More Chinese attended Dutch language schools (Hollands Chineesche School) than Chinese la nguage schools 
(Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan School). See Kwartanada, 1997:118-135.
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Dr. Yap Hong Tjoen, founder of the eye hospital.205 All Chinese political groups 
maintained a low profile and positive relations with the indigenous political 
groups because of their respect for the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hamengku Buwono 
IX.
During the Japanese occupation, formal political activities among the 
Chinese communities came to a halt after all political organisations were banned 
and their leaders were detained. The various Chinese associations were obliged to 
fuse into a single federation, the Hua Ch’iao Tsung Hui (HCTH).206 The Chinese 
response to the Japanese occupation was divided into two categories: first, those 
who willingly or unwillingly collaborated with the authorities; second, those 
who refused to cooperate with them. The first group was comprised primarily 
of peranakan businessmen and professionals who had to work in the Japanese-
sponsored organisations and enterprises, and lower-class peranakan who joined 
the Japanese sponsored-militia. The non-collaborators were mainly totoks 
activists who affiliated themselves with the anti-Japanese movement in China. In 
Yogyakarta, the non-collaborators offered little resistance to the Japanese. In fact, 
the Japanese occupation was a ‘blessing in disguise’ for the totok Chinese and 
those who wished to maintain a Chinese cultural identity. In order to erase the 
Dutch influence, the Japanese authorities encouraged the Chinese to revive their 
culture and educational system.207
During the struggle for independence (1945-49) when Yogyakarta 
temporarily became the capital of Indonesia, the Chung Hua Tsung Hui 
(CHTH), Chinese Association208 joined the Sultan in supporting the new 
Republic (Coppel, 1976:40). Since 1946, CHTH made a special effort in 
fund-raising for the republican government and military, and several totok 
businessmen aided the republican forces by smuggling commodities out of the 
Dutch-occupied areas (Twang, 1998: chapter 5).  Many pro-republic Chinese 
complied with the Sultan’s appeal to use republican currency instead of the 
205 The Yap Family was the most respected family in Yogyakarta. Members of theYap family became Major and 
Captain of the Chinese community.  See Hardjono, 1970 and Kwartanada, 1997.
206 Most of the HCTH board members were peranakan. For details on the Yogyakarta HCTH see Kwartanada, 
1997:261-302.
207 For more discussion, see Kwartanada, 1997:306-311.
208 CHTH was a new federation of Chinese organisations that was established at the end of the Japanese oc-
cupation.. In fact, it was the old organisation, HCTH, with a new name.
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Dutch-issued money (Kwartanada, 1997:519). In September 1946, the Chinese 
associations in Yogyakarta hosted the Indonesia-Tionghoa Conference, which 
was attended by the Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, the supreme commander 
of the Indonesian armed forces, General Sudirman, Sultan Hamengku Buwono 
IX, several governors, and representatives from both the indigenous and Chinese 
communities. The conference led to the establishment of the Indonesia-Tionghoa 
Institution (Lembaga Indonesia-Tionghoa) which aimed to promote brotherhood 
between indigenous and Chinese Indonesians (Kwartanada, 1997:507-09). In 
1948, the republican government in Yogyakarta appointed Ir. Liem Ing Hwie, 
the chairman of CHTH, as a member of Dewan Pertimbangan Agung (Supreme 
Advisory Council). This appointment was widely appreciated by the Chinese 
communities on Java (Kwartanada, 1997:469-470). In 1949, Dr. Sim Ki Ay, 
a former board member of CHH and the Sultan’s personal physician, became 
an adviser for the Indonesian delegation to the Round Table Conference when 
Indonesian independence was negotiated with the Dutch. It should be noted 
that apart from a significant number of pro-republican Chinese who opted for 
Indonesian nationality, there were sections of the Chinese community that were 
not too enthusiastic about the new republic and, therefore, took a neutral political 
stance.209
Once independence was achieved and Indonesians were in command, 
the Chinese had to adjust to Indonesian political life. The situation demanded 
that they demonstrate their loyalty to and identify with Indonesia. Complete 
assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous population emerged as a trend 
in Indonesian political thinking, which in turn sparked off a debate amongst the 
Chinese. In 1954, advocating a separate Chinese identity within the Indonesian 
nation was the objective of a major new socio-political organisation Badan 
Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, Consultative Body for 
Indonesian Citizenship). Although the organisation dropped the word ‘Chinese’ 
from its name, and although some Eurasians were among its members, Baperki 
was predominantly a Chinese Indonesian organisation. It identified itself with 
209 It is raher surprising that during the revolution the nearest to a pro-Dutch position was “a neutral political 
stance”. Perhaps most of the pre-war CHH, pro-Dutch supporters had moved out of republican territory or, 
like Sim Ki Ay, had become supporters of the republican forces.
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Indonesia, but the identification was primarily political and legal, rather than 
cultural. It advocated the preservation of Chinese social and cultural institutions 
in Indonesia. 
Baperki kept its ideologically unaligned position and vigorously promoted 
the elimination of discrimination against Chinese. The fact that Baperki designated 
itself as a mass organisation rather than a political party was a tactical move, 
since Chinese in general were reluctant to get involved in politics. Thus Baperki 
quickly attracted a large membership of Indonesians of Chinese descent.210 The 
participation of Chinese in government and politics was mainly channelled 
through Baperki.211 It fielded candidates in the national and regional elections, 
and had members in parliament and the Constituent Assembly. 
In Yogyakarta, few Chinese were active in party politics, however, they became 
enthusiastic about joining political activities that promoted their interests, such 
as the elimination of racial discrimination. According to Liem (1960:38), many 
Chinese in Yogyakarta joined in Baperki for this reason. In 1960, there were 729 
Chinese members in the Yogyakarta branch of Baperki. Baperki could rely on their 
sympathy because it was concerned with Chinese economic interests. Baperki 
established GAWARI (Gabungan Warung Indonesia/Association of Indonesian 
Small Shop Owners) and GAPEMI (Gabungan Pengusaha Menengah Indonesia/
Association of Indonesian Medium-Scale Entrepreneurs) to accommodate 
Chinese businesspeople (Liem, 1960:40). The indigenous business associations 
were not open to Chinese.
Although Baperki was a predominantly peranakan organisation that 
advocated the interest of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, there were a 
number of totok Chinese who were sympathetic with Baperki’s aim of preserving 
Chinese identity.212  Due to their alien status, many totok Chinese suffered from 
210 By 1965, the membership had grown to over 280,000, concentrated heavily on Java. See Coppel, 1983:44, 
186.
211 There were Chinese members of several political parties; including Partindo, which recruited many Chi-
nese members in the early 1960s (Coppel, 1983:47). Oei Tjoe Tat, one of the Baperki  leaders, also joined 
Partindo in 1960 and became a member of its  board of directors (Oei Tjoe Tat, 1995)
212 There is a misleading generalisation that peranakan Chinese have become Indonesian citizens (Warga Neg-
ara Indonesia, WNI), while totok Chinese have remained foreign citizens (Warga Negara Asing, WNA). 
This generalisation needs to be qualified in regards to both place and time. Many totok WNI in Sumatra 
and West Kalimantan, and some peranakan Chinese in Java rejected Indonesian citizenship during the 
1949-51period. In the last ten to fifteen years, however, almost all Chinese in Indonesia, both totok and 
peranakan, are Indonesian citizens.
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various government stipulations that restricted their economic activities. On 
several occasions, Baperki also defended foreign Chinese interests, for example, 
in opposing the alien head tax and the 1959 regulation banning aliens from 
conducting business in rural areas (Coppel, 1976:49-50).
As the pendulum of Indonesian politics swung left, Baperki abandoned 
its unaligned stance.213 It was widely believed that Baperki was affiliated with 
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Indonesian Communist Party, so it was 
eventually identified with the political left (McVey 1968:364-6). Consequently, 
several Chinese Indonesians, especially Catholics and Protestants, who disagreed 
with Baperki’s new stance or were afraid to be affiliated with the PKI, left the 
organisation. Nevertheless, Baperki continued to receive the support of the 
greater part of the Chinese community. No Yogyakarta Chinese attended a 
seminar on national consciousness held in January 1961, in which a group of 
assimilationist agreed on the Assimilation Charter (Piagam Asimilasi).214 The 
Chinese in Yogyakarta were more involved in cultural activities, rather than high-
profile politics. Baperki’s cultural group in Yogyakarta, which included people 
from various ethnic groups, not just Chinese, was among the better-managed 
branches in Central Java. 
In opposition to Baperki’s view that Chinese should be accepted as one of 
the many ethnic groups (suku) in Indonesia, a small group of Chinese advocated 
assimilation. They thought the Chinese should join the indigenous political parties. 
According to Willmott (1961:102), by 1960, the assimilationists were probably 
the smallest opinion group. However, the assimilationists managed to establish 
a formal link with the government, creating an institution called the Lembaga 
Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (LPKB), Insitute for the Promotion of National 
Unity, in 1963. The establishment of the LPKB, which was later associated with 
and supported by the army, created a problem for Baperki. Conflicts between the 
two groups consequently created a cleavage amongst Chinese, which paralleled 
the polarisation in Indonesian politics between the PKI and the army (Coppel, 
1983:44-48; 1976: 44-63).
213 For a discussion of the change in Baperki’s alignment, see Siauw Giok Tjhan, 1963.
214 The charter declared that assimilation was the only way for the Chinese to become an integral part of the 
Indonesian nation. See Jahja, 1983:13.
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Beginning in 1963, President Sukarno favoured Baperki as his ally in national 
politics. In his speech at the Baperki congress in 1963, he explicitly referred to 
the peranakan Chinese as one of the suku in Indonesia. He also stated that a 
person did not need to change his name to be a good citizen (Somers, 1988:271-
273). By that time, the Chinese had made accommodations with the dominant 
political forces. However, this period of relative stability, lasted only briefly and 
proved to be unstable foundations, as it ended abruptly with the allegedly PKI-
sponsored coup attempt of September 1965 and violence that followed.
 In the anti-communist and anti-left atmosphere of the post-coup period, 
the identification of Baperki with the left proved to be a set-back for the Chinese 
in general. Widespread anti-Chinese violence became part of the mounting 
wave of action against the communists. Chinese supporters of the assimilationist 
movement who were fiercely anti-communist succeeded in having Baperki 
dissolved, leaving the Chinese community without its own political organisation. 
Several Chinese student leaders, including Arief Budiman, Sofyan Wanandi, Soe 
Hok Gie, Harry Tjan, were active during the rise of the New Order (Coppel, 
1976:114).
The New Order period marked the demise of Chinese formal political 
involvement. The long period of anti-communist and anti-Chinese violence 
throughout the country following the abortive coup, from 1965 to 1967, made a 
profound impact on the Chinese, and led to their withdrawal from the political 
arena. 
Although anti-Chinese mass violence never occurred in Yogya karta, local 
Chinese were strongly influenced and traumatised by events elsewhere in the 
country. With Baperki dissolved, their hopes of being recognised as one of the 
many ethnic groups in Indonesia evaporated. Instead, the LPKB was taking steps 
to accelerate the process of assimilation.215 Four years after its establishment, the 
LPKB leadership decided to transfer of all its functions to the Department of 
Home Affairs. The LPKB was dissolved by a Presidential Decree on 22 November 
1967.216 However, in 1977, some of the former LPKB leaders proposed a forum 
215 For a detailed account on the role of LPKB following the attempted coup, see Coppel, 1983: 75-81.
216 The decree affirmed the claim by the LPKB leadership that its task was done, because its concept of assimila-
tion had been accepted as New Order policy. See Coppel, 1983: 143-144.
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to help the government promote national unity. In response to the request, the 
Minister of Home Affairs authorised the formation of the Badan Komunikasi 
Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (Bakom-PKB), Communication Body for the 
Appreciation of National Unity. This organisation, clearly, was under the 
government auspices and did not have a mass membership (Coppel, 1983:169). 
During the New Order, Bakom-PKB became the sole intermediary to 
accommodate the Chinese aspirations. However, according to Pak Andy, a board 
member of Bakom-PKB since 1990, the institution served the government 
interests in promoting assimilation, rather than represent the Chinese community. 
In fact, its chairman and board members were not elected by Chinese, but were 
appointed by the government. Generally, Bakom-PKB did not have a positive 
image among the Chinese in Yogyakarta.  Some Chinese businesspeople used 
Bakom-PKB as a vehicle to make personal contacts with officials. During election 
campaigns, Bakom-PKB also helped the government promote Golkar (Golongan 
Karya), Working Group, the government party, among the Chinese constituents. 
In this respect, it was successful as the majority of Yogyakarta Chinese voted for 
Golkar throughout the three decades that the New Order was in power.
The period between 1966 and 1998 was, generally, a period of political 
apathy among Chinese in Yogyakarta. Most of them complied with pressures to 
assimilate. Several people explained that Chinese no longer had a ‘defender’ so 
they had no alternative other than to seek a practical way to facilitate and secure 
their lives.  While a few Chinese keep their Chinese name, many others found 
that changing their names produced a tactical advantage. If they used Indonesian 
names, they were easily identified as Chinese and this, to an extent, facilitated 
certain arrangements, for example, obtaining licenses or enrolling in school. One 
businessman admitted that when he used the name ‘Gatot’, people thought he was 
a WNI, when in fact, he was still a WNA at that time. He also found that using his 
Javanese name was helpful in forgoing business relations with the Javanese.
After about a decade under the New Order pressure to assimilate, 
abandoning cultural identity became less of a concern for many Chinese, 
while the discriminatory measures, mistreatment and the practice of extortion 
and racketeering (pungutan liar/pungli)217 emerged as a sore points. Chinese 
217 Pungli or pungutan liar is a term that refers to the practice of asking money that is not officially stipulated by 
the regulations.
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were required to obtain a special citizenship document called the Surat Bukti 
Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia (SBKRI), Certificate of Proof of Indonesian 
Citizenship, which was required when applying for school enrolment, passports, 
and permits.218 After having complied with the New Order regulations that 
curtailed their social and cultural lives, the Chinese were resentful of this extra 
certificate that was not required for other citizens. Although it caused difficulties 
for the poor Chinese since obtaining the SKBRI could be expensive, there was 
nothing they could do to change the policy. Even Bakom-PKB was silent on this 
issue. Public protest against the SBKRI emerged only after the demise of the New 
Order.
A few Chinese participated in political activities during the power transition 
in 1998. They supported and participated in the groups that called for reformation 
in Yogyakarta. The Chinese calls for change in the treatment of Indonesian citizens 
coincided with the demands for reform that were articulated by opposition 
figures and student organisations, and that sought a more open and democratic 
society in which human rights would be respected. In anticipation of the national 
political change, a group of prominent Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople had 
an audience with the Sultan and the local military leaders to discuss the security 
situation in Yogyakarta. As the reformation movement reached its climax, many 
Yogyakarta Chinese showed their support for the movement and Chinese shops 
along the main roads posted reformation banners. Immediately after the fall 
of Suharto, a group of Chinese businesspeople established a committee called 
Tim Simpatik Yogya Damai, Sympathetic Team for a Peaceful Yogyakarta. The 
aim of this committee was to help the authorities and to cooperate with non-
governmental organisations maintain peace in Yogyakarta. According to the 
secretary of Tim Simpatik, they did not want to rely solely on military protection, 
therefore they co-operated with other community associations and student 
organisations. Although they mainly provided financial support that was raised 
by the Chinese business community, a number of individuals participated in 
political meetings, public forums, and mutual-support groups. This period of the 
transition of power of the national government (reformasi) was fully supported by 
the Sultan and Yogyakarta remained peaceful.
218 This proof-of-citizenship issue raised controversy in 1953; see Willmott, 1961:79-84. During the New Or-
der, the requirement for SBKRI was based on the Minister of Justice Regulation No.J.B. 3/4/12 of 1978.
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There was another flare of Chinese political activity in Yogyakarta can be 
seen during the gobernatorial election held in August 1998, in which Sultan 
Hamengku Buwono X was a candidate. The election led to a dispute between 
the Sultan’s supporters and the group that opposed his candidacy, and who was 
supported by the central government in Jakarta. Following other community 
groups, a group of Yogyakarta Chinese elite members also declared public support 
for the Sultan by making a public statement in the regional parliament (Bernas 
daily newspaper, 14 August 1998).
In the 1999 elections, a Chinese businessman, Haji Budi Setyagraha, who 
had joined the Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), a political party led by Amien 
Rais, was elected to the regional parliament.219 Several Chinese joined other 
political parties, including Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P), 
Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and the Chinese-based political party – Partai 
Bhinneka Tunggal Indonesia (PBI). This flurry of political involvement did not 
mean that suddenly the Yogyakarta Chinese had become enthusiastic for politics, 
but the role of Haji Budi Setyagraha as a  ‘Chinese representative’ in parliament 
was an important symbol for both the  Chinese and indigenous communities. 
Despite their reluctance to become involved in party politics, Chinese socio-
cultural associations in Yogyakarta have become more assertive in voicing their 
concerns and in communicating with the local authority. They organise public 
forums with the intention of providing political education to the ethnic Chinese 
communities and starting a dialogue with indigenous communities. 
Changing Patterns of Chinese Political Behaviour during the New 
Order
Political activity in the form of a mass organisation, like CHH, PTI or Baperki, 
is now a thing of the past. This does not mean, however, that Yogyakarta Chinese 
have withdrawn completely from politics. Since the political climate and ‘the 
rules of the game’ changed, so has Chinese political behaviour. The traumatic 
experience of 1965 and the New Order’s assimilation politics influenced how 
219 PAN, the National Mandate Party, was founded as a pluralistic and secular party by reformist Muslims under 
the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais, in 1998.
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they thought and behaved in politics. The possibility of playing an opposition 
role was highly unlikely. Some Chinese chose an assimilationist political stance, 
which, to some extent, may have been advantageous. The integrationist (non- 
assimilationist), and the former Baperki supporters and symphatisers made a 
half-hearted attempt to accommodate to the new situation. 
Although the assimilationists won the fight with the integrationist when 
the New Order government sided with them, the latter have not disappeared 
completely A few integrationists who were not the hardliners became board 
members of Bakom-PKB and have contributed an element of diversity within this 
state-sponsored organisation. Pak Andi felt that he and his non-assimilationist 
friends might use Bakom-PKB as a vehicle for disseminating their political ideas, 
which they did when they spoke to Chinese communities at the communication 
forums sponsored by Bakom-PKB. Unlike Baperki, they did not call for recognition 
of the Chinese as an indigenous ethnic group, but did demand equal treatment 
as Indonesian citizens. They did not plead against assimilation, but tried to steer 
the process in a natural way (asimilasi secara wajar), rather than through forced 
regulations (asimilasi yang dipaksakan) or engineered (direkayasa) by the state, 
because forced assimilation would only lead to discrimination. In their opinion, 
to assimilate is to be involved in social interaction or to participate in the sharing 
important aspects of life with non-Chinese. Therefore, intermarriage was a result 
of the assimilation process, not a method to achieve assimilation. They emphasised 
that assimilation could not be forced and should not eliminate diversity.220 This 
small group within Bakom-PKB remained active. According to Pak Andi, despite 
their different views on assimilation they never had problems with the authorities, 
as they always kept a low profile. They also avoided confrontational debates with 
other Bakom members who were assimilation-minded. 
In the late 1980s, the assimilationists, particularly members of Bakom-PKB 
who previously preferred to play it safe by accommodating to government policies 
rather than to the interests of the Chinese, began to insist on the revocation of state 
discrimination against the Chinese.221 According to Handoko, an assimilation-
220 The prevailing arguments on assimilationt are precisely over these terms. There are those who define assimi-
lation as participation in social interactions or social processes, while others define it as the replacement of 
the ethnic minority cultural identity with the majority’s identity.
221 In Jakarta, prominent assimilationist figures like Sindhunata and Harry Tjan Silalahi spoke out against 
discrimination toward the Chinese Indonesian citizens. See Tan, 1991:124.
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minded Yogyakarta Chinese and former chairman of Bakom-PKB, it was not true 
that the organisations did not attempt to defend Chinese interests. He claimed 
that they conveyed Chinese grievances on discriminatory practices against their 
economic and social activities at an official meeting with government officials. 
They proposed that the government raise the quota for Chinese Indonesian 
enrolment in state universities, and discussed the possibility of staging the lion 
dance, barongsai performance in public spaces. Handoko acknowledged that most 
of these proposals have not found their way into government policy. However, 
the governor of Yogyakarta followed Bakom’s suggestion and requested journalists 
not to use the term ‘keturunan Cina’, Chinese descent, in the local papers and 
to refrain from mentioning ethnicity after a person’s name, particularly when 
that person was accused of committing a crime. In another case, a government 
employee in a sub-district office was replaced after Bakom-PKB reported on his 
discriminating treatment of a Chinese businessman.
The political activities of Yogyakarta Chinese through Bakom-PKB during 
the New Order evolved in response to unfolding events. There was a shift from 
identity politics to the politics of citizenship. The main issue was no longer on 
whether Chinese would be allowed to retain their Chinese identity or not, but 
concerned their civil rights as Indonesian citizens, as well as security issues. This 
shift occurred as a consequence of a constant discrimination and periodic mass 
violence against the Chinese during the New Order era when Chinese were 
afforded minimal protection by the authorities. Despite their different ideological 
backgrounds, Chinese activists in Bakom-PKB in Yogyakarta shared a common 
interest in opposing ethnic discrimination. 
Yogyakarta Chinese, both the assimilationists and the non-assimilationists, 
have used Bakom-PKB to facilitate their own interests. Using their Bakom-PKB 
connections with government officials, the more political-consciousness Chinese 
worked for better treatment by the state towards the Chinese communities. 
Other Chinese on the Bakom-PKB board attempted to promote their personal 
interests. They tended to be high profile and preferred to be in the front, in the 
sense that they wanted to be seen in public, especially when accompanied by 
high-ranking government officials. This was a way of flaunting their connections 
with the power holders, with the intent that it might deflect trouble from lower-
ranking officials. 
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The phenomenon of Chinese political activities during the New Order 
era, either through Bakom-PKB or other political organisations, indicated a 
shift from group politics to personal politics. The objectives of their political 
activities were no longer in the interests of the Chinese at large, but rather, 
for themselves.  In this way, Chinese political behaviour was, to a high degree, 
opportunistic and depended on subjective factors as circumstances changed over 
time. In Bakom-PKB Yogyakarta, there were non-assimilationist Chinese who 
became assimilationists, while integrationists sometimes pretended to be engaged 
in assimilation politics. There were also assimilationists who shared integrationist 
ideas and became members of Chinese communal associations. Perhaps Coppel’s 
claim (1976:75) that the variety of Chinese political behaviour in Indonesia has 
been considerably reduced is not completely true. In the New Order political 
climate, which did not bestow any favours on any opponent, and in which the 
Chinese were involved in politics only informally, diversity was not emphasised 
or exposed. Since the shift to personal politics, the variety of political behaviour 
is no longer between groups but, rather, amongst the political actors. 
Another form of personal politics exercised by a few ethnic Chinese in 
Yogyakarta refers to what Coppel (1976:65) categorises as ‘cukong influence’, i.e., 
informal political influence of Chinese businesspersons (cukong) who are in close 
contact with political power holders. This type of relationship is not defined, as is 
often asscribed to be the practice of Chinese businesspersons, by presenting gifts 
to government officials in expectation of favours in return, or by government 
officials charging Chinese extra fees for licenses or protection. In fact, there are 
two models of cukong influences. The first represents those who have high social 
status due to their contribution to the city or to their positions in the community. 
With their high social status, they have more opportunities to make contacts 
with the high-ranking officials and, over time, establish personal relationships. 
The second represents those businesspeople who have business relationships with 
high-ranking officials.  It is not clear whether their influence extends over issues 
that go beyond personal and business interests. What is clear is that members of 
the Chinese community who wish to see certain policies implemented by the 
government are highly unlikely to use formal political channels. Therefore, as 
will be described in the next section, Yogyakarta Chinese must rely on informal 
politics in defending their civil rights. Another alternative is to make it a legal 
issue rather than a political one, as illustrated in the following case.
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The Abolition of Yogyakarta Chinese Landownership Rights
Landownership rights have been a compelling issue for the Yogyakarta Chinese. 
The ruling that Chinese Indonesians cannot own land is applicable only in 
Yogyakarta. The official explanation is that the Chinese have been legally barred 
from owning land in order to protect the economically weak indigenous peasants 
(Selosoemardjan, 1962: 39-40).
According to the Agrarian Law of 1960, all Indonesian citizens are entitled 
to landownership, regardless of their ethnic origins because the law does not 
recognise the distinction between the indigenous and the non-indigenous. The 
law covers property rights, such as hak milik (rights of ownership) and hak guna 
bangunan (HGB). HGB is the right to use the building on state-owned land and 
has a maximum term of 30 years, extendible for another 20 years (Article 30 
Act No. 5/1960). This right of use can be transferred to other peope by sale or 
inheritance, but the owner of HGB land is the Indonesian government. Privatley 
owned land can be sold (hak milik), in accordance with the law. 
On 5 March 1975, the Special Region of Yogyakarta promulgated a 
Governor’s Instruction (No.K.898/1/A/1975) on the policy of granting land 
rights to non-indigenous Indonesian citizens. As per this decree, the Yogyakarta 
regional government does not grant ownership rights to Indonesian citizens of 
non-indigenous descent. If a non-indigenous citizen wants to build on land 
owned by indigenous citizen, the owner must first transfer the status of the land to 
state-ownership and only then can he/she apply for building rights. Although the 
term non-indigenous does not explicitly refer to the ethnic Chinese, in practise, 
it is understood to mean Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. This regulation 
was applied retroactively, so that all Yogyakarta Chinese who already possessed 
hak milik land were required to hand over their ownership rights to the state and 
then apply for a new HGB rights. 
To justify the regulation, the local government argued that the prohibition 
of landownership by non-indigenous citizens was not a new rule in Yogyakarta 
because under the Dutch administration, there was  a stipulation (Rijksblad 
Kesultanan No. 23 of 1925) that resembled the Governor’s Instruction of 1975 
(Mursyd, 2005:56). In the Rijksblad of 1925 (Chapter IV, Clause 1), the Sultan 
asked his people not to sell their land to non-Javanese: adol utawa ngaliyakake 
wewenang handarbeni utawa nganggo bumi marang wong kang dudu bangsa Jawa 
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lan maneh nyewaake nggaduhake bumi gawe marang wong kang dudu bangsa Jawa 
… kalarangan (prohibiting the sale of land or giving the rights to own or use land 
to non-Javanese people; also prohibiting renting and sharecropping). Lawmakers 
in 1975 replaced the term ‘non-Javanese’ in the Kesultanan regulation with ‘non 
indigenous’. Although not officially acknowledged, the principle argument behind 
the prohibition is to protect the ‘weaker economic’ group (the indigenous) from 
the ‘stronger economic’ group (the Chinese). It has never been clearly explained 
what the weaker group is being protected from. Some government officials and 
members of parliament stated unofficially that the purpose of the Governor’s 
Instruction of 1975 was to prevent the Chinese from seizing indigenous land 
and dominating the land market in Yogyakarta.222 However, two senior notaries 
in Yogyakarta, Daliso and Soeryanto, argue that the HGB status of Chinese-
owned land also was related to regional revenues. With limited land use rights, 
the Yogyakarta Chinese need to extend their HGB when the term expired, and 
thus must constantly bear the costs and pay heavy taxes.
 There are no records on any legal actions taken by the Yogyakarta Chinese 
against this discriminatory regional law. In 1984, by Presidential Instruction 
No. 33 of 1984, the central government urged a full implementation of the Act 
No.5 of 1960 (UUPA/Basic Agrarian Laws) in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. 
With the passing of this Presidential Instruction, the Yogyakarta Governor’s 
Instruction of 1975 has been overruled by a national law. However, the Governor’s 
Instruction has never been rescinded. Officials argue that in the implementation 
guidance (petunjuk pelaksanaan) of the Presidential Instruction, stated in the 
Decision of Interior Minister No. 66 of 1984, there is a clause that mentions 
that the implementation of UUPA in Yogyakarta would be gradual, according 
to the priorities of the local government. Nevertheless, following the Presidential 
Instruction of 1984, the Yogyakarta regional government, through Provincial 
Regulation (peraturan daerah) No.3 of 1984, abolished several regulations 
concerning land management in Yogyakarta, except for the Governor’s Instruction 
of 1975. This means that the national Agrarian Law is not yet fully implemented 
in Yogyakarta, especially in regards to the clause that requires the government to 
provide equal treatment towards Indonesian citizens regardless of their ethnicity. 
222 See Gubernur DIY (2000), governor speech in the regional parliament.
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In other words, granting land ownership rights to the Chinese has not become a 
priority of the local government. There has never been official explanation about 
this, except for comments from individuals in the regional government office who 
claim that the 1975 instruction needs to be enforced, as long as many indigenous 
people do not own land.
The Yogyakarta Chinese Responses
There are three basic responses of the Yogyakarta Chinese towards the Governor’s 
Instruction on landownership. The first group adopts a law-abiding attitude. 
Although they know the instruction is a form of discrimination, they do not 
oppose the authorities, as they do not want to put themselves into a more 
difficult position if they do not follow the regulation. According to a Chinese 
businesswoman, Mrs. Sudirman, her husband and many of their close friends 
who had hak lands long before the New Order, obidiently applied for HGB 
status for all their lands, rather than risking trouble later. Some Chinese who 
did not fully comprehend the regulation said they were afraid the Yogyakarta 
government would seize their land if they did not obey the instruction. Many 
Chinese would rather buy land that has HGB status rather than hak milik land, 
because the procedure of changing land status changing as regulated by the 
Governor’s Instruction of 1975 is very expensive and exasperating.
The second group represents those who try to bend the rule. Often, a Chinese 
will buy land under the name of an indigenous friend. They ‘borrow’ the name of 
a person who has a legal right to own land and then make a separate agreement 
between the Chinese buyer and the indigenous ‘front’ person through a notary. 
Other Yogyakarta Chinese use their own name in cooperation with notaries who 
are willing to make a hak milik certificate for Chinese-owned land that should be 
HGB. These certificates are known as ‘aspal’ certificate. ‘Aspal’ is derived from the 
phrase ‘asli tapi palsu’ (original, but fake); they are ‘original’ because the certificate 
is drawn up according to the UUPA, but it is ‘fake’ because it is not legitimate 
according to the Governor’s Instruction of 1975. If the truth were revealed, their 
ownership status would be revoked in a process known as ‘penurunan hak’, or 
lowering the level of rights.Yogyakarta Chinese who have aspal certificates claim 
that these cases are rarely discovered because the owner often use an aspal identity 
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card that has a photograph that does not reveal Chinese feature or lists Islam as 
the cardholder’s religion. They do not risk using the certificates for business or 
anything involved with the government. 
The third group consists mostly of those Yogyakarta Chinese who cannot 
afford to buy land and who live in rental houses. Many of them do not know 
about the Governor’s Instruction of 1975. In their views, the land law is the 
problem of rich Chinese. Although they regret the discrimination, only a few of 
them suggest that full implementation of UUPA should be considered wisely and 
gradually. They worry that the issue of the Chinese dominance in landownership 
would create a widespread discontent among the indigenous community.
As mentioned previously, there has not been any legal action taken by the 
Yogyakarta Chinese challenging the Governor instruction of 1975. According to 
Musa, several Chinese notaries in Yogyakarta sent formal letters of objection to the 
local and central governments, but they have been ignored. It was only after the fall 
of Suharto that Chinese individuals dared to openly question this discriminatory 
land law in public forums. The first inquiry occurred on 18 November 1999, 
when a group of Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople organised a “Private Evening 
Meeting with the Sultan”.223 The purpose of this meeting was to congratulate the 
Sultan upon his recent election as governor. During the dialog with the Sultan, 
Thomas, a young Chinese notary, raised the issue concerning the prohibition of 
landownership for the Yogyakarta Chinese. Voicing his objection, Thomas said 
that the Governor’s Instruction of 1975 not only violated the national UUPA and 
the international convention on the abolition of racial discrimination, but  it was 
be of no economic benefit to the local government, and had a negative impact 
on the interests of non-indigenous investors.224 The Sultan answered tactfully. He 
replied that he has maintained a good relationship with the Yogyakarta Chinese, 
and that he personally did not advocate any form of ethnic discrimination. If it 
was his decision alone, he would abolish the regulation immediately. However, 
he continued, the problem was more complicated than what the Chinese may 
have envisoned and the authority to change the law was not in his hand. At 
223 A Chinee contractor who was close to the Sultan led this informal group. This meeting was also planned as 
a fund raising event to support the Sultan’s project to help the East Timorese refugees.
224 Prior to the event, there was an informal todiscuss the plan to intoroduce the land right issue to the forum. 
Thomas was selected to represent the Yogyakarta Chinese.
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another event in February 2000,225 when he was asked about the landownership 
issue again, the Sultan appeared to take offence and abruptly asked the Chinese 
to understand the historical and social context behind the land regulation in 
Yogyakarta.
Given the Sultan’s response, the Yogyakarta Chinese’s reactions are divided. 
On the one hand, there are those who, preferring to be on the safe side, felt that 
they should stop arguing about the issue with the Sultan because he was obviouly 
reluctant to retrack the law. On the other hand, more politically conscious Chinese 
think that they have already taken a risk in raising the issue, so they should not 
withdraw their appeal for a change, otherwise they may lose their opportunity. 
There was a disagreement on how they should deal with the authorities, whether 
directly or indirectly. In December 2000, Haji Budi Setyagraha took legal action 
when his application for hak milik on a land he bought from an indigenous 
person was rejected. 
The Case of Haji Budi Setyagraha Vs Kantor Pertanahan Bantul
The case was the first legal action taken by a Chinese in Yogyakarta concerning 
his rights of land ownership. Haji Budi Setyagraha (Wong Rhen Cong) was a 
member of the regional parliament and former chairman of PITI (Muslim 
Chinese Association). In December 1999, Haji Budi bought 552 m2 of land 
from Haryono, a Javanese, in Ngestiharjo in the Bantul district. Following 
the usual procedure when land is sold, Haji Budi registered the sale with the 
Kantor Pertanahan Bantul (KPB), Land Office of Bantul District, to transfer 
the landownership rights from Haryono to himself. This process of balik nama, 
changing the owner name on the landownership certificate, is usually completed 
at the time of transaction.  Basing their decision on the Governor Instruction of 
1975, the KPB refused to give Haji Budi the certificate of landownership under 
his own name.  KPB informed him that he was not eligible to obtain the right to 
own land and directed him to apply for a HGB instead. 
225 The event was a combined Syawalan gathering (in celebration held at the end of the Ramadan fasting 
month, a Muslim festival) and Chinese New Year celebration (Imlek). There was a dialog with the Sultan on 
the role of businesspeople in increasing the regional income, In order to encourage people to join the event, 
there was a brief note written on the invitation: “Tidak ada penggalangan dana” (No fund raising).
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Haji Budi discussed KPB’s rejection to process his land registration with his 
lawyers and his colleagues in parliament and business. He asked for their opinion 
about the possibilities of taking legal action in this case, i.e., to sue the KPB for 
refusing his application. He thought that it was imperative to discuss his plan first 
with Chinese lawyers and board members of PUKY and Bhakti Putera, especially 
in regards to the consequences for the larger Chinese community in Yogyakarta. 
They envisioned two possibilities: the Yogyakarta Chinese as a whole would reap 
the advantages from Haji Budi’s success if he won his case against KPB, i.e., 
regain landownership rights, or, if he failed, there might be an adverse effect on 
the Chinese position in general. It is a public knowledge that a direct challenge to 
Indonesian authorities or officials is not tactical, and often result in more trouble 
than resolution, as the officials may feel humiliated by being challenged in public, 
and thus put the Chinese into a worse situation in terms of discriminatory.  
 Although this case could become a breakthrough that might lead to an 
equal legal treatment toward the Yogyakarta Chinese, only a few of them gave 
their full support to Haji Budi. However, he did receive financial support from 
Chinese communities. Haji Budi proceeded to sue KPB. He won the case.
The Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara Yogyakarta (State Administration Court), 
through Decree No/11/G.TUN/2000/PTUN-YK, ordered the KPB to process 
the transfer of hak milik from Haryono to Haji Budi.226 The court accepted the 
plaintiff ’s argument that the Governor’s Instruction of 1975 violate national 
laws, such as UUPA, Presidential Instruction No.33 of 1984, and Presidential 
Instruction No.26 of 1998 on the termination of the term ‘indigenous’ and ‘non 
indigenous’ from policy formulations and all government activities. 
The KPB appealed to a higher court. In litigation, the KPB defended its 
claim that the intent of denying hak milik to non-indigenous citizens is to promote 
equal condition amongst the indigenous and the Chinese, and to prevent social 
envy, which may lead to social unrest. According to the KPB, the Governor’s 
Instruction of 1975 was intended as a form of affirmative action, which is in line 
with the UUPA and the International Convention on the need to protect and 
give wider opportunities to the weaker economic group by placing restrictions on 
the rights of the stronger group. Moreover, the instrution has been in effect for 
226 Transcript of the Decree No. 11/G.TUN/2000/PTUN.YK
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many years without stirring social discontent, which means it has been accepted 
as convention.227 The higher court accepted the KPB’s appeal based on the legal 
formalities. They ruled that the subject of the prosecution was only a KPB’s letter 
of notification, not a legal document.  The lower court decision was declared a 
misjudgement and reversed.228 
Following his lawyers’ advice, Haji Budi took his case to the Supreme Court 
in May 2001. To strengthen his defence, he provided evidence of mistreatments 
by the KPB, i.e., that two non-indigenous citizens (one Arab and one of Chinese 
descent) have been given hak milik certificates for their land. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court denied the cassation from Haji Budi, and supported the argument 
and decision of the second court.229 It was rumoured  that the Sultan had sent a 
letter to the Supreme Court asking for a rejection of Haji Budi’s case.
Conclusion
Prior to the New Order, the Yogyakarta Chinese were, as were the Chinese in other 
part of the country, often involved in politics. However, their political activities 
encouraging the advancement of the Chinese communities were less assertive. 
During the New Order era, very few of them engaged in political activities. They 
did not withdraw completely from the political arena; they were just not visible in 
the front lines. They channelled their aspirations and interests through personal 
ties with the authorities.
 The general attitude of Yogyakarta Chinese towards the local authorities is 
reflected in the case of landownership. Although they are discriminated against 
over landownership rights, they have never made any political claims or strong 
protest against the local government, which is headed by the Sultan.
The Governor’s Instruction of 1975 was a political strategy of the local 
government to maintain political stability in the region. By this law, it demonstrated 
its power to control the Chinese who have been seen as the dominant economic 
group, intending to calm the indigenous people’s anxiety about land availability.
227 Transcript of KPB’s plea.
228 Transcript of the State Administration Higher Court decree No.31/B.TUN/2001/PT.TUN.SBY.
229 Transcript of the Supreme Court decree No, 281K/TUN/2001
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The Yogyakarta Chinese protest and appeal for the abolition of the 
prohibition against their land rights is a symbol of their political struggle for 
the elimination of discrimination, rather than for the sake of the landownership 
alone. Whether they will achieve their goal or not is difficult to predict. From 
the Haji Budi Setyagraha’s case, it seems that they still have a long way to go 
before they can obtain hak milik rights and end their dependence on the local 
authority’s will.
Since the fall of Suharto’s New Order, there has been increased official and 
general acknowledgement within Indonesia that the Chinese are victims of racial 
discrimination. The new administrations have revoked some discriminatory 
laws and have allowed the Chinese to regain their cultural rights. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the total elimination of discrimination against 
the Chinese will be seriously implemented or remain as empty rhetoric. It is 
widely acknowledged that there is a gap between the law and its enforcement 
in Indonesia. Developments during the early years of Reformasi period will be 
discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Seven
Crisis, Change and Resilience
Since independence, the Chinese in Indonesia have undergone crisis after crisis, both preceding and following the transitions of power in the country. 
Outbreaks of violence against the Chinese have occurred during these transitions. 
For most of the New Order’s thirty years, the Chinese were singled out, pressured 
to assimilate into the mainstream indigenous society, to abandon their culture 
and renounced cultural exclusiveness. Despite the economic progress achieved by 
many Chinese entrepreneurs, insecurity, discrimination, and resentment were their 
rewards. In May 1998, the Suharto’s repressive regime dissolved. His regisnation 
was a watershed in Indonesia’s political history, and, potentially, a turning point for 
the Chinese as well. In this atmosphere of change, there were growing aspirations 
amongst the Chinese to demand an end to racial discrimination and to restore 
their cultural and civil rights. This chapter explores how they coped with the 
1998 crisis, and examines the variety of responses among the Yogyakarta Chinese 
to the newly available space and challenges of early Reformasi Indonesia.
The Turbulence
In the second half of 1997, following the devaluation of their currencies, much of 
Southeast Asia entered a severe economic recession. Of all of the countries affected 
by the crisis, Indonesia was the hit worst (Johnson, 1998:3-60). Beginning as a 
currency problem, it spread rapidly and deepened until it affected all sectors of the 
national economy, and ultimately, national politics. According to Djiwandono 
(1999:146), the former governor of the Bank Indonesia, the national economy 
had already been suffering from inefficiency generated by crony capitalism, so 
the weakening of the rupiah adversely affected an already weak financial sector. 
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In similar fashion, the spread from an economic to a social and political crisis was 
facilitated by the inherent weakness in Indonesia’s social and political system. 
In this multiple-faceted crisis, the Chinese were in an ideal position to be 
treated as scapegoats. Government and military officials in Jakarta repeatedly 
accused the Chinese for causing the economic crisis (Eklof, 1999:96-121). They 
tried to influence public opinion by leading people to believe that the crisis was 
not a natural one, but was created by Chinese businesspeople.230 Chinese who had 
transferred funds overseas to avoid risk and uncertainty were labelled ‘economic 
saboteurs’ or ‘traitors’. Furthermore, when shortages of various commodities 
coincided with rapid increases in prices, the Chinese traders were accused of 
hoarding and profiteering. The government made no efforts to explain to the 
public the real causes and consequences of the economic crisis were. Consequently, 
in early 1998, public anger about the financial crisis (krisis moneter, krismon) was 
vented against Chinese.231 
In May 1998, mass violence against the Chinese and their property broke 
out in Jakarta.232 Angry mobs broke into Chinese homes and stores, looted, 
destroyed and burned their properties.233 The government and the army allowed 
these riots to happen and even exploited anti-Chinese sentiments to avoid 
attention being directed towards their own failings (Turner, 2003:344).234 The 
scale of the destruction of property was tremendous. The situation detoriated and 
fear spread among the Chinese Indonesian when the violence extended to gang-
rapings of Chinese women.235 The stories of Chinese who were burned to death 
in their homes and women who were killed after being repeatedly raped echoed 
230 For example, in a press conference on 14 January1998, the commander of the armed forces called on the 
owners of thirteen large conglomerates to bring their dollars back from foreign bank accounts and convert 
them to back to rupiah. Since those conglomerates were owned by Chinese, the appeal was an implicit ac-
cusation that wealthy Chinese were contributing to the currency crisis. 
231 Resentment towards the government, augmented by severe poverty and anti-Chinese sentiment, proved to 
be both a volatile mix and a powerful motivation for ethnically targeted violence (Turner, 2003:343).
232 For an analysis of the May riots, see Siegel, 1998, and van Klinken, 1998. Indonesia Assessment 1998. 
233 The rioters were the massa (populist lower classes).  The majority of middle-class students who were demon-
strating at that time, demanding Suahrto resignation, did not target to the Chinese, but directed their anger 
against the government and the Suharto’s family. See Coppel, 2002 and Turner, 2003.
234 See S.Wanandi, 1999, “The Post-Suharto Business Environment”. 
235 The rape of Chinese women was a phenomenon of anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang, in June 1946. There 
have been systematic rapes of women of different ethnicity in East Timor, Irian and Aceh (Coppel, 2002:17); 
see also Wandita, 1998. 
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throughout the country. The horror of the attacks, it is widely believed, induced 
many wealthy Chinese to flee the country, with expectations that indigenous 
entrepreneurs would assume their dominant economic position.236 Government-
sponsored fact-finding teams have found that much of the violence was planned 
and provoked. They have called for further investigations of the roles of prominent 
army officers (Coppel, 2002:18).237 
After Suharto’s resignation, attacks on Chinese Indonesian property 
continued in Java and Sumatera. Although it was at a significantly lower level 
compared to the violence in Jakarta, it was insufficient to recreate a sense of 
security and confidence in the Chinese communities.  Chinese women remained 
extremely cautious because of ongoing reports of rapes (Reid, 2000:424). At the 
beginning of the Habibie administration, there were voices calling for government 
action to transfer sectors of the economy dominated by Chinese into the hands of 
indigenous entrepreneurs. Adi Sasono, the minister of Cooperatives in Habibie’s 
cabinet, attempted to implement this strategy by using cooperatives to distribute 
essential foods. President Habibie himself is on record saying that he did not care 
if Chinese left with their money because then others would replace them (Reid, 
2000:415).
The Situation in Yogyakarta during the Turbulence
Contrary to the situation in Jakarta, Solo and other cities where outbreaks of 
violence against the Chinese occurred, there was no hostility expressed publicly 
towards the Chinese in Yogyakarta. Racial slurs and anti-Chinese slogans did not 
appear in the yells, banners and posters used in the demonstrations that occurred 
daily.238 Instead, banners that bore slogans such as “Yogya Anti-Kerusuhan, Jangan 
236 See Cohen, FEER, 30 July 1998. It is estimated that 150,000 Chinese temporarily fled to Singapore, Hong-
kong and Australia (The Jakarta Post, 29 July 1998).
237 For more details on the team’s report, see Joint Fact-Finding Team 1998.  Prabowo Subianto, former son-in-
law of President Suharto and commander of the Special Forces Command (Kopassus) was alleged to have 
orchestrated the May riots (Forester, 1999). He is reported to have said to a leading Chinese businessman: 
“We are going to persecute your people even if it sets Indonesia back 30 years and we all have to go back to 
riding bicycles.” Prabowo was removed from his position after President Habibie replaced Suharto. 
238 This does not suggest that there were no anti-Chinese sentiments at all, but that those sentiments were not 
deeply rooted and were, for certain reasons, not publicly expressed or emphasised.
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Bakar”, Yogya is Anti-riots, Don’t Burn, and “Aksi Refomasi Damai”, Peaceful 
Reform Movement, and were signed by the Sultan, were displayed in many 
public places. Although there were regular student demonstrations, which were 
well organised, they did not direct their anger against the Chinese, but rather, 
against the government and the Suharto family. Some student leaders were aware 
of efforts to tempt them into anti-Chinese violence; therefore they imposed strict 
discipline on the demonstrators. They had a better understanding of who was to 
blame for the financial crisis, namely the Indonesian government and its corrupt 
practices, and refused to be lured away to attack the Chinese. The fact that the 
protestors in Yogyakarta were primarily students, rather than the masses, may 
have been the major factor for the absence of anti-Chinese violence.239
 It is worth noting that the local newspapers and other media also played a 
role in preventing ethnicity from becoming a public issue. In cases that involved 
a Chinese individual or company, the journalists did not emphasise the ethnicity 
of the accused.240  Jong, a Chinese businessman in Rejowinangun was accused 
of hoarding sembako in early 1998. Although the case was covered by the local 
newspaper for several days, there was no explicit connection to the Chinese. 
People who did not know that Jong was Chinese would not necessarily suspect 
that he was Chinese. To an extent, the conservative news coverage helped to 
prevent provocateurs from fueling anti-Chinese sentiments, as had occurred 
elsewhere. Although some indigenous Yogyanese knew that Jong was Chinese, 
there were no violent attacks or looting of his warehouse. The social context in 
which the Yogyanese did not exploit ethnic prejudice is rooted in a long history 
of cultivated mutual understanding fostered by all sectors of the community (see 
Chapter 2). The reason behind the restraint of anti-Chinese sentiment was not 
due only to the presence of Chinese, who were better integrated into the society, 
but also, to some degree, to a social situation in which, generally, violence was not 
favoured and diversity accepted. 
239 By comparison, the massa needed to vent anger arising from misunderstandings about the causes of their pov-
erty, based on suspicions towards the Chinese that had been building up over the years (Turner, 2003:344). 
See also Siegel, 1998 and Wibowo, 2001.
240 Some national newspapers and magazines often inserted the Chinese name of the accused between brackets 
following the Indonesian name to indicate that the person is Chinese, i.e., Sudono Salim (Liem Sioe Li-
ang).
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However, the Reformasi movement in Yogyakarta was not free from violent 
incidents. The first demonstration of student unrest occurred on 5 May 1998, 
on Gejayan Street,241 Student demonstrators clashed with policemen and soldiers 
who were trying to disperse them. One student was killed by a stray bullet, and 
many others were injured. A few public facilities were damaged, but no shops or 
houses were attacked. 
The situation in the city had become very tense and people were gripped 
with fear, especially since May 13, when riots broke out in Jakarta and Solo. The 
fear was, no doubt, exaggerated – only a small proportion of indigenous people 
engaged in the violence – but many Chinese in Yogyakarta who had families 
and relatives in those cities were extremely worried about their safety. They were 
also worried about the possibility that the riots would spread to Yogyakarta. 
The situation in Pecinan was relatively calm. The residents joined together to 
guard their neighbourhood. According to Marcel, who lived in Pajeksan, the 
indigenous residents of the kampung reassured their Chinese neighbours that 
they would defend their kampung against any rioters who tried to enter their 
neighbourhood.
In general, it was believed that the threat of violence would come from 
outside Yogyakarta. Residents organised intensive patrols in their kampungs, 
while military and police personnel from Yogyakarta guarded the regional 
borders. There were rumours that hundreds of rioters from other towns who tried 
to enter Yogyakarta were detained and refused entry into the city by the military. 
The police also set up security posts in strategic places throughout the city.242 
Although some prominent Chinese may have requested protection during these 
critical times, these security measures were not just to protect the Chinese.243 It 
241 Gejayan Street located at about 4 km northeast of the Malioboro area. Several universities are located in this 
neighbourhood.
242 These security posts are set up throughout the year on particular busy holidays, such as Idul Fitri, Christmas 
and New Year Eve.
243 Whenever there was a possibility of insecurity, the authorities would call several prominent figures, usually 
businesspeople from the Chinese community to a meeting. Although the agenda was officially a discussion 
on the critical situation and necessary precautionary measures, the message behind the invitation was clear 
for the Chinese. Invitations could come from officials of different agencies at different levels, from the Lurah 
(village headman) up to the governor. Government or military leaders could benefit personally from these 
situations.
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was rumoured that the Chinese businespeople made large contributions to the 
military at this time.244 
 A few days later, on Friday, 15 May, all the shops and restaurants, offices, 
and banks along the main streets closed. Posters and banners declaring support for 
Reformasi were hung in front of shops and offices. Thousands of people poured 
on to Jalan Solo, a predominantly Chinese commercial area. They destroyed a 
showroom of automobiles, threw stones at a bank, and set fire to tyres in the 
street. There was no further destruction. The leader of the Islamic political party, 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), United Development Party, arrived to calm 
down the crowd. Later, the Sultan spoke to the masses for twenty minutes.245 He 
said, “Please, I ask you, as citizens of Yogyakarta, do not destroy what we have 
built together. I ask you to keep the peace and do not let any outsiders incite riots 
in Yogyakarta. Are you able to do that?” The crowd roared back, “Sanggup!” (Yes, 
we can!), Then they applauded the Sultan. He also told them that he appreciated 
their struggle to change the situation for a better one, but that it should be done 
in an orderly and peaceful way. When the Sultan continued on to the Gadjah 
Mada University campus, the crowd followed him, yelling along the way: “Hidup 
Sultan, hidup Sultan!” (Long live the Sultan! Long live the Sultan!). Hundreds 
of student gathered in the campus square. When the Sultan asked crowd to go 
home - “It is time for sholat Magrib (Islamic evening prayers). Please go home in 
a calm and orderly way” - the crowd applauded him. Many of them tried to shake 
his hand as they left.
As the Reformasi movement246 intensified in Yogyakarata, many Chinese 
supported it in various ways, primarily by providing financial support. Their 
contributions were used, for example, to make banners, stickers, and headbands, 
244 It is debatable to view this as buying protection. The security forces were concerned with protecting the city 
and its people, not just the Chinese. Some Chinese businesspeople said that the military officials claimed 
that they did not have enough funds, so they hoped the Chinese would understand their position (minta 
pengertian) and provide financial support to maintain operations. They did not insist that the Chinese pay 
a certain amount of money, but they explained their needs and expected the Chinese to come to their own 
conclusions.
245 A large part of this description is taken from the local newspapers, Bernas and Kedaulatan Rakyat, 16 May 
1998.
246 The reformasi movement mobilised massive opposition and demonstrations against Suharto, especially 
amongst students. The aim was to force Suharto to resign from office and end the New Order rule. See Arief 
Budiman, et.al.1999. Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia.
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and to provide food and drinks to student demonstrator. Moreover, many Chinese 
individuals were involved in various new groups formed to support Reformasi 
Damai, peaceful reform. Some Yogyakarta Chinese activists explained that this 
was not for opportunistic reasons but that they had great interest in encouraging 
a peaceful reformation process. They really thought that it was time for them to 
participate actively in the struggle for Reformasi with their fellow countrymen. 
The 20th of May commemorates the beginning of the anti-colonial 
resurgence.247 This day was chosen by the coalition of student groups for a mass 
Reformasi rally held in the north square in front of the Sultan’s Palace. Almost all 
of the stores along the main streets were closed till late afternoon.The storeowners 
and their employees provided snacks and drinks in front of their shops, and served 
the crowd who marched through the city and gathered in the north square. It was 
estimated that one million people attended the rally. Representatives of student 
and social organisations gave speeches and religious leaders led prayers. Finally, 
the Sultan read his “Yogyakarta Declaration” in support of change in the national 
government.248 This huge gathering was a show of moral force that demanded 
total reformation, starting with the resignation of Suharto.   
The rally turned out to be the greatest pro-Reformasi demonstrati on in the 
country. It was a success, not only in terms of the number of participants, but also 
becaused it was peaceful and in an orderly. This success was, of course, not the 
result of a single day’s preparation. The Sultan and prominent leaders of various 
groups in the community, particularly religious groups, had frequently reminded 
the Yogyanese to keep their city free of violence. An awareness of maintaining 
peace and order, and preventing acts of violence against their city and its people, 
had been consistenly nurtured over an extended period.      
On 21 May, the day after the Reformasi gathering in Yogyakarta, Suharto 
announced his resignation and appointed Vice President B.J. Habibie as his 
successor. Many students in Yogyakarta celebrated Suharto’s resignation with 
247 20 May (1908), the birthday of ‘Budi Utomo’, is celebrated as Hari Kebangkitan Nasional, Day of National 
Resurgence.
248 In the declaration, the Sultan asks the people of Yogyakarta and Indonesia to be united in supporting the 
Reformation Movement, and that ABRI (Indonesia Arm Forces) protect the movement and the people who 
supported it he asksed all Indonesians to avoid all acts of anarchy and to guard the nation’s unity (Kedaulatan 
Rakyat, 21 May 1998).
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a motorcycle motorcade that roamed the city’s streets all day. There were no 
incidents of violence reported throughout the day.
Yogyakarta, at the peak of the 1998 political turnover, bristled with tension. 
The Chinese was both increasingly insecure and tense, but at the same time, 
enthusiastically joined the Reformasi movement and becoming politically active 
in public for the first time in many years. The following sections will discuss the 
reactions to the threats and tensions in early 1998, and the strategies the Chinese 
adopted to assure security.
Dealing with Insecurity at the End of New Order
During 1996 through 1998, when Chinese shops and houses in many towns 
on Java were burned and destroyed, Yogyakarta remained peaceful. It would 
appear that Chinese in Yogyakarta enjoyed a secure situation. However, many 
Yogyakarta Chinese were anxious when they heard about the anti-Chinese riots 
that had broken out in other cities, especially those close to Yogyakarta. They 
were afraid that the violence might spread to Yogyakarta, and they anxiously 
monitored events through the national and local media.
 The riots that broke out in Jakarta and Solo on 13-15 May escalated the 
feelings of insecurity among Chinese in Yogyakarta. Copies of video recordings 
of the riots in those cities, stories of gang-raped of Chinese women circulated 
the Chinese communities. The atmosphere in Pecinan changed, particularly in 
the evening, as the streets became desolate and deserted. There were rumours 
that small groups of gangsters (preman) might demand protection money from 
shopowners. For precaution, many Chinese shopkeepers closed their shops early 
or opened only during the day. Some Chinese families made preparations for 
quick escapes in case the anti-Chinese violence spread to Yogyakarta. A handful 
of wealthy Chinese, mainly the women and children, fled overseas or moved 
temporarily to Bali.
  It was only after the Sultan managed to persuade the demonstrators to keep 
Yogyakarta peaceful, and prominent Muslims, including Amien Rais, Chairman 
of Partai Amanat Nasional,249 also made public statements condemning violence 
249 Rais is a professor of political science at Gadjah Mada University professor who was also the head of Mu-
hammadiyah, a Muslim social organisation. For a detailed description, see Chapter 2. He formed the Na-
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against the Chinese, that the Yogyakarta Chinese were able to release their tension. 
The Sultan and the military commander asked prominent Chinese figures to 
reassure the Chinese community that the situation was under control and they 
could conduct their businesses as usual.
The rich Chinese, in general, were more worried than the poor. The lower 
income Chinese were also uncomfortable when anti-Chinese violence broke out 
in several towns. Their anxiety and fear were not focused on themselves, but they 
symphatised with their fellow Chinese in other cities who were victims of the 
violence. The majority of poor Chinese who live in Pecinan were uncertain that 
they would not be targeted in any anti-Chinese violence. As one of them said, 
“In these kampungs, we are as poor as our Javanese neighbours, and we suffer 
from the krismon as badly as they do.  We have nothing, so what will they take 
from us?” Indeed, the houses and warung of these kampung Chinese are not 
indistinguisable from their indigenous neighbours. 
The mixed ethnic, i.e., Chinese-Javanee, who considerd themselves to be 
‘half-indigenous’, also did not feel threatened. They thought that they were better 
assimilated into the indigenous majority and their physical appearance was, in 
general, less distinctively ‘Chinese’. 250 
Another group that was less worried about the potential danger of the anti-
Chinese sentiments were the Muslim Chinese. According to a prominent Muslim 
Chinese, conversion to Islam would protect them from any rioters.251 Posting a 
sign declaring the owner to be “Muslim” or “‘Islam” on the wall of their houses 
and shops would serve to protect them.
It was the Chinese business community, especially the shopkeepers, who 
were fearful for their safety. They had carefully monitored the risks and adversities 
of the anti-Chinese outbreaks. These riots had primarily targeted Chinese 
business properties, which were highly visible along the streets. The fact that anti-
tional Mandate Party (PAN) in 1998. The party is secular and claims to represent all religions and ethnic 
backgrounds, however, the core support is rooted in Muham madiyah members. In Yogyakarta, two Chinese 
businessmen became board members of PAN.
250 Throughout the history of anti-Chinese riots, physical appearance had been a major determinant in singling 
out the targets. Indigenous Indonesians who resembled Chinese sometimes became victim of the rioters’ 
misjudgment.
251 The feeling of (in)security were related to the perception of the threats. The rioters did not bother to ask 
their victims first about their cultural affiliation of Chinese or their perspectives on assimilation.
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Chinese violence had not spread to Yogyakarta from the neighbouring towns, was 
not totally reassuring. Signs similar to those that marked the targets of violence 
before the riots in Jakarta and Solo were found in Yogyakarta, particularly on the 
fences of wealthy Chinese houses and businesses. As a Chinese businesswoman 
in Malioboro said anxiously, “At times like this, we never know what will happen 
tomorrow. We live in uncertainty. We don’t know how we would react if rioters 
came and attacked us.” Their anxiety was justified in view of the fact that in 
most outbreaks of anti-Chinese, the Chinese did not receive protection from the 
authorities, police or military, who allowed the rioter and looters free reign. 
Security was a pre-eminent concern for the majority of Chinese in 
Yogyakarta. ‘Safety First’ became their top priority. Throughout the crisis, Chinese 
businesspersons, shopkeepers, and middle-class professionals repeatedly referred 
to this ‘Safety First’ principle. In their view, security was much more important 
than large profits or wealth. If the anti-Chinese riots occurred in Yogyakarta, the 
Chinese would have preferred to renounce their property to the rioters if that 
could save them from being killed. Almost all Yogyakarta Chinese tried to protect 
themselves and to prepare themselves in the face of constant threats of violence. 
Together with indigenous community, they succeeded in preventing violence in 
Yogyakarta.
Coping with Insecurity 
Factors contributing to the absence of anti-Chinese violence in Yogyakarta have 
been partially explained in previous chapters. Although this section focuses 
primarily on the 1998 crisis, it should be borne in mind that (in)security has 
been an important issue for the Chinese throughout their history. The strategies 
Yogyakarta Chinese used to accommodate themselves during the crisis reflect 
their strategies in dealing with security issues in general (Susanto, 2006). The 
strategies adopted by the Chinese in Yogyakarta in dealing with the security 
crisis can be categorised into two categories, namely, short-term and long-term 
strategies. The first category refers to the strategy undertaken when the crisis or 
potential danger has come to the door, immediate coping strategy that includes 
giving donations, buying protection and fleeing. The second category can be seen 
as a forestalling potential danger. Instilling loyalty, acts of charity and nurturing 
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cooperation belong to this category. These two categories of strategies are not 
mutually exclusive and can be combined for maximal effect.
According to Pak Iman, a Chinese white-collar employee, writer and 
outspoken critic, many Chinese entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta favour short-term 
strategies rather than long-term strategies because they do not want to bother 
with efforts that do not produce immediate results. Investing money and energy 
into long-term ‘social investment’ appears to be inefficient and impractical 
for this group. However, some Chinese businesspersons who use short-term 
strategies argue that maintaining positive relationship with indigenous people, 
by itself, does not guarantee the prevention of anti-Chinese sentiments, because 
the outbreaks of violence are closely connected to political engineering. In their 
view, it is misleading to conclude, for example, that the Chinese in Solo were not 
cultivating positive relationships with the larger society and, therefore, became 
victims of anti-Chinese violence in 1980 and 1998.252 There is, then, a difference 
in the reasoning between those who favour long-term strategies and those who 
favour short-term ones. On the one hand, the long-term group believes that the 
social ground where the relationship between the Chinese and indigenous people 
is poor maintained represent fertile soil for anti-Chinese riots. On the other 
hand, the short-term group sees the violence anti-Chinese outbreaks primarily 
as the instigation of certain groups in the government or society who manipulate 
the issue for their vested interests. 
Long-term strategies
Most of the long-term coping strategies have been explained in previous 
chapters; it suffices here to highlight the significant features. From the beginning 
of the Sultanate until the present day, the Chinese, as other residents of Yogyakarta 
have remained loyal to the Sultan. A declaration of their loyalty was memorialised 
in a special plaque that is displayed in one of the palace courtyards.  The Sultan is 
often attributed with the protection of the Chinese in Yogyakarta from the anti-
Chinese violence that periodically occurred elsewhere. Since the colonial period, 
the Chinese elite have also maintained good relations with influential leaders 
of nationalist and Islamic organisations. They supported the Republic during 
252 For a discussion on the 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Solo, see Purdey, 2002.
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the struggle for independence and a prominent Yogyakarta Chinese joined the 
Indonesian delegation to the 1949 Roundtable Conference in The Hague, which 
resolved the issue of Indonesian sovereignty. Prominent Chinese have made 
invaluable contributions to the Yogyakarta community with the establishment of 
the Dr.Yap Eye Hospital and the Gembira Loka Zoo. 
Prior to the New Order era, while maintaining their own ethnic culture, 
traditions and religions, many Chinese in Yogyakarta also displayed interest in 
traditional Javanese culture. The shadow puppet performance (wayang kulit) 
and gamelan were always included in the cultural activities of most peranakan 
Chinese social organisations. During the New Order, however, much of their 
ethnic affinity became invisible. Ethnic-based associations transformed into 
organisations open to the ‘general’ society. While they were still highly visible as 
shopkeepers, they maintained a low-profile. Moreover, they accepted the state’s 
rejection of their landownerships rights. Whether consciously or not, it is clear 
that for many years, the Yogyakarta Chinese have obediently and silently complied 
with compromising situations in the interests of security.
 Chinese associations and companies conducted various charity activities long 
before the 1998 economic crisis. Their contributions to relief aid programmes for 
victims of natural disasters have been substantial. Every year, on special occasions, 
such as Chinese New Year and Idul Fitri, the Muslim festival that marks the end 
the Ramadan fasting month, Chinese associations distribute foods or angpao (red 
envelope filled with money) to poor people.  They also regularly support the 
construction of mosques, and contribute financial support to Islamic orphanages 
and pesantrens.253 Several entrepreneurs provide scholarships to children of their 
indigenous employees and to the less fortunate children who live near their 
companies. Support is often granted to those who are in a position to influence 
the society at large.
The ultimate motive for these charity activities has never been fully revealed, 
but it is obvious that there has been a need to promote a positive image in public. 
They may also have speculated that if the hardships of the indigenous poor could 
be relieved somewhat with Chinese financial support, they may have less interest 
253 A peasantren is an Islamic school for children and young people, most of whom board on the school pre-
mises.
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in joining anti-Chinese violence. In other words, the charity was also intended 
to counter popular prejudice against the Chinese. According to Anwar, who is an 
active member of the Indonesian Red Cross, the experience of Chinese victims 
elsewhere taught them that buying protection from the police or military was 
ineffective. They have come to realise that they could not rely on the police or 
military for protection.
 On the other hand, prominent Chinese who cultivated personal relationships 
with high-ranking officials could use that special connection to help or protect 
themselves, their fellow Chinese and the larger community. For example, they 
become protectors of Chinese temples and funeral societies in Yogyakarta.  Chinese 
individuals appealed to these prominent Chinese who have special relations with 
royal families or high-ranking officials, if they had trouble with certain oknum254 
from the bureaucracy or military. During the May 1998 riots, some Yogyakarta 
Chinese businesspersons used their connections with the military to hide their 
luxury cars in air force garages in Yogyakarta.
Short-term strategy
During the krismon, which mostly affected the livelihood of lower and 
middle class people, the general concern was to alleviate the hardships these people 
suffered. There was apprehension that the adversity would lead to social unrest. 
Therefore, various social groups in Yogyakarta, including those of the Chinese, 
frequently organised charity activities, mainly in the form of meal provision and 
pembagian sembako, distribution of basic necessities. While enduring difficulties 
in their businesses, many Chinese-owned companies and shopkeepers periodically 
sponsored these distributions to ease the burdens of their employees and less 
fortunate residents in their neighbourhoods.
It is worth noting that when Chinese donated to indigenous charity 
organisations in the past, it was not necessarily publicly acknowledged. At this 
time, however, they openly organised this charitable activities themselves or in 
254 A term which is popularised by the Suharto government referring to a person from government or military 
whose wrong-doings should be taken as individual account, and nothing to do with their offices. This is to 
say that the department (government or military) is not responsible for what their employees did as indi-
vidual.  
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conjunction with indigenous groups. The establish ment of Pamitra in 1998 
by Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs (see Chapter 4), was an example of 
cooperation and coordination with other groups as, probably, the best protection 
against any escalation of conflict. 
In another effort to prevent trouble during the economic crisis, the Chinese 
associations played a significant role in influencing Chinese wholesalers and 
shopkeepers to refrain from hoarding their products and increasing their prices. 
Chinese businesspeople were reminded that these actions would endanger the 
lives of the entire Chinese community in Yogyakarta. 
Apart from doing these charitable activities, no special collective efforts were 
made to anticipate the possibility of anti-Chinese riots in Yogyakarta. According 
to Waluyo, a member of an informal Chinese group, Chinese gatherings were 
always under scrutiny, therefore they were afraid to organise meetings to discuss 
preventive actions. In late 1997, before the crisis, a group of graduates from a 
Chinese school in Yogyakarta held a reunion. This meeting was reported to the 
authorities, and the organisers were then interrogated. Eventually, they had to 
pay millions of rupiahs to close the case. This precedent discouraged plans to 
organise any precautionary steps during the crisis. Precautions were primarily 
made personal, not collective. Shopkeepers, for example, posted signs declaring 
“Mendukung Reformasi”, Support Reformasi, or “Milik Pribumi”, Indigenously-
Owned, in the front of their shops. Wedding parties and family gatherings were 
cancelled or simplified. Most of the less-fortunate Chinese families in Pecinan 
simply submitted their fate to God (pasrah aja).  
There was an establish pattern for maintaining security in Indonesia that was 
based on relationship between the Chinese and the authorities. The relationships 
were, for the most part, informal and personal, and were rarely admitted to or 
acknowledged. The general pattern was set in motion when either the Chinese 
in need took the initiative in requesting protection from the authorities, or 
when the government or military officials had a request, they would ask Chinese 
leaders, who served as middlemen, to deliver the request to their fellows. These 
middlemen would then organise a meeting with other Chinese and arrange to 
fulfil the request.  This pattern was repeated in a crisis, when government and 
military officials requested Chinese donations before taking protective actions.
During the crisis, the Bakom-PKB played the role of middlemen in negotiating 
with the military officials. The military contacted Chinese leaders in Bakom-PKB 
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and asked them to organise a meeting between Chinese businesspeople with the 
military. Their intentions were obvious to the businesspeople; they were expected 
to provide financial contributions for protections. Those who attended the meeting 
were mainly the big Chinese businesspeople who had connections with either 
leaders of Bakom-PKB or the authorities, and those who were afraid to ignore 
the invitation. However, a number of Chinese entrepreneurs who disapproved 
this meeting did not attend in person but sent their employees. According to a 
Chinese businessman who refused to attend, these covert exactions were common 
in 1998 when anti-Chinese riots broke out in various parts of Indonesia. 
In early 1999, President Habibie, Suharto’s successor, decided to hold early 
elections. The political temperature rose rapidly. Again, the Sultan appealed to 
the Yogyanese and political parties to maintain peace in the region. In response, 
various NGOs in Yogyakarta conducted peace campaigns. Inspired by these 
NGOs, and protective of the feelings of anxiety amongst Chinese, in April 1999, 
a group of Chinese businesspeople invited members of Yogyakarta Chinese 
business community to establish a task force, called Tim Simpatik Yogya Damai, 
Sympathetic Team for a Peaceful Yogya. Their aim was to support the security 
posts (pos keamanan) that were set up by police and political parties in various 
places throughout the city. They did not provide financial aid, but they provide 
meals, drinks, cigarettes, and other necessities for the people who guarded the 
posts. According to coordinator of the Tim, some police and military posts 
requested money instead, but they insisted on delivering provisions.255 Apart 
from the pos keamanan, they also help various NGOs to make banners and other 
forms of media to promote peace in Yogyakarta. Some Chinese associations 
and individuals established aid-centres in their neighbourhoods. To distribute 
sembako and provide nasi bungkus (packaged  meals) for the  less fortunate. 
Impacts on economic life
The immediate impact of krismon was the soaring prices of daily necessities. This 
situation worsened after the government increased the price of petrol, kerosene 
255 I was informed by a prominent Chinese businessman, that a new military commander were irritating with 
the disobedience of Chinese entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta, and saying that it never happened in Medan where 
he was in command previously. He exclaimed that perhaps the Yogyakarta Chinese need a shock therapy 
before compliance. 
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and diesel fuel on 4 May 1998.256 Consequently, the prices of a wide range of 
commodities skyrocketed. The changes in the situation were obvious. Owners 
of food stalls noted that prior to krismon, their stalls were busy all evening until 
midnight, but since krismon, the streets were quiet by 8 p.m. Chinese shopkeepers 
on Malioboro complained about the drastic drop in sales, as most people just 
window-shopped. Pak Yudi, a gold shop owner in Ketandan, the centre for the 
gold trade in Yogyakarta, said that most people came to the shops to sell their 
gold, no longer to buy it. The situation deteriorated further when widespread 
rioting occurred in several towns in Java. Although there were no acts of violence 
in Yogyakarta, the outbreaks that had occurred in other cities had an enourmous 
impact on the tourists business.257 Tourism plummeted, affecting tourist-related 
businesses, such as hotels, restaurants, travel agencies, art shops and souvenirs 
vendors. 
Throughout 1998, krismon affected the livelihoods and businesses of 
Chinese in Yogyakarta, though its impact varied from one sector to another. 
Greater hardship was felt by the blue-collar employees, casual labourers and owners 
of small businesses as their purchasing power diminished. Many Chinese as did 
indigenous people, found that their salaries were no longer sufficient to cover their 
monthly expenses.  The krismon had also severely affected Chinese-owned small 
businesses, particularl home industries. Their problems were almost the same, i.e., 
the prices of raw materials soared while demand declined. Several small ventures 
were forced to close because they suffered continuous loss.
During the economic crisis, Pek Bun, encountered difficulties maintain his 
small business of making peyek (chips made of flour and peanuts). The problem 
was not the long hours that Pek Bun and his wife put in, i.e., fifteen hours each 
day, from early morning to late evening, but that the prices of the ingredients for 
making peyek had risen. He could not increase the price of his peyek, because, he 
feared, less people could afford to buy them and there then be a decrease in his 
sales. He had no alternative other than to borrow money from the moneylender 
in order to keep his business running. The only thing on his mind was how to 
survive the crisis, and to pray for God’s help.
256 Kedaulatan Rakyat and Bernas (5 May 1998).
257 Yogyakarta is the second most popular tourist destination in Indonesia after Bali. For a discussion on the 
economic change in Yogyakarta during the 1998 crisis, see White, 2005.
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The economic crisis, of course, did not affect only the small businesses. 
Middle and big enterprises in Yogyakarta, particularly the retail business and those 
that dealt with imported commodities, such as electronics, computers, cars and 
motorcycles, and machinery, were not exempted from the crisis. The diminishing 
purchasing power in the society caused a significant decline in market demand. 
For industries that required imported components, the impact of the monetary 
crisis was unavoidable. Three textile industries reported that the turnover of their 
businesses shrank by 30 percent.258 The high rise of the imported components 
raises the production costs, which, along with old equipment and less-advanced 
technology, made their products less competitive in the international market. 
The insecurity resulting from political instability and social unrest 
contributed more to the unfavourable conditions for conducting business than 
the economic crisis itself. The political crisis undermines confidence in the global 
financial system. According to Chinese engaged in export businesses, several 
buyers cancelled their orders citing security concerns as the reason. As a result, 
large manufacturing enterprises had difficulties maintaining large labour forces.   
Tjun’s MSG259 company, for instance, was badly affected. The cost of 
production rose, but the product could not be sold at a price that would cover 
the actual production cost, becuase the buyers who were from the lower classes, 
had no purchasing power. The company slowed production down. This decision 
would have led to a reduction in the labour force, but Tjun realised that this time 
of crisis, it would simply create more trouble if he discharged workers. In lieu 
of this, he initiated a new shift system to reduce working hours.260 Fortunately, 
his employees were willing to accept the new system, although it resulted in 
lower individual incomes. The workers did receive compensation in the form of 
health care programme. During the crisis, the company occasionally distributed 
basic commodities, such as: rice, sugar, and cooking-oil, to their employees. 
Tjun’s company barely made any profit and he was doubtful whether he could 
continue. When the anti-Chinese violence reached its peak in the May 1998, 
258 This account was given in 2004, so it could be said that these remarks illustrated the crisis’ long-term ef-
fects.
259 MSG (monosodium glutamate) is a substance used to season food.
260 A similar scheme was undertaken by the Samitex, a textile factory owned by the oldest son of the founder of 
Toko Ramai. 
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Tjun considered selling his company and moving to Bali or Australia, but in the 
end, he did neither. 
 The decline of Chinese businesses at this time was not due solely the 
direct impact of the 1998 crisis. A number of businesses were already in a critical 
condition before krismon for a variety of reasons. The crisis made their situations 
worse. In other words, the economic crisis was not the single factor for the decline 
of Chinese business in Yogyakarta.  In some cases, the crisis became part of a pre-
existing problem, as illustrated in the following case.
Sali, a 44-year Chinese businesswoman, started a silver business in late 
1989 by opening a small shop in her house, which was located on the side of 
a road leading to Kotagede, the centre of silvercraft shops. Within six years, 
with good customer services and marketing, including the use of travel agencies 
and participating in international exhibitions, her business grew rapidly, and 
developed from trading to manufacturing. In 1995, she opened a pre-school. 
This venture was successful and most of the pupils were from the upper-middle 
class.261 In the same year, she used a bank loan to buy land near to the Borobudur 
Temple to set up a branch-store. Unfortunately, in 1996, she was deceived by her 
business partners in Malaysia and lost a great amount of money. Her business was 
in serious trouble and before she could recover, she was hit by the 1998 economic 
and political crisis. Like other tourism-related businesses, her silver business 
declined drastically. She estimated the drop in turnover at 70%, and returns 
could no longer cover the production and maintenance costs. According to Sali, 
the main problem she faced was not the monetary crisis itself, but the decline 
of Indonesia’s reputation as a safe country, and particularly the implications of 
its loss of credibility for the Chinese businesses. Although her silver business 
suffered from the crisis, she also indirectly benefited from it. While the trust of 
international business in Indonesia plummeted during the crisis, many foreign 
buyers entrusted her to supervise production and make payments on their behalf 
for their businesses.
Inspired by a fellow Chinese businesswoman who was engaged in the export 
furniture business. Sali managed to get a bank loan to start a similar business in 
261 The grandchild of the Sultan was one of the pupils, and so she knows the Queen (Ratu Hemas) and became 
a close friend. They worked together in empowering the traditional handicrafts.
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late 1998. She made use of her existing network, which she had developed for her 
silver business; as most of her new furniture buyers were her old silver customers. 
This business helped her to recover her liquidity. Learning from her experience 
to ‘not to put all her eggs at one basket’, she diversified her business further by 
starting a knitting home industry in early 2004. 
Other business that survived the crisis were those that exported product 
whose main components were supplied locally and purchased in depreciated 
rupiah.262 A striking example is the  furniture export business, which formerly 
in the hands of expatriate businessmen. However, since krismon, a number 
of Chinese entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta have been lured into investing in this 
lucrative endeavour. It was not unusual, however, to see these businesses fall 
because of a lack of experience and knowledge about product manufacturing, 
exporting, networks, and the international market. The fact that many Chinese 
entered the same business made it highly competitive. According to Marsel, a 
supervisor in a furnitureexport company, suppliers for one company were often 
lured away by competitors. This would cause problems if there was a production 
deadline to meet.
 On the whole, the decline of their businesses was due not merely to the 
immediate impacts of the economic crisis, but also because of inept coping 
strategies and lack of skills in particular businesses. Eventually, it ruined their 
economic life, because they lost much of their savings intended for starting a 
new business, as illustrated in the cases of the Chinese wage labourers who tried 
to start their own small businesses. In early 1999, new food stalls and warungs 
that were set up on the terraces of Chinese’s houses in the alleys of Pecinan. 
These attempts to earn additional income were short-lived. Very few of them 
survived.  These endeavours were not carefuuly deliberated and, thus, failed. It 
was questionable to start a business selling foods at a time people did not spend 
much on eating out. However, as Lily, owner of one of those warung, said, they 
could not think of any other business that suited them. They did not need to 
invest much to start the business because they could use their household furniture 
and did not have to rent a space. 
262 Siman, who established his charcoal business in 1991, said that his export jumped to 60 percent in 1998. 
Fortunately, he had bought high-tech equipment from South Korea before the crisis. With this new equip-
ment, his company was capable of producing higher quality products that out-classed his competitors.
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Cultural Revival
A phenomenon that has been a feature of Chinese life since the fall of President 
Suharto is the revival of cultural forms that had been banned or discouraged 
under the Suharto’s New Order regime. The most visible and symbolic of these is 
the Barongsai Lion Dance, which has come to epitomise the purported freedom 
of expression now granted to the Chinese.263 Suharto resignation has led to an 
opening of space, suddenly providing opportunities for Chinese to openly discuss 
their experiences as an oppressed minority. This space broadened in January 2000, 
when President Wahid officially revoked Presidential Decree of 1967, which had 
prohibited the celebrations of Chinese religious festivals and traditional customs 
in public. The Chinese were able openly to openly celebrate Chinese New Year. 
In 2003, President Megawati Sukarnoputri declared Chinese New Year to be a 
national holiday.
Since the end of Suharto’s New Order, there has been official and general 
acknowledgement within Indonesia that the Chinese have suffered from 
ethnic discrimination. The new administrations have eradicated some of the 
discriminatory laws and allowed the Chinese to reclaim their cultural rights. The 
bans on the use of the Chinese languages and written Chinese were revoked.There 
are radio television stations that broadcast programmes in Mandarin. Stories 
depicting friendships between Chinese and indigenous people, and the need 
for greater understanding across ethnic boundaries have appeared in television 
drama series and works of literature. According to Pamela Allen (2003), Chinese 
Indonesian literature is undergoing a process of revitalisation and re-emergence 
in Reformasi Indonesia.264  The print media is now free to publish for Chinese 
readers in a proliferation of daily newspapers, weekly and bi-weekly tabloid and 
magazines in Indonesian, Mandarin, or both languages (Coppel 2003:332).265
263 In fact, not all Chinese find the Barongsai performance enjoyable, some Chinese intellectuals commented on 
the ‘kitsch’ and tackiness’ of the performance. See Myra Sidharta, 2001. 
264 A number of Chinese writers have began to write under their Chinese names or write in Mandarin. For 
examination of recent literary works by and about the Chinese in Indonesia, see Allen, 2003: 386-399.
265 No longer at risk of closure by the authority, many of these new media faced lacking of subscribers and 
advertisers to be economically viable. For detailed description of Chinese media after the New Order, see 
Pandiangan 2003:401-419. 
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During the post-Suharto period, new civil rights and non political 
organisations emerged in Jakarta to campaign on anti-discrimination issues and 
concentrate on social and cultural issues. Two well-known socio-cultural NGOs 
are Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI), Chinese Indonesian 
Social Clan Association, and Ikatan Indonesia Keturunan Tionghoa (INTI), 
Association of Indonesians of Chinese Descent. While these two NGOs are 
dominated by the old generation who oppose forced assimilation and intend 
to reclaim their cultural rights, the younger generation of Chinese Indonesians 
established groups focused on addressing issues of discrimination, including 
Solidaritas Pemuda Pemudi Tionghoa Untuk Keadilan (SIMPATIK), Chinese Youth 
Solidarity for Justice, and Gerakan Perjuangan Anti Diskriminasi (GANDI), Anti-
discrimination Movement.266 
The Chinese reactions to this clearing of space have been varied in degree, 
method, and region. In general, the Yogyakarta Chinese have responded cau-
tiously. As of the end of 2003, none of the national ethnic associations had estab-
lished branches in Yogyakarta. Remnants of a reluctance to express their ethnicity 
in public remain. Public celebrations of Chinese New Year gained support only 
gradually. Other than the appearance of banners announcing Selamat Tahun Baru 
Imlek, Happy Chinese New Year, along the main streets of Yogyakarta, and the 
sales of Chinese New Year’s decoration in Pecinan, there was little indication of a 
celebration. The New Year celebrations were confined to klentengs, restaurants, 
and homes, no fireworks or festivities were organised in public places. The first 
public Chinese New Year celebration was held in 2000, with the theme, Malam 
Keakraban Bersama Sri Sultan, Social Evening with the Sultan. The camouflague 
indicated the caution of the organisers. Their restraint may have been due to the 
gentle warnings from the Sultan and Yogyakarta Chinese community leaders to 
not t go ‘overboard’ in celebrating their Chinese-ness.
Until mid-2002, the Barongsai Lion Dance, which become an icon of the 
Chinese cultural revival during Reformasi, was rarely performed in public places 
in Yogyakarta. According to the leader of Budi Abadi association, which has the 
best barongsai group in town, there were many requests from local government 
departments and business enterprises to include the barongsai dance in public 
266 For exploration on the development of these organisations, see Giblin 2003:353-368.
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events. However, since his association considers the barongsai dance to be part 
of a religious ritual and not a form of entertainment, he tactfully denied those 
requests.267
Although there are diverse opinions on how it would be best to voice their 
concerns, it is difficult to categorise them. The varying reactions of Chinese in 
Yogyakarta to the new freedom of cultural expression are somewhat, although not 
definitely, related to the groups of assimilationists discussed in Chapter 5. 
On the whole, the natural assimilationists and the cosmopolitan 
assimilationists are the groups that demonstrate little enthusiasm toward the 
‘cultural revival’. They rarely attend celebrations of Chinese culture. There were 
some concerns within these groups about the euphoria over the new freedom of 
expression that they feared, could drive a further wedge between Chinese and 
indigenous people.  For the majority in these groups, ethnicity is not an issue, 
and Chinese-ness is irrelevant. They are not in favour of the establishment of 
ethnic-based organisations and are more concerned with the continuing disguise 
of institutionalised discrimination against Chinese. While some perceive that 
discrimination overlapped with ethnicity, the younger generation of these groups 
did not view that way. Their perception is based on the frame of the nation-
state, therefore they see themselves as Indonesian citizen, not as Chinese. Unlike 
the symbolic assimilationist which see the Reformasi as the time to correct the 
past and reclaim their cultural rights to be Chinese, these groups, like other 
Indonesians,  perceive this time as an opportunity to pursue a better position in 
the future within a more democratic political-economic system. 
On the other hand, the symbolic assimilationists, who felt oppressed 
throughout the New Order, are passionately interested in the cultural revival. 
However, members of this group can be divided into two factions. The first 
faction emphasises the decoration of Chinese cultural identity. They view the new 
situation as a freedom to express their culture that they are forbidden to express 
in the past.  The second faction has a broader agenda, which is in line with the 
integrationist perspective, i.e., pursuing the rights of Chinese as one of the ethnic 
groups in Indonesia. Their activities, therefore, focusing on the struggle against 
267 Chinese activists from other associations regretted this rigid decision, because in their view its time to re-
introduce the Chinese culture to the public. Most barongsai performances were played by groups from other 
towns in Central Java.
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discrimination, are more political in nature.268 While sharing a similar desire to 
retain Chinese culture, the second group is less oriented to their ancestral country 
than the former. The opportunistic assimilationists are inclined to favour, albeit 
timidly, the first faction.
Due to the differences between the two factions, in 2003, there was a 
disagreement regarding the plans of PSMTI and INTI to establish branch 
organisations in Yogyakarta occurred. Leaders of the first faction, who has 
established an association called Paguyuban Bhakti Putera, opposed the plan 
and argued that there already were local Chinese organisations who were more 
familiar with the local situation than the national associations. Eventually, in 
2004, prominent figures of the second faction decided to establish an INTI 
branch. Although the initiators are mainly totok Chinese, they were supported by 
a number of peranakan intellectuals, who then become the chairman and board 
members of INTI Yogyakarta. The rivalry between the two factions magnified. 
Interestingly, many Yogyakarta Chinese are caught in between the two factions. 
In fact, many feel that both associations represent them in different ways.   
Conclusion
The opportunities that emerged out of the 1965 crisis and the economy recovery 
under Suharto’s New Order, enabled the Chinese businesspeople to make great 
advances. At the same time, they were discriminated against by the law in their 
daily lives, pressured by the government officials and the military to pay tributes, 
and denied their basic rights as citizens. The government, who failed in distributing 
the state’s welfare, regularly used the Chinese as a scapegoat. Violent attacks on 
their properties occurred periodically throughout the New Order period. Despite 
their perceived strong economic position, the Chinese remained in a politically 
vulnerable state of insecurity. 
The 1998 economic and political crisis again placed them in a tense situation. 
The crisis had relatively less consequence on their livelihood, but considerably more 
effect on their safety or feelings of security. The major impact was not so much 
268 It is reasonable that the first group has more supporters than the second group, since most Chinese are still 
wary of political things.
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in economic terms, but more on psychological and socio-political aspects of their 
lives. In fact, the Chinese have been living through one crisis after another and 
managed to survive against all odds, continually insecure. Although the Chinese 
in Yogyakarta have never been attacked by mass anti-Chinese violence, they do 
have to cope with the feelings of insecurity and the possibilities of outbreaks of 
anti-Chinese violence. 
Different groups of Chinese cope with insecurities in, at the least, two 
dimensions. One the one hand, there are long-term strategies focused on prevention 
of possible misfortune in the future, such as building social communication or 
other forms of cooperation between the Chinese and the indigenous people. On 
the other hand, there are short-term strategies to deal with imminent threats, such 
as buying protection, and spontaneous acts of charity. According to Chinese who 
are themselves long-term minded, most Chinese business people in Yogyakarta 
tend to prefer short-term strategy, which means they act only when the danger 
imminent. They support ‘instant programmes’ that produce immediate results. 
However, this kind of coping strategy does not adresss the root of the problem. 
Unlike the local strategy applied successfully by the lower and middle-classes, 
the Chinese’s coping strategies have been exclusive and short-term in nature. 
The application of only these strategies will not widen the circle of people who 
are vwilling to support them in eradicating ethnic discrimination in Indonesia. 
More inclusive and long-term strategies that involve more indigenous people or 
organisations must be considered.
After the fall of Suharto’s New Order, the Chinese experienced a new 
freedom to speak out and express their Chinese-ness. Chinese cultural activities 
are allowed to re-emerge in public. However, there may have been a tendency 
to overstate this revival. The euphoria of Chinese cultural resurgence has not 
been shared equally within the Chinese community itself and has remained a 
phenomenon at the national level. 
The Yogyakarta Chinese have welcomed the opportunity to express their 
cultural identity without fear. Their organisations have now regained confidence 
to advance their cultural interests and actively lobby the government to eliminate 
discriminatory legislation. However, these activities are conducted very cautiously, 
as many fear a strong backlash if they step over an invisible line. 
168
CONCLUSION
Under Suharto, the New Order politics and institutions attempted to force the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to assimilate into the indigenous society 
and maneuvered to weaken their dominance in  the economy, while continuing to 
practice legal segregation by referring to them as ‘non-indigenous’.  The Chinese 
become convenient targets of harassment, extortion, and discrimination. Periodic 
anti-Chinese violence in some form occurred in virtually every outbreak of social 
and political unrest during Suharto’s thirty-three years in power.
The main objective of this study is to understand how different sectors of the 
Chinese community in Yogyakarta accommodated the ‘Chinese problem’, i.e., how 
they responded: to the pressures for socio-cultural and economic assimilation, the 
pressures to narrow the economic gap, the negatives stereotypes of the Chinese, 
the insecurity caused by periodic outbreaks of anti-Chinese violence, and the 
political marginalisation and state discrimination, practised throughout the New 
Order period. This study focuses on the differential experiences, responses, and 
strategies adopted by Yogyakarta Chinese, to accommodate the local government 
and society and to assure safety in the face of constant threats of violence.
This study shows the diverse ways in which the Yogyakarta Chinese redefined 
their role and place in the Indonesian society, in their attempt to challenge the 
pressures to assimilate, to confront discrimination, and to overcome popular 
grievances towards them. What is most important in these findings is precisely 
the variety of the responses, the ways in which different sectors of the Chinese 
community constructed, negotiated and maintained their security, identities, 
social lives, economic interests, civic rights within their local community, and 
within society at large.
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In the economic sphere, the Yogyakarta Chinese businesspeople have 
organised themselves differently to accommodate to the local government, their 
competitors, their employees, and the society at large. While some big Chinese 
businesses still rely on the cukong system or conduct their business under the 
patronage of high-ranking government officials, many middle-size Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Yogyakarta prefer to detach themselves from the cronyism that 
was omnipresent during the New Order. They select business sectors that are not 
associated with government projects or need political protection. Nevertheless, 
in order to conduct their businesses, they sometimes cannot avoid paying bribes 
or bending the rules. In general, business competition between the Yogyakarta 
Chinese and indigenous entrepreneurs is not intense; there are few cases of 
direct economic competition between the two groups. There are some sectors 
in which the Chinese are dominant, such as cars and motorcycles retail, gold 
trade, and electronics. However, there are other businesses where they are weakly 
represented and in which indigenous firms are dominant, such as transportation, 
construction, hotels, and tourism-related businesses. It is also worth noting that 
Chinese businesspersons rarely, if ever, take over businesses that have traditionally 
been in the hands of indigenous entrepreneurs, such as batik and silvercraft.
During the more than thirty years in which the Chinese were being 
pressured to assimilate, both socially (by the indigenous society) and legally (by 
the government), they have, undoubtedly, evolved. Generally, they, especially the 
younger generation, have become ‘Indonesianised’.  However, the Yogyakarta 
Chinese are not united in the ways they respond to the pressures to assimilate. 
There are at least four categories of response: 1) natural assimilationists, those 
who believe that is natural for Chinese to eventually merge into the local 
community, and who identify themselves fully as Indonesian; 2) opportunistic 
assimilationists, those who support the process of assimilation primarily for 
the sake of avoiding difficulties and conducting their businesses, and assimilate 
merely on the surface level; 3) symbolic assimilationists, those who actually refuse 
to abandon their Chinese-ness, but have little option other than to comply with 
the state-sponsored assimilation pressures, and in order to avoid trouble, only 
superficially accept assimilation; 4) cosmopolitan assimilationists, those who 
feel totally Indonesian and see themselves as Indonesian citizens,  but define 
themselves with modern urban culture, not ethnically. The majority of Yogyakarta 
Chinese are natural assimilationists and cosmopolitan assimilationists. They are 
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less attached to Chinese culture or do not emphasise their Chinese-ness, but 
still perceive themselves as apart from the indigenous population. It is safe to 
say that assimilation has progressed in regards to political identification and 
social interaction, but not in the domains of religion, intermarriage, and ‘special 
association’, particularly funeral societies.
During the New Order period, the Yogyakarta Chinese, as was the case with 
Chinese throughout the country, were not politically active, although not always 
by personal choice. However, they did not completely withdraw from the political 
arena, but they were not in the spotlight. Chinese businesspeople channeled their 
aspirations and interests through personal ties with the authorities. The relationship 
between the Yogyakarta Chinese communities and the local government, notably 
the Sultan, have long been, marked with a patronage relationship, in which the 
Sultan guaranteed their security and the Chinese communities offered their 
loyalty  to him in return. In general, the Yogyakarta Chinese have maintained a 
low profile and law-abiding attitude. Even though they have been discriminated 
against in landownership rights since 1975, they have not taken legal action, 
political claim or strong protest against the local government, which is headed 
by the Sultan. 
Yogyakarta is a very special place. Indeed, that is is quite literally, so it 
has officially been designated as a Daerah Istimewa, Special Region, since the 
Revolution in the late 1940s. Its special administrative status is due to the fact 
that it served as the seat of the Republic of Indonesia government during the 
struggle for independence, and in honour of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX’s 
support throughout the revolution. The reigning Sultan, who has centuries of 
tradition behind him, also serves as the governor of the region. This means that 
Yogyakarta can exercise a considerable degree of autonomy from the national 
government in Jakarta.
The story of Yogyakarta Chinese and how they have accommodated to the 
local society reflects the relatively peaceful conditions in which they have lived 
for the past century. This study shows that the peaceful co-existence between the 
Chinese and indigenous communities has been the product of the cultivation of 
a mutual relationship that has been fostered by both sides. The absence of mass 
anti-Chinese riots in Yogyakarta during the New Order period was due not merely 
to the presence of Chinese who are better integrated into the mainstream society, 
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but to the mutual understanding in which ethnic violence is not an option. This 
study shows that the ethnic card has not been played in Yogyakarta.
Although anti-Chinese violence has never occurred in Yogyakarta, local 
middle-class and Chinese businesspeople were affected by the outbreaks elsewhere 
in Indonesia. The response of the Chinese in Yogyakarta to the contingencies of 
anti-Chinese violence was not an over-reaction. The feelings of insecurity and 
strategies employed to cope with these insecurities varied amongst different sectors 
of the Chinese community. On the one hand, there are long-term strategies that 
are preventive in nature, such as building social relationships and communication, 
as well as cooperation between Chinese and indigenous peoples. On the other 
hand, there are short-term strategies that are meant to deal with imminent threats, 
such as buying official protection and sponsoring charity programmes. Security, 
much more than large business profits, is the central objective of the majority of 
Chinese in Yogyakarta. While of the methods to attain this objective have varied, 
they remain focused on ‘safety first’.
This study underlines the importance of the local context in understanding 
not only the diversity in the accommodations of Yogyakarta Chinese, but also 
the diversity amongst the Chinese themselves, which has been a feature of their 
communities in the past and has presently become more pronounced. This study 
approaches the issue of accommodation amongst Yogyakarta Chinese, not just 
responses to actions from external sources, i.e., societal and government pressure, 
but as results of interplay between internal and external forces. The particular ways 
in which sections of the Chinese community accommodate to these pressures is 
influenced by the changes within the community itself, as well as shaped and 
affected by the local socio-political environment in which they live.
Early Change in the Reformasi Indonesia
Suharto’s resignation was seen by the Chinese as a turning point that would bring 
an end to their pariah status in the cultural and political spheres. It has enabled 
Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, to speak publically about anti-Chinese 
violence and discrimination. In this atmosphere of change, growing numbers of 
Chinese dared to speak out and express their Chinese-ness in a variety of forms 
and degrees of expression.
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In Yogyakarta, the natural assimilationists and cosmopolitan assimilationists 
showed little enthusiasm towards the Chinese cultural revival that emerged after 
1998. In their view, the revival has been overstated. The symbolic assimilationists 
and opportunistic assimilationists, however, passionately celebrated their new 
freedom and established Chinese associations to advance their cultural goals. 
There was diversity, however, in regards to which was the best way to voice their 
concerns; on the one hand, there were those who are overwhelmed by euphoria 
and emphasised celebrating the freedom to express Chinese culture, while, on 
the other hand, there were those who emphasised the rights of Chinese as a 
distinct suku and struggle against ethnic discrimination. They exposed the need 
to deconstruct the whole notion of Indonesian identity from which Chinese has 
often been excluded.
As the political situation changed during the power transition in 1998, 
the political accommodation of the Yogyakarta Chinese changed accordingly. 
Internal discussions have resulted in a new interpretation of pembauran, which 
is now framed in terms of social and political inclusion without the coercive uni-
directional implications of cultural and identity loss of the previous era.
Furthermore, a new consciousness developed among the Yogya karta Chinese 
in the post-Suharto era regarding the need for broadening their network. There 
was an effort to include Chinese culture as part of the local and national culture, 
in the sense that elements of Chinese traditions were no longer exclusively the 
property of the Chinese, but also belonged to the greater society and Indonesian 
culture. For example, a group of Chinese businesspeople, in conjunction with 
the local government, succeeded in introducing the traditional Chinese New Year 
festival, Cap Gomeh,269 as an annual event to promote tourism.
Another post-Suharto change took place in regards to strategies of coping 
with insecurity. During the New Order, the Chinese relied primarily on the 
military for their protection. In Reformasi Indonesia, they attempted to gain 
support of the wider local community. They began to establish alliances with 
NGOs, student organisations, and inter-religious groups.
Early changes in the Yogyakarta Chinese communities indicate their 
reluctance to stand alone as a group in demanding their rights as full citizens. 
269 Cap Gomeh is a festival, which is held fifteen days after Chinese New Year, as a closing ce lebration.
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The continuing lack of security and their dependence on the authorities inhibits 
a truly open discourse on the economic, social and political role of Chinese in the 
nation. To some extent, they are still seen as essentially as ‘outsiders’ or  ‘visitors’ 
by the government and indigenous people, and, as such, they are hesitant to 
over-react.
It appears that the Yogyakarta Chinese do not want to risk their relatively 
secure situation, which they have enjoyed for many decades, by overstepping 
undrawn boundaries while exploring their new freedom and bargaining for their 
rights. Living under ‘the umbrella of the court’, the Yogyakarta Chinese are caught 
in a dilemma between their desire to voice a claim for cultural autonomy and 
their desire to suppress their differences out of loyalty and respect for the Sultan.
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Appendix I
Yogyakarta, 5 Maret 1975
KEPALA DAERAH
DAERAH ISTIMEWA YOGYAKARTA
Nomor :   K.898/I/A/1975
Lampiran :  
Perihal :   Penyeragaman Policy
     Pemberian Hak atas Tanah
     kepada seorang WNI non Pribumi
Kepada :
Yth. Bupati/Walikota Kepala Daerah
Seluruh Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
INSTRUKSI
Sebagaimana diketahui policy Pemerintah Daerah Daerah Isti mewa 
Yogyakarta hingga sekarang belum memberikan hal milik atas tanah kepada 
seorang Warganegara Indonesia non Pribumi yang memerlukan tanah.
Guna penyeragaman policy pemberian hak atas tanah dalam wilaha Daerah 
Istimewa Yogyakarta kepada seorang Warganegara Indonesia non Pribumi, 
dengan ini diminta:
Apabila ada seorang Warganegara Indonesia non Pribumi mem beli tanah 
hak milik rakyat, hendaknya diproseskan sebagaimana biasa, ialah dengan melalui 
pelepasan hak, sehingga tanahnya kembali menjadi tanah Negara yang dikuasai 
langsung oleh Pemerintah Daerah DIY dan kemudian yang berkepentingan/
melepaskan su paya mengajukan permohonan kepada Kepada Daerah DIY untuk 
mendapatkan sesuatu hak.
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Kemudian hendaknya menjadikan perhatian dan dilaksanakan sebagaimana 
mestinya.
 Wakil Kepala Daerah 
  Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta
 Cap ttd.
 PAKU ALAM VIII
 
Tembusan disampaikan kepada:
1. Ketua DPRD DIY
2. Ketua DPRD Kodya Yogyakarta
3. Kepala Dit.Agraria DIY
4. Kepala Sub Dit. Pemerintahan Pemda Kodya Yk
5. Kepala Kantor Perundang-undangan dan Tata Hukum DIY
6. Kepala Kantor Urusan Kodya Yogyakarta
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Appendix II
The Head of the Special Region of Yogyakarta
Instruction No: K.898/I/A/1975
On Standardised Policy in Granting Land Ownership Non-Indigenous to Indonesian 
citizen 
To: Head of regencies and Municipality in the Special Region of Yogyakarta
It is the policy of the Yogyakarta government to the present, to not grant rights of 
landownership to a non-indigenous Indonesian citizen, who needs a land.
In order to standardise the policy in granting landownership rights in the Special 
Region of Yogyakarta to a non-indigenous Indonesian citizen, the instruction are:
If a non-indigenous Indonesian citizen purchases a land that belongs to the people, 
it shall be processed as usual, that is by transferring the status of the land to regional state-
ownership, and then apply to the head the Special Region of Yogyakartafor for certain 
rights.
It must be acknowledged and implemented as is.
Issued in Yogyakarta on 5 March 1975
Vice Governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta
Signed
PAKU ALAM VIII
Cc:
Head of Regional Parliament1. 
Head of Municipal Parliament2. 
Head of Department of Land Use3. 
Head of Sub-Department of the Municipal Government4. 
Head of Yogyakarta Legislation Office5. 
Head of Yogyakarta Municipality Affairs Office6. 
(translation) 
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Glossary
arisan  rotating credit group
asing   foreign, alien
asli  native, indigenous
asimilasi assimilation
bakpia Chinese snack
balik nama transferring ownership
becak tricycle pedicab
bupati head of regency
buruh worker, employee, labourer
cina  Chinese
cukong  Chinese big businessperson 
dagang trade
ekonomi lemah  economically-weak group
ekonomi kuat  economically-strong group
gamelan  traditional Javanese music ensemble
hak milik  landownership rights
hak guna bangunan rights to use land/building on state-owned land
haji  one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
hash club jogging club
hui Chinese rotating credit group
kabupaten  regency
kampung  urban neighbourhood
kebatinan Javanese religion
kecamatan  sub-district
kekeluargaan familism, relationship similar to ties within a family
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kerukunan harmony
keturunan  descendant
klenteng  Chinese temple
kraton sultan’s palace
paguyuban association
pancasila five basic principles, state ideology
pecinan  Chinese quarter
pembauran  assimilation
pembauran ekonomi economic assimilation
pendapatan daerah local government income
peranakan Indonesian-born – acculturated Chinese
pesantren  Islamic boarding school
preman thug, hoodlum, gangster
pribumi  indigenous Indonesian
reformasi reform movement
ronda  guard patrol
suku  ethnic group
surat sakti letter from powerful officer
tionghoa  Chinese
toko  shop or store
totok  China-born Chinese, culturally China-oriented
warung  small shop or food stall
WNI Keturunan Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent
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Abbreviations
Bakom-PKB Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa, Com mu-
nication Body for the Appreciation of National Unity
Baperki Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Con sul-
tative Body for Indonesian Citizenship
BPS Badan Pusat Statistik, Central Bureau of Statistics
BUMN Badan Usaha Milik Negara, State-owned Enterprise
DIY Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, Special Region of Yogyakarta
DPA Dewan Pertimbangan Agung, National Advisory Council
Golkar Golongan Karya, Functional Groups (ruling party in the Suharto 
New Order)
HGB Hak Guna Bangunan, rights to buid on a land
IKIP Institute Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan, Teacher College
INTI Perkumpulan Indonesia-Tionghoa, Indonesian-Chinese Associa-
tion
Kadin Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry
Krismon Krisis moneter, monetary crisis of 1997-98
KPB Kantor Pertanahan Bantul, Land Office of Bantul
KTP Kartu Tanda Penduduk, identity card
LPKB Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa, Institute of the Promotion 
of National Unity
Pakto Paket Oktober, October package of bank reforms
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Pamitra  Paguyuban Mitra Masyarakat, Society Partner Asso ciation
PAN Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party
PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, Awekening Nation Party
PDI-P Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic 
Party of Struggle
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party
PITI Perkumpulan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia, Chinese Muslim 
Association
PP Peraturan Pemerintah, Government Regulation
PPKLM Paguyuban Pengusaha Kaki Lima Malioboro, Association of 
Malioboro Sidewalks Traders
PPM Paguyuban Pengusaha Malioboro, Malioboro Entre preneurs 
Association
PTI Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, Indonesian Chinese Party
PTUN Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara, State Administration Court
PUKY Perkumpulan Urusan Kematian Yogyakarta
RT Rukun Tetangga, the smallest neighbourhood association, section 
of RW
RW Rukun Warga, neighbourhood association
Sembako Sembilan bahan pokok, nine basic necessities
SBKRI Surat Bukti Kewarganegaran Republic Indonesia, Indonesan 
Citizenship Certificate
SCUT Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina, Special Staff for Chinese Affairs
SMA Sekolah Menengah Atas, Senior High School
SNPC Sekolah Nasional Projek Chusus, Special Project National 
School
THHK Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan, Chinese Association
UMR Upah Minimum Regional, Regional Minimum Wage
UUPA Undang Undang Pokok Agraria, Basic Agrarian Laws
WNI Warga Negara Indonesia, Indonesian citizen
WNA Warga Negara Asing, foreign citizen 
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SAMENVATTING
De etnische Chinesen in  Indonesië hebben door de eeuwen heen  verschillende vormen van discriminatie ervaren. Ze worden veelal beschouwd als 
‘vreemde’ landgenoten, als inwoners van ‘vreemde’ afkomst. Daardoor hebben ze 
een bijzonder zwakke positie en zijn ze een gemakkelijk doelwit van belediging, 
afpersing en discriminatie. Tijdens de regeringsperiode van Suharto, de Nieuwe 
Orde of Orde Baru, was het overheidsbeleid gericht op totale assimilatie van de 
Chinezen en het ondermijnen van hun economische overheersing. Het beleid 
ging gepaard met anti-Chinese uitbarstingen en sociale onlusten gedurende de 
ruim drie decennia lange bewind van Suharto.
Deze studie laat zien, dat de etnische Chinezen in Jogjakarta op verschillende 
manieren hebben gereageerd op de gedwongen assimilatie, de discriminatie, de 
stereotypering en de negatieve houding van anderen. Ze hebben op verschillende 
wijzen geprobeerd veiligheid te bewerkstelligen en hun rol en positie in de 
Indonesische maatschappij zeker te stellen. Daarbij hielden ze voortdurend 
rekening met de sociale verhoudingen, economische belangen en politieke 
oriëntaties in zowel de eigen gemeenschap als in de wijdere samenleving.
In de economische sfeer hebben de etnische Chinezen in Jogjakarta 
te maken met lokale ambtenaren, autochtone concurrenten, werknemers 
en lokale bevolkingsgroepen, waarop zij verschillend reageren. Terwijl een 
aantal grote Chinese ondernemers tijdens de Orde Baru zaken deed met hoge 
regeringsfunctionarissen en deze zelfs bij hun activiteiten betrok, kozen de 
Chinese ondernemers in het midden- en kleinbedrijf er over het algemeen voor 
zich zoveel mogelijk afzijdig te houden van de vriendjespolitiek die de Orde 
Baru kenmerkte. Het verkrijgen van regeringsprojecten of de bescherming van 
regeringsambtenaren is voor het midden- en kleinbedrijf van minder belang. 
Dat betekende echter niet dat de kleine en middelgrote Chinese ondernemer 
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gevrijwaard was van corrupte praktijken, zoals het betalen van steekpenningen en 
het ontduiken van de officiële regelgeving. 
Uit de verzamelde gegevens blijkt dat de concurrentie tussen Chinese en niet 
Chinese ondernemers niet zo hevig is als gewoonlijk wordt verondersteld. Beide 
groepen ontplooien onderscheiden economische activiteiten op verschillende 
niveaus. Ofschoon veel Chinese ondernemers er niet voor voelen om samen te 
werken met autochtone Indonesische ondernemers en tussenpersonen, komt het 
in de praktijk regelmatig voor. Ook bij het kiezen van administratief personeel 
blijken verschillende voorkeuren en praktijken te bestaan. Zo zijn er Chinese 
ondernemers die de voorkeur geven aan professionaliteit, zonder te letten op 
etniciteit of godsdienst, maar er zijn er ook die meer vertrouwen hebben in 
personeel dat christen is en geen moslim. Daarentegen zijn er ook Chinese 
ondernemers die met opzet kiezen voor islamitisch personeel. 
Al meer dan 30 jaar ervaren de etnische Chinezen een sociale en politieke 
druk om zich totaal te assimileren in de Indonesische maatschappij. Er is, zoals 
gezegd, een duidelijk onderscheid waarneembaar in de wijze waarop Chinezen 
met deze pressie omgaan. Uit het empirisch materiaal komen ruwweg vier 
verschillende vormen van assimilatie in Jogjakarta naar voren: 
1.   De natuurlijke assimilationisten (natural assimilationists): zij die zich 
nadrukkelijk identificeren met autochtone Indonesiërs en geloven dat 
de vermenging van de etnische Chinezen met de lokale bevolking iets 
is dat uiteindelijk op natuurlijke wijze zal plaats vinden. 
2. De opportunistische assimilationisten (opportunistic assimila tio nists): zij 
die het assimilatieproces kiezen en steunen als middel om moeilijkheden 
te voorkomen en de weg te effenen voor hun zakenlijke belangen. Ze 
assimileren zich met andere woorden door een masker op te zetten. 
3.   De symbolische assimilationisten (symbolic assimilationists): zij die 
eigenlijk weigeren om hun Chinese identiteit los te laten, maar niet 
durven tegen te stribbelen.  Om een slechtere behandeling te voorkomen 
zien ze geen andere mogelijkheid dan het sluiten van compromissen. 
Ze passen zich alleen uiterlijk aan. 
4. De kosmopolitische assimilationisten (cosmopolitan assimila tionists): zij 
die zich al ten volle Indonesisch burger voelen. Zij vereenzelvigen zich 
niet met de lokale cultuur, maar identificeren zich met de cultuur van 
de moderne stad. 
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Het grootste gedeelte van de etnische Chinezen in Jogjakarta valt onder 
de eerste en vierde categorie. Zij voelen zich niet overmatig aangetrokken tot de 
Chinese samenleving en cultuur, maar vinden dat ze zich nog wel onderscheiden van 
andere Indonesiërs. Over het algemeen voelt de jongere generatie zich meer 
Indonesisch dan de oudere.
De Orde Baru verbood maatschappelijke organisaties op basis van Chinese 
afkomst. Dat betekende echter geenszins dat Chinezen zich niet op etnische basis 
organiseerden. Ze richtten in Jogjakarta organisaties op waarvan het algemene doel 
werd geformuleerd in overeenstemming met de Pancasila, de nationale ideologie 
van de Indonesische staat. Het bevorderen van het algemeen welzijn van de leden 
stond voorop en het lidmaatschap stond in principe voor iedereen open, ook 
voor leden van andere bevolkingsgroepen. Ofschoon deze nieuwe organisaties 
geen  Chinese naam hadden en officieel niet alleen voor Chinezen bedoeld waren, 
bestond het bestuur en het ledenbestand in de praktijk evenwel bijna uitsluitend 
uit Chinezen. Voor hen was niet zozeer de naam van de organisatie belangrijk, 
als wel het feit dat er een plek was waar ze samen konden komen om Chinese 
sociaal-culturele activiteiten te kunnen ontplooien. Het waren vooral de ouderen 
die zich zo organiseerden. De jongere generatie Chinezen voelt zich niet meer 
aangetrokken tot een organisatie op grond van etniciteit. Chinezen van de hoge- 
en middenklasse kiezen bij voorkeur voor professionele organisaties met een 
multi-etnische samenstelling, die meer aanzien hebben in de samenleving.
Eén van de uitkomsten van deze studie is dat assimilatie vooral plaats 
heeft op het terrein van politieke en sociale interactie en niet zozeer wat betreft 
godsdienst, inter-etnische huwelijken en het verenigingsleven. Tijdens de Orde 
Baru  werden Indonesiërs van Chinese afkomst uit politieke instituties geweerd. 
Deze belemmering om aan de officiële politiek deel te nemen, betekende echter 
niet dat ze geen politieke invloed hadden. De grote ondernemers onder de etnische 
Chinezen kanaliseren hun aspiraties en belangen via persoonlijke kontakten met 
hoge regeringsfunctionarissen.  In Jogjakarta geniet de Chinese gemeenschap 
bovendien al eeuwen lang de bescherming van de sultan. De sultan, die thans ook 
de lokale overheid leidt, waarborgt tot op de dag van vandaag de veiligheid van 
de Chinese gemeenschap. De Chinese gemeenschap beantwoordt dit vertrouwen 
met een onvoorwaardelijke loyaliteit aan het vorstenhuis van Jogjakarta. Ze 
ziet er zelfs hun aangedaan onrecht voor door de vingers. Discriminatie op het 
gebied van grondeigendom heeft dan ook jarenlang niet geleid tot protesten of 
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rechtszaken tegen de lokale overheid. Pas na de reformatie die optrad na het 
aftreden van Suharto is hierin verandering gekomen. 
Wat de religieuze affiliatie betreft, blijkt dat de meeste Chinezen hebben 
gekozen voor het christelijke geloof.  Deze tendens kan tot op zekere hoogte 
geïnterpreteerd worden als een afwijzing van de druk om te assimileren in de 
Indonesische maatschappij, die immers voor het overgrote deel uit moslims 
bestaat. Slechts een minderheid van de etnische Chinezen in Jogjakarta kiest voor 
de islam. Ze geloven dat ze daardoor meer geaccepteerd worden door de lokale 
gemeenschap, hetgeen hen een gevoel van veiligheid verschaft. 
De wijze van aanpassen van de Chinezen wordt bepaald door zowel lokale als 
nationale condities. Tegelijkertijd is de diversiteit van de assimilatie in Jogjakarta 
niet te begrijpen zonder een begrip van de lokale en nationale verscheidenheid 
binnen de Chinese gemeenschap in Jogjakarta en Indonesië. Het is van belang 
‘Chinese assimilatie’ niet te percipiëren als een uniforme, gemeenschappelijke 
reactie op invloed van buiten, maar oog te hebben voor interne verschillen, 
opvattingen en strategieën. De situatie van de Chinezen in Jogjakarta wordt in 
belangrijke mate bepaald door het gegeven dat Jogjakarta een speciaal gebied is, een 
daerah istimewa, dat een hoge mate van bestuurlijke autonomie bezit.  De eeuwen 
oude goede verstandhouding tussen de sultan en de Chinese gemeenschap heeft 
ertoe geleid dat de relatie tussen allochtonen en autochtonen vreedzamer is dan 
in andere lokaties in Indonesië. Desalniettemin bestaan er in Chinese kring ter 
plaatse verschillende opvattingen over vreedzaam samenleven en samenwerken.
De harmonieuse co-existentie van Chinezen  en andere lokale 
bevolkingsgroepen is de vrucht van wederzijdse waardering, die in de loop der 
eeuwen geleidelijk is gegroeid. Ze heeft er in belangrijke mate toe bijgedragen 
dat er tijdens de Orde Baru geen massale anti-Chinese onlusten in Jogjakarta 
optraden. Desalniettemin hebben onlusten in andere steden het Chinese 
veiligheidsgevoel in Jogjakarta wel degelijk beïnvloed. Onveiligheid werd binnen 
de Chinese gemeenschap op verschillende wijzen ervaren en ook de wijze waarop 
met dat gevoel werd omgegaan kent vele variaties. Aan de ene kant zijn er Chinese 
inwoners die om redenen van preventie kiezen voor een strategie op lange termijn, 
door bijvoorbeeld diverse vormen van samenwerking met de lokale bevolking aan 
te gaan. Aan de andere kant zijn er Chinezen die om dezelfde redenen korte 
termijn of ad hoc strategieën prefereren, door bijvoorbeeld veiligheid te kopen van 
regeringsambtenaren en legerautoriteiten of tijdelijke liefdadigheidsprogramma’s 
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op te zetten. Hoe verschillend de strategieën ook zijn, ze hebben maar één 
doelstelling: veiligheid.
De val van de regering Suharto heeft voor de etnische Chinezen in Indonesië 
gunstige  politieke en sociaal-culturele gevolgen gehad. Ze kregen tot op zekere 
hoogte de vrijheid terug om hun Chinese identiteit tot uitdrukking te brengen en 
de ervaren discriminatie tijdens de Orde Baru ter discussie te stellen.  De reacties 
op de herwonnen vrijheden zijn verschillend. In Jogjakarta zijn de natuurlijke 
en kosmopolitische assimilationisten  niet zo gelukkig met de opleving van 
de Chinese cultuur. De symbolische en de opportunistische assimilationisten 
daarentegen zijn zeer enthousiast over de mogelijkheden Chinese gebruiken en 
rituelen opnieuw in te voeren. Onderling verschil is ook te constateren in de 
doeleinden waarvoor de nieuwe vrijheid gebruikt wordt. Sommigen zetten zich in 
voor het herstel van het Chinese erfgoed, anderen voor de juridische gelijkstelling 
van hun bevolkingsgroep. 
Om hiervoor meer steun vanuit de samenleving te krijgen, trachten Chinese 
activisten de sociale contacten met de wijdere samenleving te vergroten en 
intensiveren, bijvoorbeeld door deelname aan algemene sociale organisaties en 
door samenwerking met andere lokale organisaties. Tegelijkertijd spannen ze zich 
in voor het accepteren van de Chinese cultuur als onderdeel van de nationale of 
lokale cultuur.
Ondanks de veranderingen die de Chinese gemeenschap van Jogjakarta 
doormaakt, zijn de leden op hun hoede om zich als etnische groep te manifesteren 
en hun rechten als volledig staatsburgers op te eisen. Het gevoel van onveiligheid 
en afhankelijkheid van de bescherming van de machthebbers is nog lang niet 
verdwenen. Om die redenen aarzelen ze om zich publiekelijk over onrecht te 
uiten en tot acties over te gaan. De Chinezen in Jogjakarta willen de veiligheid die 
ze al gedurende eeuwen genieten niet in de waagschaal stellen door te ver te gaan 
in hun eisen. Onder de paraplu van de kraton, het paleis van de sultan, zitten de 
etnische Chinezen nog steeds gevangen in het dilemma tussen aan de ene kant 
het streven naar volledige burgerrechten en het behoud van hun cultuur, en aan 
de andere kant het verlangen hun trouw en eerbied aan de sultan te tonen.
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